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Africa: Most Vulnerable Continent to COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Marshal Olal Johnson LIMONG 
marshalolal@gmail.com 
 
Abstract: African governments have responded swiftly and courageously to the 
Coronavirus pandemic. However, the African continent remained extremely 
vulnerable to COVID-19 due to the social nature, attitudes and behaviours that 
constitute the mindsets of the people. Africa also has weak health systems with 
limited testing capacity, doctors, few ventilators and Intensive Care Units (ICU). The 
continent faces stagnant economic growth due to conflict, loss of revenue due to 
lockdown and lack of transparency and accountability. Although the African 
continent is spared and not hit hardest by COVID-19 as had been predicted earlier, 
the continent will find it very hard to re-emerge from this crisis. International 
cooperation and solidarity are central to recovery to address the long-term impact 
of COVID-19. 
Key words: African vulnerability, COVID-19 Pandemic, African social nature, 




This paper aims to contribute actively to the ongoing debate about the 
vulnerability of African continent to COVID-19. It seeks to provide a broad 
view of the vulnerability of the African continent to the COVID-19 pandemic 
and explore the issues related to Africa, globalisation and perspectives of 
International cooperation with the European Union and China in a post 
COVID-19 world to enable Africa to resurface out of the crisis. Without 
renewed integration and global cooperation, Africa will be more vulnerable 
to Coronavirus and its aftermath. 
The method used by the researcher to accomplish the goal of the study is to 
review works and articles published by experts and international institutions 
such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Health Organization 
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Africa (HOA), Centres for disease control and prevention (CDCP), Africa 
Centres for Disease Control and prevention (ACDCP), OECD countries, IMF, 
World Bank and other authentic sources including research conducted in 
Juba, South Sudan on COVID-19 focusing on the vulnerability of the African 
continent to the pandemic. The articles were chosen based on how they 
contribute to the understanding of the vulnerability of the African continent 
to COVIID-19 and how Africa can rebound back out of the crises.  
COVID-19 has affected all the seven continents and the world recorded 
cases of Coronavirus stand at 13,464,486, with 581,392 deaths and 7, 
84,908 recoveries as by the date of 15 July 2020.1 Africa’s recorded cases of 
Coronavirus stands at 594,955 cases, 13,246 deaths and 295,242 recoveries 
as by the date 13 July 2020.2 
The social distancing method, identified by the scientific world as the best 
means of preventing the spread of Covid-19, goes against the very social 
nature of the African way of life. Self-isolation becomes extremely difficult 
due to house density. Coupled with the high rate of illiteracy in some parts 
of Africa, the majority of Africans do not reason in a scientific way but the 
mindsets are magical, mythical and people live in the condition of fatalism. 
The state of their mindsets conditions their attitudes and behaviors that 
could make Africa more vulnerable to COVID-19. 
Africa is the poorest continent with weak health systems and low number of 
doctors, nurses, intensive care units, testing kits and ventilators.  
Social and Cultural Challenges 
Africans are very social by nature and that could make the populations 
extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. For them, spending time together with 
                                                          
1
 Worldometer, “COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2020, <https://www.worldomters.info/coronavirus/ 
?utm_campaign=homeAdvegas1?> (accessed 15 July 2020). 
2
 Africa News, “Africa COVID-19 Stats,” 2020, <https://www.africanews.com/2020/07/13/ 
coronavirus-africa-breakdown-of-infected-virus-free-countries> (accessed 13 July 2020). 
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others is the normal order of the day. Gilles Yabi, founder of the West 
African Think Tank Wathi, said that in African cultures, family gatherings and 
big crowds go hand in hand, and that the sick are treated and revered not in 
isolation, which could make self-isolation difficult, if not impossible.3 The 
precautionary measures designed by the WHO, to slow the spread of COVID-
19 and guarantee that health systems are not overwhelmed at any one 
point in time do not reflect the reality of African society and of context 
specific challenges. They make “socio-cultural norms and values at the 
centre of African society now face severe risk of disappearing into 
oblivion.”4 It could have long term implications in terms of pulling together 
and social harmony. In South Sudan, people continue to ignore government 
restrictions on public gatherings for social purposes such as funerals, 
marriages, bars, and open markets, where huge gathering of people 
continue to take place. 
The measures designed to avoid handshake is very challenging to maintain 
in the African context. Restraining people from hands shaking is very tough 
because it is imperative and deeply rooted in the cultural life and behaviour 
of people. A strong handshake, while looking in the eye of each other, is the 
daily practice that people never get tired doing it. It is a culturally enshrined 
practice in African traditional setting that is difficult to temper with. 
Declining to shake hands presented can be negatively interpreted by the 
other person as a sign of cultural disrespect. 
Lockdown is challenging because many heads of households are street 
venders or workers who rely on a daily wages to earn their living. Complete 
lockdown could make them lose their income from one day to the next. 
About 86% of the population works in the informal sector without contract 
                                                          
3
 Christine Okello, “Social Distancing Putts Africa’s Norms to the Test,” RFI, 25 March 2020, 
<www.rfi/en/africa/20200325-africa-coronavirus-social-distancing> (accessed 25 March 
2020). 
4
 Faruk Zorlu, “No Clear View for COVID-19 On Return to Normal in 2021,” Anadolu Agency, 
30 June 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/latest-on-ccoronaviruus-outbreak/no-clear-view 
-for-covid-19-on-return-to-normal-in-2021> (accessed 30 June 2020).  
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of any kind, lacking unemployment insurance or the possibility of continued 
salary payments if work suddenly stops. Lockdown is very devastating on 
poor people’s ability to put food on the table and stay healthy.5 African 
people continue to defy government orders to stay at home and observe 
total lockdown because greater parts of the populations are economically 
poor, lack basic necessities of life and are obliged to move out of the house 
each morning to earn their living to avoid starvation. The order to stay at 
home is likened to a death verdict. It is equated to asking people to willingly 
starve as a majority of governments in Africa are unable to provide food and 
clean water to every single household each day. The research conducted by 
the University of Juba in partnership with United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) found that the majority of households could not afford 
buying basic food necessity in bulk and storing them at home. 82% of 
households do not have food to sustain them for a week in case of lockdown 
and 93% of households purchase foods from the market on a daily basis.6 
The closing of national borders face difficulty because these borders were 
arbitrarily drawn during the colonial era, and they exist only in theory for 
many communities living along these boundaries. They are simply equated 
to Google maps. Trade and family ties had been established before 
colonialism and they persist. People circumvent official border posts and 
choose so-called irregular crossing points, spotted across hundreds of 
kilometers, which abound even over rivers and lakes.7 
The presence of people living in unfavourable conditions in major cities also 
makes Africa extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. The physical infrastructures 
                                                          
5
 Isabel Gunther, “Why Social Distancing is a Big Challenge in Many African Countries,” 20 
April 2020, <https://phys.org/news/2020-04-social-distancing-big-african-countries.html/> 
(accessed 20 April 2020). 
6
 University of Juba, Gender and Socio-Economic Impact Assessments of COVID-19 
Pandemic, Juba, 30 April 2020.  
7
 Karsten Noko, “In Africa, Social Distancing is a Privilege few can Afford,” Al Jazeera, 22 
March 2020, <https://www.ajjezeera.com/indepth/opinion/africa-social-distancing-
privilege-afford-200318151958670> (accessed 22 March 2020). 
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of many African cities are made of slum, informal settlements and are 
extraordinarily overcrowded. Such congestion of human settlements in 
capital cities create conditions where the virus can spread rapidly, 
undetected, and with a high level of vulnerability. The influenza 
transmission rate in India had been found to increase above a population 
density of 282 people per square kilometers but the density of many built-
up areas in Africa is over five times this verge. In the case of South Sudan, 
inhabited areas average 8,730 people per square kilometer.8 The research 
conducted by the University of Juba in partnership with UNDP in Juba 
Municipality showed that people live in a very close proximity with each 
other. It estimated that 8 persons per household, and per compound 12 
persons, the area with the highest density is Juba Nabari East with 27 
persons per compound.9 Logically and ethically, it is unthinkable that self-
quarantine could take place in such confinement. In “Places like Alexandra in 
Johannesburg, over 700,000 people are estimated to live in less than 5 
square kilometer (1.9 square miles), Mbare in Harare 800,000 people, Kibera 
in Nairobi at least 250,000 and Makoko in Lagos over 300,000 people.”10 
Conflicts, climate change and natural disasters have pushed millions of 
Africans all over the continent living as refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons in overcrowded camps, in unfavourable conditions with poor 
sanitation that could make those sites breeding places for Coronavirus. In 
such camps social distancing remains a myth. Indeed, conflicts make the 
African continent very vulnerable to COVID-19 as conflict disrupts public 
health systems. 85% of Africa’s 25million forcefully displaced persons are 
concentrated in eight countries: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
                                                          
8
 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Mapping Risk Factors for the Spread of COVID-19 in 
Africa,” 3 April 2020, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-risk-factors-spread-covid-
19-africa/> (accessed 13 May 2020). 
9
 University of Juba, Gender and Socio-Economic Impact Assessments of COVID-19 
Pandemic. 
10
 Noko, “In Africa, Social Distancing is a Privilege few can Afford.” 
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South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African Republic 
and Cameroon.11 
The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention stated that limiting face to 
face contact with others or keeping space between you and others is one of 
the best tools to avoid being exposed to the COVID-19 and slowing its 
spread locally and across the country and the World.12 Self-quarantine 
recommended by the WHO included advice for people not to share 
bathrooms, living space and even bedrooms. However, self-isolation or 
quarantine is impracticable as people live in shared bedrooms with 
communal toilets shared with a dozen other families. There is no space to 
rest and relax for an individual. “If you live in township, making a living in 
the informal sector or travel on a crowded bus, how can you self-
quarantine? It is difficult to avoid being infected on cramped public 
transport on their way to a meager-paying job that often help them to live 
hand to mouth.”13 
Poor communication systems make many citizens unable to acquire the 
right information about COVID-19. There is limited sharing of transparent 
information. In Africa, generally, people have higher trust in religious leaders 
than in their governments. This leads certain pastors to initiate 
disinformation campaigns that challenge not only the existence of 
Coronavirus itself but also the measures designed by WHO. They easily instill 
wrong ideas in the minds of their faithful to believe that Coronavirus is a 
myth, and if it exists, it is only God who choose who will be infected by and 
die from the disease.  
                                                          
11
 Shabir Ahmad Lone and Ahmad Aijaz, “COVID-19 Pandemic – An African Perspective,” 
Emerging Microbes and Infection Journal 9, 1 (2020): 1300-1308, <https://www.tandf 
online.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2020.1775132> (accessed 15 June 2020). 
12
 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” 
2020. 
13
 Noko, “In Africa, Social Distancing is a Privilege few can Afford.” 
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Many African people believe that Coronavirus can only be eradicated by 
faith, witchcraft or other traditional means.14 Some people even believe in 
conducting traditional rituals for cursing the COVID-19 evil spirit. Based on 
such mindset, people continue to disregard health guidelines provided by 
their government. Despite the knowledge of the ways Coronavirus spreads 
and the protection measures, people continue with the same lifestyles, 
practices, attitudes and behaviours. This type of reasoning makes it 
extremely difficult to convince people to accept that God has endowed 
human beings with the intelligence and capacity to make decisions for 
themselves and manage their lives. 
Weak Health Systems 
The continent’s health system capacity has a big role in COVID-19 
management and control. Weak healthcare systems are a huge constraint to 
African governments in fighting the pandemic. Limited resources coupled 
with corruption diverts resources that could be invested in health care 
systems. “COVID-19 possesses a great danger to African countries that do 
not have proper and robust health infrastructures.”15 Africa, as the poorest 
continent in the world with a population of 1.2 billion, has no or inadequate 
intensive care units, few ventilators, hospital staff lacking protective 
equipment for personal protection. “While western nations are in panic 
reporting that thousands of ventilators will not be enough, countries in 
Africa report of few number: Zimbabwe, less than 20, Khartoum not more 
than 80, Nigeria with a population of 300 million, fewer than 500, the 
Central African Republic 3, Liberia does not have any ventilator.”16 
                                                          
14
 UNESCO, “Socio-Economic and Cultural Impact of COVID-19 on Africa: UNESCO 
Response,” 2020, <https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/stand_alone_executive_sum 
mary_fin.pdf> (no access date). 
15
 Kaan Devecioglu, “Analysiss-COVID-19 Pandemics: Great Danger Awaits Africa,” Anadolu 
Agency, 2 April 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-covid-19-pandemic-great-
danger-awaits-africa/1789840> (accessed 2 April 2020). 
16
 Ibid. 
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South Sudan, with a population of 12 million people, has only 4 ventilators 
and 24 ICU beds. This could mean South Sudan has just one ventilator for 
every three million people. It could also mean one ICU bed for 500,000 
people that could be seriously overwhelmed if all the cases were to be 
treated there. The Central African Republic has 3 ventilators for its five 
million people. Burkina Faso has 11 ventilators, Sierra Leone 13. There are 
fewer than 2,000 functional ventilators in 41 African countries and the total 
number of available intensive care unit beds in 43 countries is less than 
5,000. Ten countries in Africa are without ventilators.17 In practice, many of 
those founded infected by COVID-19 are sent back home for self-quarantine. 
The coming home of those infected to the overcrowded family and 
community could facilitate the spread of the pandemic to each person 
confine with the infected person. 
The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies pointed out that the capacity of 
public health systems to test for COVID-19, especially in the densely 
populated areas, was essential for identifying, isolating and treating those 
infected.18 However, collecting cases rapidly, separating them to curtail 
transmission, treating them and tracing their contacts were not efficient as 
most governments and politicians in Africa were not really concerned about 
their citizens but rather on their own interests.19 
Many African countries face serious challenge of availability of medical 
doctors. “Overall Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest number of doctors. In 
                                                          
17
 Bhavya Sukheja, “South Sudan has 4 Ventilators, 24 Beds for Population of 12 million 
People: Report,” Republic, 19 April 2020, <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/ 
rest-of-the-world-new/covid-19-crisis-south-sudan-has-4-ventilators-24-icu-beds-for-a-po 
pulation-of-12-m-people> (accessed 19 April 2020). 
18
 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Mapping Risk Factors for the Spread of COVID-19 in 
Africa.” 
19
 Anne Soy, “Africa v Coronavirus: A Challenge for the Continent,” BBC, 14 March 2020, 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51873514> (accessed 14 March 2020). 
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Zambia, the ratio is one doctor per every 10,000 people.”20 It is not just the 
question of insufficient numbers of doctors, but it is also about their 
protection. Many health care workers are not protected as they lack 
personal protection equipment. They risk their lives in the service of their 
society.  However, “protecting health workers is an essential critical priority 
for countries with relatively weaker health systems as those practitioners 
are integral to maintaining the capacity for these health services.”21 
A huge number of people on the African continent have high prevalence of 
malnutrition, anemia, malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, hepatitis B or C, high 
blood pressure, diabetes that could compromise the immune system of the 
people and create high risk. The World Health Organisation estimated that 
there are 26 million people infected with HIV, 205 million with tuberculosis, 
79 million with hepatitis B or C and 213 million with malaria in the African 
Region. The non-communicable diseases that include cardiovascular 
diseases, cancer, chronic respiratory diseases are also high in Africa.22 
The policymakers’ responses to the Covid-19 pandemic crises and its 
management remained a real challenge to African leaders. Some remarked 
that when the outbreak of Coronavirus was reported in December 2019 in 
Wuhan, China, African governments did not take the threat seriously as they 
thought that the virus would be confined to China. In spite of the fact that 
the majority of Western Countries banned planes from specific cities in Asia 
from landing at their airports, some African countries continued allowing 
flight from China landing at their airports due to unavoidable circumstances 
                                                          
20
 Anne Soy, “Lack of COVID-19 Testing Undermines Africa’s Success,” BBC, 27 May 2020, 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52801190> (accessed 27 May 2020). 
21
 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Mapping Risk Factors for the Spread of COVID-19 in 
Africa.” 
22
 World Health Organisation Africa, “COVID-19 Cases Coronavirus Disease Top 10,000 in 
Africa,” 7 April 2020, <https://www.africa.who.int/news/covid-19-cases-top-10,000-in-
africa> (accessed 7 April 2020). 
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of big numbers of Chinese citizens working on infrastructure development in 
many African countries.23 
Economic Impacts of COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic will cause severe long-term damage to African 
economies. African countries effectively face economic crises that risk 
destroying economic, livelihoods, slowing the region’s growth prospects for 
many years to come. According to Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), “prior to COVID-19, in 2019, the continent had 
already experienced a slowdown in growth and poverty reduction overall, 
although with large differences between countries. The current crisis could 
erase years of development gain."24 Economists had estimated Africa’s 
growth in 2020 at 3.9% which now drop to 0.4% in the best case to - 3.9% in 
the most severely hit cases. Experts also believe that growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa might fall to between - 2% and - 5% in comparison to 2.4% in 2019.25 
Covid-19 has deprived oil exporting African countries of their main sources 
of income. Oil prices had a historical fall down, from USD 61.5 in December 
to USD 23.2 in March 2020, which is a major blow to a continent whose oil 
rent represent 4.5% of GDP. “Oil price fell by about 50% in the first quarter 
of 2020. In 2014 oil prices fell by 56 percent over seven months and the 
decline contributed to bringing GDP growth for Sub-Saharan Africa from 5.0 
in 2014 down to 1.4% in 2016.”26Other economists forecasted “the African 
countries whose share of oil in total exports is over 80% on average can be 
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predicted to face difficult and uncertain economic periods.”27 The economy 
of some African oil producing countries dependent upon crude oil would be 
seriously impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic due to lockdown that has 
resulted into lowering down of consumption and prices.28 
The African mining industry could also be seriously affected by COVID-19 
because of decreasing demand for steel, iron ore, lithium and cobalt due to 
travel bans and lockdowns, and also because of a huge number of people 
employed in the mining industry working underground that create a working 
environment more exposed to COVID-19 and can become a catalyst for 
spread of the pandemic.29 
The travel restrictions and lockdown due to COVID-19 has not only resulted 
into a withdrawal of international investors, but also tourists. This is having 
a serious impact on tourism of some African countries such as South Africa, 
Kenya and Tanzania, which in turn affects prospects of economic recovery in 
those countries. It threatens direct and indirect employment. According to 
the OECD, “in a moderate COVID-19 scenario, the tourism and travel sector 
in Africa would lose at least USD 50 billion in revenues and 2 million in direct 
and indirect jobs.”30 It is predicted the overall impact of COVID-19 on 
economies of the top tourist countries would be much more than for 
average African economies. “The tourist industry contributed to more than 
10 of GDP of the following countries: Seychelles, Capo Verde, Mauritius, 
Gambia, Tunisia, Madagascar Lesotho, Rwanda, Botswana, Egypt, Tanzania, 
Namibia, Comoros and Senegal in 2019. In these countries, economic 
growth is expected to drop on average to a value of - 3.3% in 2020 whereas 
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the impact will be much higher in countries like Seychelles, Cabo Verde, 
Mauritius and Gambia with an expected - 7% drops at least in 2020.”31 
It has been underlined that almost two thirds of African countries are net 
importers of basic food and other crisis induced shortages that could gravely 
affect its availability. African industries import equipment from outside the 
continent. The most imported suppliers are Europe (35%), China, (16%) and 
the rest of Asia including India (14%). With COVID-19 disruptions of global 
supply chains, Africa will experience a decrease in the availability of final and 
intermediate imported goods.32 Many African countries could see rocketing 
food price inflation as supply chains are affected. 17 million people are 
projected to be in critical food security situation or worse, including 1.2 
million in an emergency situation. “Overall, the combination of both health 
and security crises could tip more than 50 million people over the edge 
currently under pressure in food crisis situation.”33 Experts also estimated 
millions more people could tumble into poverty, and the number of severely 
food insecure people could considerably augment. The developing world, 
low and middle-income countries will suffer the greatest consequences in 
term of extreme poverty. Though Sub-Saharan Africa so far has been 
relatively less impacted by the Coronavirus from a health perspective, it is 
likely to become the region hit hardest in term of extreme poverty. It could 
push 49 million people globally into extreme poverty in 2020, of which 
almost 23 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 16 million in South Asia.34 
South Sudan imports 95.5% basic food commodities from Uganda. 
According to the report of the University of Juba established in collaboration 
                                                          
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid.  
34
 Daniel Gerszon Mahler, Christoph Lakner, Christoph Lakner & Haoyu Wu, “The Impact of 
COVID-19 Coronavirus on Global Poverty: Why Sub-Saharan Africa Might be the Region 
Hardest Hit,” World Bank Blogs, 20 April 2020, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendate/ 
impact-covid-19-coronavirus-global-poverty-why-sub-saharran-africa-might-be-region-hard 
est-hit> (accessed 20 April 2020).  
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
25 
with UNDP, the outbreak of COVID-19 and the government’s measures have 
impacted negatively on market prices of basic food commodities in Juba 
Municipality. From the month of February to April 2020, prices of basic food 
items have seen sharp increase that made the majority of households not 
able to afford the purchase of basic food commodities: e.g. rice (40%) 
increase, sorghum (27%), and cooking oil (23%), with the least increase on 
beans (10%). This had also impacted on the number of meals per day. The 
research revealed that the number of meals per household was decreasing 
from February to April 2020 from two meals to one meal as households that 
were taking one meal increased from 33.4% to 62% and 58% of households 
had slept without a meal at least one day in a week. Since better nutrition 
contributes a lot to improved immune systems, such poor culture of feeding 
could put the poor population at high risk to succumb to the pandemic.35 
While many African countries might be able to respond immediately to 
some of these challenges, the health and economic shocks will quickly put 
Africa countries on an unsustainable debt path.36 Based on the nine 
demographic dimensions of vulnerability, the Africa Centre for Strategic 
Studies reported that South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sudan and Nigeria are among the most exposed, mainly due to combination 
of factors such as existing armed conflicts, large displacement of populations 
in refugee camps, total population living in urban areas and low government 
transparency and trust in public institutions.37  
All these factors place African governments under substantial pressure. UN 
Chief, Guterres Antonio, stated that the Coronavirus pandemic has 
threatened the “hard-earned gain Africans have made throughout the 
                                                          
35
 University of Juba, Gender and Socio-Economic Impact Assessments of COVID-19 
Pandemic.  
36
 IMF, “Data Mapper: General Government Debt,” 13 May 2020, <https://www.imf.org/ 
external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/OECD/ADVEC/WEOWORD> (accessed 13 
May 2020). 
37
 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Mapping Risk Factors for the Spread of COVID-19 in 
Africa.”  
1 7 / 2 0 2 0  
 
26 
continent” and the world need to stand in solidarity with the people “now 
and for recovering better.” The global solidarity with Africa is an obligation 
and calls for international action to help strengthen Africa’s resilience 
against the pandemic and beyond.38 
Why are there less recorded cases of infection and deaths than initially 
thought 
Many experts had predicted that the African continent could be hit hardest 
by the pandemic as being the poorest continent with the most vulnerable 
population. The African Centre for Strategic Studies stated “the most 
vulnerable countries may not be those with the earliest onset.”39 Others 
said, “Even if the United States of America, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, 
The United Kingdom, China, Iran, Turkey, Belgium, The Russian Federation, 
Canada and Brazil are the most affected countries, Africa is expected to be 
the most vulnerable continent.”40 Africa was cautioned to be the next 
epicenter of the Coronavirus and that “in the WHO best-case state of affairs, 
where governments introduced intense social distancing, once a threshold 
of 0.2 deaths per 100,000 people per week is reached, Africa would see 122 
million infections, 2.3 million hospitalisations and 300,000 deaths. On 7 May 
a new study by the WHO Regional office for Africa estimated that up to 
190,000 could die in the first year of the pandemic if containment measures 
fail.”41 Bill Gates had alerted, “if left unchecked in the region of crowded 
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slums and flimsy health systems, the disease could claim a horrifying 10 
million African lives.”42 
Despite the predictions and vulnerability of the African continent to COVID 
19, the cases of infections and deaths appeared less than in other parts of 
globe. It has been recognized that despite crossing the threshold of more 
than 100,000 confirmed cases, the pandemic which has struck hard other 
parts of the world has appeared to take a different course in Africa. The 
cases have not grown at the same rate as in other regions. Africa has not 
experienced the high mortality seen in some parts of the world. On 22 May, 
there were only 3,100 confirmed deaths. By comparison, when cases 
reached 100,000 in the WHO European Region, deaths stood at 4,900.43 
Even if the official recorded number of COVID-19 infections and deaths 
cases appeared to be very low in comparison to the rest of the world, 
common citizens are aware that their societies have experienced a higher 
incidence of cases of infection and deaths than those officially announced by 
their governments because they witnessed not only many people had 
symptoms undeniable to be Coronavirus, but also witnessed extraordinarily 
high death levels which could be ascribed to Coronavirus. Numbers of death 
cases were exceptionally higher than the usual. Many people died at homes 
of very sudden illnesses but due to lack of testing kits, these cases 
disappeared unrecorded. “Due to inadequate testing, weak diagnostic 
capacity of COVID-19,”44 the true number of cases of infection and mortality 
rate remain undetected which would make it difficult to predict the true 
epidemiology of COVID-19 on the African continent. The full scope of the 
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pandemic remained inexact as cases are “underreported and accuracy of 
data collection varies considerably.”45 
The fact that the African continent witnessed the spread of Coronavirus 
much later than other continents was of their benefit. It prepared Africa to 
recognize the danger of COVID-19 and face the pandemic. The strong 
leadership of various governments in the continent deserves recognition as 
they took quick decisions to put in place certain measures such as the 
closing of international airports, complete lockdowns, travel bans, the 
closing of schools and universities, companies and offices, a ban on large 
gathering including religious, sports, social and other events, curfews and 
systematic quarantine to control the spread of the pandemic. 
The experiences of useful lessons learned in 2014-2016 from the Ebola 
epidemic might have prepared Western and Central African countries in 
facing COVID-19 pandemic. The struggle to contain the Ebola virus has 
contributed extensively to the development of infrastructures and skills for 
laboratory testing, exchange of capacities across countries, partnerships 
among the technological agencies, international organisations and the 
private sector and public health awareness among the population.46 
The demography of the African continent seems to play significant role in 
reducing the number of infections cases and deaths in Africa compared to 
other continents affected by COVID-19. According to Lone et al (2020), only 
4% of the African population is older than 65 which are as low compared to 
37% in Eastern and South – Eastern Asia, and 29% in Europe and Northern 
America. COVID-19 affects older people rigorously with higher mortality 
rates than the younger population.47 The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 
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(2020) confirmed that approximately 80 percent of COVID-19 fatality had 
been among people over the age of 60. With 70% of African population 
under the age of 30, Africa’s youth benefit might be a safeguard against the 
most devastating human costs of the disease on the continent.48 
Results 
There is consensus among various experts that COVID-19 has changed 
completely the social cohesion of African societies. Many believe that things 
will never be the same again in the post COVID-19. However, African social 
nature of life and their mindsets continue to make Africans extremely 
vulnerable to COVID-19. The weak health system with low testing capacity, 
few doctors, ventilators and intensive care units will continue to make Africa 
vulnerable to future crises of this kind. The lockdown measures have led 
African countries to lose sources of their revenues, ranging from oil, 
minerals, trade, tourism, resulting in the stagnation of economic growth, 
with very serious consequences on the lives of their populations.  
There is also a general consensus among the different experts that, although 
the African continent is not hit hardest by the COVID-19 as speculated, the 
continent has been hit hardest in term of health and economic viability, and 
Africa will struggle to recover from the crisis without international 
cooperation.  
Conclusion 
The findings of this research revealed that, although not hit hardest by 
COVID-19 as predicted by experts, the African continent remained very 
vulnerable to the pandemic. Africa may find it hard to re-emerge from crises 
without international support and cooperation. Just as Africa would have 
not done without global response, it remained a challenge to the continent 
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to seek the collaboration and cooperation of the international community to 
face and survive the health and economic shocks. Coordination of action 
that calls for international cooperation to ensure that Africa controls the 
pandemic and put more reliable health systems in place is indispensable. 
While addressing the immediate impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
focus on recovery remains central to the response and that development 
policy operation focusing on supporting governments to mitigate the effects 
of the COVID-19 crisis and promoting reforms will create the conditions for 
economic recovery. 
Recommendations 
1) Promoting international cooperation with Africa to increase investment 
in science, technology and innovation to move Africa into the future, and 
training teachers in skills and capacity in information and communication 
technology to provide education to learners online, is fundamental. 
2) Strengthening health systems in Africa is urgent. 
3) Effective implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(ACFTA) and the African Union’s productive transformation agenda is 
fundamental to strengthening regional value chains, reduce vulnerability to 
external shocks, advance the digital transition and build economic resilience 
against future crises. 
4) Accelerating the implementation of a pharmaceutical manufacturing 
plan of Africa and the establishment of an African medicine agency by 
prioritising investments for regulatory capacity development. 
5) Strengthening media ability to communicate information, disseminating 
messages around COVID-19 and accelerating the fight against 
misinformation is fundamental. 
6) Commitment of African governments to meet the goal of at least 1% of 
GDP in Research and Development as only three countries in the continent 
spending at around 0.8%. 
7) Strengthening the capacity of the vulnerable groups through expanding 
cash transfer programmes to provide an effective way to improve poor 
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people’s lives, ensure decent living for all is indispensable on the African 
continent. 
8) Training and developing targeted young people to prepare them for 
future challenges of a similar nature. 
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L’Afrique face à la pandémie du Coronavirus: Subir ou agir. De la 





Résumé: La pandémie coronavirus constitue une menace sans précédent dans 
l’histoire de l’humanité. Dès l’apparition du virus, les experts prédisaient le chaos 
pour les pays les moins avancés en matière sanitaire. Pourtant, contre toute 
attente, l’Afrique reste le continent le moins touché. Mais pour combien de temps? 
L’idée soutenue dans cette communication est que, d’une part, sans perspective 
médicale urgente, le vieux continent reste plus que vulnérable sur deux axes 
majeurs: la culture et l’économie. D’autre part, il sera question de montrer qu’avec 
l’appui technique des institutions internationales comme l’OMS, l’ONU et l’UA, 
l’Afrique peut apporter sa contribution à la lutte contre le Coronavirus, à base des 
savoirs endogènes.  
Mots clés: Coronavirus, Afrique, vulnérabilité, savoirs endogènes, traditions, 
recherches, Union africaine. 
 
Introduction 
Depuis novembre 2019, le Coronavirus menace l’humanité en général et 
l’Afrique en particulier. Curieusement et contre toute attente, l’Afrique 
reste le continent le moins touché par le Covid-19 du point de vue du 
nombre de décès et de cas de contaminés1 ou testés positifs: «On fait le 
point ce lundi 20 juillet 2020: Le coronavirus touche 14.665.793 personnes 
dans le monde et est responsable de la mort d’au moins 610.781 
individus»2. A la même date, l’Afrique compte «542.563 de cas avec 12.466 
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 Jeune Afrique – santé, «Coronavirus en Afrique: une carte pour suivre au jour le jour 
l’avancée de l’épidémie», https://www.jeuneafrique.com/910230/societe/ (consulté le 10 
juillet 2020). 
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de décès»3. Pourtant, les pays considérés comme les plus avancés en 
matière sanitaire sont plus gravement touchés «États-Unis: 3.898.501 cas 
recensés, Brésil: 2.098.389, Inde: 1.119.307, Russie: 771.546, Espagne: 
307.335, Royaume-Uni: 294.792»4. Il en est de même pour les cas de décès: 
«États-Unis: 143.289 morts, Brésil: 79.488, Royaume-Uni: 45.300, Mexique: 
41.658, Italie: 35.045, France: 30.155, Espagne: 28.420 morts, Inde: 
27.514»5. Les chiffres sont donc sans équivoque. L’Afrique est encore très 
loin d’entrer dans le chaos tant prédit même des experts. Néanmoins, 
même s’il n’y a pas de particularité alarmante par rapport aux morts, sans 
une perspective médicale urgente, le vieux continent reste plus que 
vulnérable sur deux axes majeurs: la culture et l’économie. 
Du point de vue culturel, l’Afrique risque d’être victime de ses traditions. 
Ainsi, profitant de l’ignorance de la grande majorité des villageois, 
marabouts, guérisseurs et devins s’adonnent à la vente des remèdes et 
décoctions de toute sorte, soi-disant qu’il s’agit d’un médicament miracle 
contre le coronavirus. Lors des fêtes ou rites traditionnels, les villageois 
utilisent en commun des instruments comme les chalumeaux pour la 
boisson. La distanciation et le confinement sont quasi-impossibles. Plus 
grave, le manque d’eau dans les villages freine les efforts pour la prévention 
contre la pandémie. Sur le plan économique, l’Afrique vit de l’importation 
(produits manufacturés) et l’exportation (matières premières) de la Chine et 
l’Union Européenne. La fermeture des frontières pèse donc lourdement sur 
l’économie de l’Afrique. L’économie, l’éducation, la santé, le tourisme, etc., 
tous ces secteurs sont touchés par le Covid-19, d’où une vulnérabilité sans 
précédent pour le continent. 
                                                          
3
 Alain Jocard, «Coronavirus dans le monde: l’Afrique inquiète l’OMS, situation critique à 
Hongkong», https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/07/20/coronavirus-dans-
le-monde-l-acceleration-de-l-epidemie-en-afrique-inquiete-l-oms_6046778_3210.html 
(consulté le 10 juillet 2020). 
4
 Julie Minetti, «Coronavirus: la situation dans le monde. Les pays les plus touchés», 
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Dès lors, que peut faire l’Afrique contre le Coronavirus pour éviter le chaos 
et des ravages de plus, après le paludisme et le VIH-SIDA, Ebola? Quelles 
sont les contributions que peuvent apporter les savoirs endogènes africains 
pour éviter la catastrophe? Telle est la problématique à aborder à travers ce 
projet de communication qui se situe dans l’axe de l’éthique et philosophie 
politique. M’appuyant sur des résultats des recherches de terrain dans les 
cours de «savoirs traditionnels africains et cultures et civilisations 
africaines», la thèse défendue est qu’avec l’appui technique des institutions 
internationales comme l’OMS, l’ONU et l’UA, l’Afrique peut apporter sa 
contribution à la lutte contre le Coronavirus, à base des savoirs endogènes. 
Cette contribution à la réflexion entre dans l’axe de recherche d’éthique et 
de philosophie politique, suit une méthode analytique et critique. 
1. L’Afrique face au Covid-19: une exception ou une réalité comme ailleurs 
Le contexte africain est à la fois une exception et une réalité. Comme 
exception: avec l’apparition du Covid-19, en analysant les ravages que ladite 
pandémie causait dans les pays les plus avancés en matière de santé, de 
l’ignorant jusqu’aux érudits, tout le monde pariait et prédisait une situation 
chaotique en Afrique. Même le directeur de l’Organisation Mondiale de la 
Santé s’en inquiétait publiquement, en mettant en garde l’Afrique pour 
laquelle il craignait une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent. C’était 
sans compter sur les mystères de la nature comme y croient beaucoup 
d’Africains. En effet, l’Afrique compte exceptionnellement moins de morts 
et de contaminés du Covid-19, très loin derrière les continents les plus 
riches et les plus avancés en matière de santé.  
Les chiffres sont sans équivoques. Il y a une exception en ce qui concerne 
l’Afrique. La question qui reste est de savoir à quoi est due cette exception. 
Plusieurs thèses s’affrontent, allant des explications farfelues aux arguments 
et hypothèses plus rationnels. Ainsi, à l’exception africaine face au 
coronavirus, les fanatiques des mouvements de réveil donnent des 
arguments qui frôlent la superstition, défendant l’idée d’une protection 
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divine ou surnaturelle. Une telle idée est moins convaincante et plus 
critiquable car un dieu qui laisserait certains mourir en masse et d’autres 
protégés par sa main serait un dieu injuste. Pour d’autres, moins 
superstitieux mais peu empiristes, le miracle africain face à la sévérité du 
Covid-19 serait dû à un facteur naturel. Ils avancent l’idée d’un climat très 
chaud et incompatible à la survie du virus. Pour eux, dans des situations 
pareilles, la nature joue un rôle important quant aux facteurs favorisants ou 
aux barrières. Ainsi, le facteur «climat froid» favoriserait la survie et 
l’expansion du coronavirus, tandis que le facteur «climat chaud» serait 
défavorable au virus. L’exemple évoqué par analogie est celui du paludisme. 
Cette maladie décime chaque année des populations en Afrique alors que 
l’Europe en est épargnée. La différence étant due au fait que le vecteur de la 
maladie, le moustique, ne survie pas au froid et trouve le terrain propice 
pour sa reproduction et son expansion en Afrique. Pour les scientifiques 
enfin, surtout ceux qui ne résident pas sur le continent africain, ils sont 
convaincus qu’il n’y a rien d’exception. Pour certains d’entre eux, le nombre 
moins élevé de morts et de contaminés ne relèvent que d’une manipulation 
des chiffres par les Etats. Pour d’autres, Il s’agit d’un manque de matériel 
adéquat pour tester le virus ou au manque de compétences nécessaires 
dans le dépistage du virus.  
Quoi qu’il en soit, la réalité est là et indiscutable. A neuf mois de l’apparition 
du virus, l’Afrique fait exception quant au nombre de contaminés et de 
morts suite au Covid-19. Seulement, cette réalité miraculeuse cache une 
autre qui lui est opposée: celle d’une bombe à retardement. Au début de la 
pandémie, les Etats unis se targuent d’être un pays béni de Dieu, à cause 
d’un nombre réduit de cas de coronavirus. Cela n’a pas duré longtemps, et 
plus grave encore, à la période du 20 juillet, le continent américain en 
général, et les Etats unis en particulier, sont les régions les plus gravement 
touchées par le virus. Une interrogation alors: que se passera-t-il un jour, si 
le virus prenait un tournant en passant à une vitesse supérieure en Afrique? 
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Sans être capable de faire des prédictions, tout laisse croire que la situation 
serait catastrophique sinon chaotique, et cela pour plusieurs raisons. 
2. Prévention et soins: un contexte paradoxal face à une pandémie 
En attendant un médicament et probablement un vaccin, plusieurs mesures, 
émises par les scientifiques et validées par l’Organisation Mondiale de la 
Santé, permettent d’éviter les dégâts. Certaines concernent la prévention et 
d’autres les secours de base pour celui qui est déjà atteint par le virus. 
2.1. L’eau et le lavage des mains comme premier précepte: une pénurie 
dans l’abondance 
Que ça soit le miracle ayant épargné et épargnant encore l’Afrique face à la 
virulence du Coronavirus, certaines traditions africaines constituent l’un des 
facteurs favorisant la propagation du virus, et l’on peut craindre le pire avec 
un retournement de la situation. Quelques exemples suffisent pour 
comprendre la réalité. En effet, si la prévention constitue la première étape 
pour vaincre le virus, l’Afrique se trouve dans une très mauvaise situation. 
En effet, selon l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé et les spécialistes 
sanitaires, le lavage des mains constitue la première étape de la prévention 
contre le Coronavirus. Or, ce précepte n’existe pas dans les traditions 
africaines. La mentalité fortement répandue est qu’on se ne se lave les 
mains pour rien (ntawukarabira ubusa). Il est surprenant de constater que 
même dans les milieux considérés comme hautement cultivés (écoles, 
bureaux), ce précepte n’est pas respecté. Parfois parce que les gens 
l’ignorent, parfois par manque d’eau. En plus, dans les villages africains, la 
célébration traditionnelle de certaines fêtes ou rites se fait en groupe. Les 
repas et les boissons sont partagés dans les mêmes ustensiles, avec les 
mêmes chalumeaux, ce qui renvoie à une proximité très rapprochée, facteur 
de contamination du virus. 
Au-delà des traditions, même si le lavage des mains venait d’être instauré 
comme une obligation pour le besoin de la cause, l’eau est un produit rare 
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dans plusieurs coins du continent. Ainsi, le rapport du département des 
affaires économiques et sociales des Nations Unies montre que «seulement 
un Africain sur quatre a un accès à une source sûre d’eau potable»6. Et de 
préciser encore que: «En Afrique subsaharienne, seulement 24% de la 
population a accès à une source sûre d’eau potable et les installations 
sanitaires de base – non partagées avec d’autres foyers – sont réservées à 
28% de la population»7. Cela ne pose pas seulement des problèmes au 
niveau des familles. Il s’agit d’un problème public de grande envergure car, 
le manque d’infrastructures de distribution et d’assainissement d’eau qui 
permettent aux populations d’avoir accès à l’eau potable touche également 
les écoles, les hôpitaux, les marchés, voir les lieux de culte. Cela montre que 
dans le cas où la pandémie s’avérait dangereuse, il y aurait trop de 
contaminations en un laps de temps. La situation s’avérait chaotique suite à 
l’insuffisance des mesures adéquates de lutte contre la pandémie. 
Pourtant, «avec 17 grands fleuves et 160 grands lacs qui l’irriguent»8, 
comme le relève Jean Bosco Bazié, «le continent africain dispose pourtant 
de ressources abondantes estimées à plus de 5.400 milliards de  ³par an.»9 
Cela montre encore que si jamais la pandémie devrait faire plus de ravages, 
la responsabilité incombe plus aux pouvoirs publics qui ne prennent pas des 
mesures appropriées pour prévenir le danger. Il est bien vrai que certains 
gouvernements ont déjà pris des mesures allant dans le même sens comme 
le Burundi qui envisage la réduction du prix du savon et de l’eau, mais cela 
ne suffit pas pour que le combat contre le virus soit mené efficacement. Ces 
mesures vont profiter à l’élite minoritaire et les citadins. Pour plus 
                                                          
6
 Nations Unies, «Programme mondial de l’UNESCO pour l’évaluation des ressources en eau 
2019», Le Rapport mondial des Nations Unies sur la mise en valeur des ressources en eau 
2019: Ne laisser personne pour compte, Paris, UNESCO, 2019, https://fr.unesco.org/water-




 Jean Bosco Bazié, «Accès à l’eau: l’Afrique entre abondance et pénurie», Dans Après-
Demain, 2014/3-4 (N° 31-32, NF): 28-29, Cairn info, https://doi.org/10.3917/apdem.031. 
0028 (consulté le 17 juillet 2020). 
9
 Ibid. 
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d’efficacité, les Etats africains devraient fournir plus d’efforts pour que 
même les populations rurales puissent accéder à l’eau potable, et surtout 
les écoles, les hôpitaux, les centres de santé, les marchés et les lieux de culte 
qui accueillent régulièrement un grand nombre de gens plusieurs fois dans 
la semaine.  
2.2. L’impossibilité du confinement 
L’autre méthode de prévention contre le Coronavirus est le confinement. En 
Afrique, un dilemme apparaît avec cette pratique: «faut-il mourir de faim ou 
de coronavirus?»10. En effet, le grand problème auquel sont confrontées la 
majorité des populations africaines, surtout celles qui vivent dans les villages 
et ghettos, c’est qu’ils vivent au jour le jour. L’individu mange parce qu’il est 
sorti de chez lui le matin, le villageois pour aller dans le champ ou au 
chantier, le citadin du ghettos pour avoir sorti son vélo ou sa moto taxi ou 
son touk-touk, de même que le convoyeur de bus, le garçon de course, … Il 
en est de même pour le fonctionnaire de l’Etat qui, même avec des moyens 
financiers à sa disposition car touchant un salaire mensuel, est obligé de 
sortir de chez lui pour aller acheter des vivres au marché. Les villes africaines 
ne disposant pas de services de livreurs à domicile, même ceux qui ont des 
moyens risquent d’être débordés, ce qui conduirait à outrepasser la mesure. 
Pour qu’un confinement soit efficace donc, l’Etat africain doit subvenir aux 
besoins de la population, en donnant des vivres aux personnes confinées. 
Or, aucun Etat ou presque ne dispose de potentialités pour réaliser cet 
exploit. 
Sur le plan pratique, deux facteurs rendent le confinement impossible en 
Afrique, à l’exception de quelques quartiers ou villes chics. L’un des deux 
facteurs est l’habitat. Celui-ci est très dispersé, disséminé sur des collines et 
montagnes, contrairement aux quartiers européens regroupés ensemble sur 
                                                          
10
 Bruno Parmentier, «La faim plus dangereuse que le Coronavirus», France Culture, 
https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/radiographies-du-coronavirus (consulté le 19 juillet 
2020). 
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des avenues, faciles à contrôler. L’autre facteur est que beaucoup 
d’Africains mangent parce qu’ils sont allés travailler ou récolter dans leurs 
champs. Même si cela était possible donc, confiner signifie alors donner à 
manger aux gens, or très peu des Etats sont capables de réaliser cette 
exigence. Quant au port du masque, à moins que cela soit pris en charge par 
l’Etat, sinon beaucoup d’Africains sont incapables de s’en procurer, du 
moment que beaucoup d’entre eux peinent même à trouver de quoi mettre 
sous la dent. 
3. Des conséquences néfastes et un avenir incertain 
Jusque pour le moment, très peu d’Africains se soucient du danger que 
représente le coronavirus. L’opinion répandue est que le paludisme, le Sida, 
l’Ebola, …. C’est plus grave que le Covid-19, mais on vit encore. 
3.1. Entre superstition et prise de Conscience  
L’un des grands problèmes auxquels l’Afrique risque de faire face à tout 
moment est celui lié à la sous-estimation des conséquences de la pandémie. 
C’est sans doute cette situation qui fait que le nombre réduit des 
contaminés ne convainc pas les scientifiques, tant Africains 
qu’internationaux, voir ceux de l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé. Il y a 
lieu de suspecter que soit on ne fait pas suffisamment de dépistages, soit on 
masque les résultats de ces derniers. Dans les deux cas, les risques sont 
redoutables. La pandémie va s’aggraver à tel point qu’on risque de se 
retrouver devant une catastrophe humanitaire de grande envergure. L’on se 
demande ce que peut l’Afrique au cas d’un tel scénario, avec ses 
infrastructures sanitaires quasi-inexistantes, ou mal équipées et sans 
personnel suffisamment qualifié, quand on sait que même les pays les plus 
avancés en la matière comme ceux de l’Union européenne ou les Etats Unis 
d’Amérique ont été dépassés. Et cela n’est qu’une simple hypothèse. 
Plusieurs cas sont de plus en plus reportés où le nombre de contaminations 
passant du double, triple, … en moins d’une semaine. Cela montre bien à 
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quel point le risque d’une catastrophe humanitaire liée au Covid-19 reste 
très élevé. 
L’autre grand problème qui risque d’aggraver la situation en Afrique est le 
risque de tomber dans la superstition et dans le charlatanisme. D’une part, 
en référence aux croyances traditionnelles, des pratiques magiques et de la 
sorcellerie prétendent avoir des remèdes miracles, soit pour la protection 
contre le virus, soit pour sa guérison. C’est ainsi que des décoctions de tous 
genres sont proposées aux gens qui consultent les guérisseurs. D’autres 
apprentis scientifiques prétendent avoir trouvé des herbes miracles. C’est 
dans ce sens que, depuis l’apparition de la pandémie, on a observé la 
flambée des prix de certaines herbes et plantes (gingembre, fungus, …), de 
même que l’inondation du marché par certaines herbes inhabituelles dans le 
commerce, comme certaines variétés d’eucalyptus, des tisanes, etc. 
D’autre part, suite à la forte prépondérance des mouvements messianiques 
et des églises de réveil fortement répandues et tirant l’origine dans le 
monde anglo-saxon et aux Etats Unis en particulier, il y a des discours, et 
parfois émanant des hommes politiques de haut niveau, qui tendent à 
affirmer que l’Afrique est épargnée du coronavirus par une main divine. Ils 
vont jusqu’à justifier cela en affirmant que le virus est un châtiment divin 
contre l’occident en raison de la légalisation des pratiques comme 
l’homosexualité et l’avortement, ce qui n’a aucun fondement rationnel. Tout 
cela renforce l’ignorance de la population africaine à grande majorité 
analphabète, quant à la prévention contre le virus. Il en est de même que 
l’ignorance qui entoure ceux qui ont déjà attrapé le virus. Au lieu d’aller 
consulter le médecin, la majorité se contente des prières des pasteurs et 
d’autres des guérisseurs. Cela a pour conséquence d’accroitre le taux de 
contamination de la pandémie. 
Par ailleurs, la pauvreté qui sévit en Afrique, amplifiée par la corruption et 
l’incompétence dans le domaine de la santé, ont renforcé la médecine 
traditionnelle. Ainsi, la pandémie fait des affaires des guérisseurs 
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traditionnels, de vrais comme des charlatans. C’est ainsi que dans chaque 
pays, plusieurs individus ou groupuscules d’individus font chaque jour la 
promotion de ce qu’ils appellent remèdes miracles, qui ne sont que des 
décoctions de tout genre. Et les gens s’y adonnent à cœur joie, sans penser 
aux conséquences. Et, plus grave encore, cela semble être encouragé par 
des pouvoirs publics qui ne prennent aucune mesure pour décourager et 
stopper la pratique.  
Cela prouve donc qu’en cas d’une forte contagion, l’Afrique faira face à une 
situation incontrôlable, ou même à une mutation du virus, ce qui aurait une 
conséquence dramatique pour l’humanité toute entière, car, sans vaccin ni 
médicament, il y a probablement risque d’un cycle vicieux même chez ceux 
qui pensaient avoir circonscrit et maitrisé la pandémie. Reste alors la 
question de savoir comment l’humanité peut éviter ce risque de catastrophe 
présumée? 
3.2. D’une économie moribonde au chaos 
Aucun pays africain n’est stable pour résister économiquement au 
confinement prolongé. Ceci car la quasi-totalité des pays du continent vivent 
de l’exportation des matières premières et de l’importation des produits 
manufacturés. Du point de vue interne, un confinement prolongé priverait 
les Etats d’une main d’œuvre pour l’extraction des matières premières, cela 
se faisant d’une manière traditionnelle ou semi-moderne dans la plupart des 
cas. Sur le plan externe, la fermeture des frontières entre les Etats prive les 
pays africains l’accès aux marchés mondiaux pour vendre leurs matières 
premières qui est la principale source de revenus.  
Par ailleurs, le confinement a arrêté ou réduit l’aide internationale aux pays 
africains. Plusieurs projets ont été arrêtés ou suspendus. Plusieurs 
organisations non gouvernementales internationales ne peuvent plus venir 
directement en aide aux populations vulnérables. Pourtant, c’était là l’un 
des soutiens les plus importants pour les populations africaines, surtout 
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rurales, vivant de l’agriculture, de l’élevage et des petits métiers. Il y aura 
donc inévitablement une grande rechute de niveau de vie en Afrique.  
L’autre secteur qui est dramatiquement affecté par le coronavirus est celui 
de l’éducation. Avec le confinement, plusieurs programmes d’échange qui 
étaient très profitables aux Africains, tant étudiants que chercheurs, ont été 
suspendus. Impossible donc de bénéficiers des bourses comme Erasmus 
mundus, Angle, Ares, Vlir-Uos, etc. il en est de même pour l’échange 
d’expertise ou l’accompagnement des recherches. Il devient impossible de 
continuer la coopération en matière d’enseignement et de recherche suite à 
l’impossibilité des mobilités. Et c’est l’Afrique qui en paie le lourd tribut car 
c’est elle qui a tant besoin de cette assistance. Et l’économie et le 
développement du continent en sera affectés dans les années à venir. Ainsi, 
le coronavirus va donc laisser une plaie béante dans l’économie africaine, ce 
qui aura des conséquences à long terme sur les populations africaines dans 
tous les domaines de la vie tant publics que privés. 
4. L’Afrique dans le combat contre le Covid-19: l’apport des savoirs 
endogènes 
Dire que l’Afrique représente une menace de l’humanité face à la pandémie 
du coronavirus n’est qu’une présomption. Il s’agit d’une hypothèse qui peut 
s’appliquer à tout continent comme à un certain moment la Chine a été 
accusée d’avoir cachée la vérité sur le virus, et qu’elle aurait de ce fait 
contribué à son expansion. Ce qui est important pour le moment, c’est de se 
demander si l’Afrique peut apporter une contribution dans la lutte contre la 
pandémie, et si oui laquelle. En effet, l’Afrique a été depuis longtemps 
considérée comme un continent inapte en ce qui concerne la recherche 
scientifique. Cela se justifiant par le manque d’infrastructures adaptées à la 
recherche (centres de recherches, bibliothèques et laboratoires équipés), 
chercheurs qualifiés (exiles, fuite de cerveaux), manque de la volonté des 
dirigeants, etc. 
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Néanmoins, avec la mondialisation, on observe une certaine dynamique 
quant à l’évolution de la recherche scientifique. Beaucoup d’étudiants 
Africains vont aujourd’hui faire des études dans tous les coins du monde. 
Des professionnels vont également se spécialiser partout, et dans les grands 
centres et laboratoires de recherches. Avec la libéralisation de plusieurs 
secteurs, des hôpitaux privés et de renom commencent à émerger, ce qui va 
avec l’émergence des grands centres et laboratoires de recherches. Le seul 
problème auquel ils sont confrontés est le manque de moyens. C’est ici en 
effet que se situe la véritable problématique en ce qui concerne l’apport de 
l’Afrique dans la lutte contre le Covid-19. 
Du point de vue technique, l’Afrique peut, comme tous les autres 
continents, apporter sa contribution dans la lutte contre le Covid-19, à 
travers les recherches scientifiques, et les atouts sont nombreux. D’abord, il 
s’agit d’un continent dont la faune et la flore sont très florissantes et 
revêtent une particularité qu’on retrouve nulle part ailleurs, à cause de son 
climat et son sol encore naturel (non encore contaminé par les engrais 
chimiques et les pesticides), ses forêts tropicales regorgent une grande 
variété de plantes médicinales avec plusieurs vertus non encore explorées. 
D’ailleurs un grand engouement vers un retour à la médecine traditionnelle 
s’observe partout en Afrique. Cela pourrait favoriser les recherches autour 
du Coronavirus si jamais il y avait suffisamment de moyens. C’est le cas de la 
polémique qui a été déclenchée par le Covid-Organics, remède malgache à 
base des plantes.  
Logiquement, la polémique n’avait aucune raison d’être. L’Organisation 
Mondiale de la Santé (OMS) devrait plutôt prendre la situation en main, en 
octroyant des moyens et en fournissant des experts en la matière au 
Madagascar, afin de faire toutes les études nécessaires pour vérifier 
l’efficacité du remède et améliorer si c’est nécessaire. Quoi qu’il en soit, cela 
aurait été une action plus humanitaire, car, même sans en faire un objet de 
médias, le remède est consommé en Afrique, et, les guérisons sont 
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observées, dans l’ignorance des conséquences bien sûr11. Il faut noter que 
l’OMS s’est prononcée contre le Covid-Organics et contre tous les autres 
remèdes à base des plantes contre la prévention et la guérison du virus, 
assurant que des médicaments sont encore à l’essai et qu’il n’existe ni 
vaccin ni médicament pour l’instant. En référence aux rapports historiques 
entre l’Afrique et le reste du monde, des réactions n’ont pas tardé, accusant 
l’OMS de jouer la carte du dénigrement envers l’Afrique. Un bon nombre 
d’Africains pensent que si le remède avait était découvert dans un pays 
autre que celui d’Afrique, il aurait été homologué. C’est pour cela que 
beaucoup de pays Africains l’ont commandé12. 
Sans entrer dans la polémique, il est important de savoir qu’un axe 
important des savoirs traditionnels africains a développé un grand chantier 
de médecine traditionnelle. Plusieurs maladies sont soignées 
traditionnellement en Afrique. 
Conclusion  
Il s’observe en Afrique, un grand engouement pour la revitalisation des 
savoirs endogènes en général, et la médecine traditionnelle en particulier. Et 
cela ne concerne pas seulement les populations paysannes. Même des 
centres de recherche et des laboratoires des universités commencent à 
manifester de l’intérêt envers cet axe de recherche. Des groupements et des 
associations des tradipraticiens, des centres de santé de médecine 
traditionnelle prospèrent partout en Afrique. Ce qui se faisait en cachette 
commence à se pratiquer publiquement. La médecine traditionnelle, par le 
rejet de l’image caricaturale de sorcellerie et magie, s’impose aujourd’hui 
                                                          
11
 José Belalahy, «Covid organics: des effets indésirables rapportés par les internautes», 
http://www.midi-madagasikara.mg/societe/2020/04/28/covid-organics-des-effets-indesi 
rables-rapportes-par-des-internautes/ (consulté le 15 juillet 2020). 
12
 R. Davis, «Covid-Organics: Andry Rajoelina approvisionne les 15 pays de la CEDEAO», 
http://www.midi-madagasikara.mg/politique/2020/05/02/covid-organics-andry-rajoelina-
approvisionne-les-15-pays-de-la-cedeao/ (consulté le 15 juillet 2020). 
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comme une médecine à part entière. D’ailleurs, elle change de visage, en 
faisant une synthèse entre tradition et modernité. 
Depuis longtemps, les Africains savaient soigner certaines maladies qui ne 
demandent pas une expertise pour être détectées (examens de 
laboratoires) comme le SIDA, le Cancer, et autres. Un bon nombre 
d’Africains savent soigner parfaitement la plaie, les fractures, les morsures 
de serpents, la toux, les diarrhées, l’abcès, … Certains initiés sont spécialisés 
dans les domaines des poisons. Il suffit d’ingurgiter certaines décoctions 
préparées à cet effet pour qu’à partir des crachats ou vomissures, l’initié 
détecte quel genre de poison avalé, quel est l’état d’avancement et quel 
remède faut-il pour soigner. Et tout cela à partir des ingrédients récoltés 
dans la nature, à partir de la flore et la faune des forêts. Là ce ne sont que 
quelques exemples. 
L’une des grandes barrières de cette médecine est en effet la mesure. Il y a 
des maladies dont la consultation exige des instruments ultra-modernes 
comme les cancers, les hépatites, les virus comme le Sida, le Covid-19, etc. 
Là, les savoirs endogènes n’en peuvent pas grand-chose. Il en est de même 
en ce qui concerne la quantité de médicaments à prendre et la période de 
médication. De nos jours, la médecine traditionnelle africaine, en se ralliant 
à la modernité, a franchi un pas en avant et tend à apporter une solution à 
ce problème. Les guérisseurs traditionnels ou tradipraticiens sont 
aujourd’hui des gens qui ont fait des études universitaires, surtout les 
filières médicales. Ils demandent donc aux malades d’aller d’abord faire des 
examens dans des centres spécialisés, et ils vont leur donner des 
médicaments conformes à leurs maladies. A partir des laboratoires 
modernes, ils établissent des quantités de médicaments équivalentes aux 
doses de la médecine moderne. Cela a un atout bénéfique car, soigner au 
naturel, le patient évite l’intoxication des produits chimiques des 
laboratoires pharmaceutiques. Par ailleurs, l’on remarque de plus en plus 
des guérisons des maladies dont la médecine moderne ne parvient pas à 
guérir comme les hépatites, les poisons, etc. 
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Plus intéressant encore, les chercheurs Africains, en joignant le traditionnel 
au moderne, viennent de faire un exploit en ce qui concerne une pandémie 
récurrente, plus meurtrière que le Sida et le coronavirus, il s’agit du 
paludisme (malaria). En effet, il s’agit de la maladie qui tue beaucoup 
d’Africains par an, toutes générations confondues. Jusqu’à ce jour, si 
plusieurs thérapies existent contre la maladie, elle reste plus que mortelle, 
du fait du vecteur qui en est la cause, le moustique (anophèle femme). Du 
fait du climat favorable à sa rapide reproduction, le moustique reste 
invincible sur le continent, et un individu peut être contaminé plusieurs fois 
en une année. Ainsi, le remède efficace aurait pu être le vaccin, ce qui, en ce 
jour, n’a pas encore été réalisé. Même l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, 
sans s’avouer vaincue, a investi dans une voie de privilégier plutôt la 
prévention, en subventionnant la moustiquaire. Un tel instrument n’est 
efficace que passagèrement. Il ne protège que l’homme quand il va dormir, 
soit un quart de jour. Or, la majorité des populations africaines passent les 
trois-quarts de temps du jour soit dans les champs, dans la nature ou sous 
l’arbre, endroits où sévissent les moustiques. Ainsi, la portée de la 
moustiquaire reste limitée, même si son importance reste non négligeable. 
En faisant la synthèse entre tradition et modernité, les chercheurs Africains 
sont prêts à vaincre la pandémie. De nos, jours, il existe des plantes, 
sélectionnées par des chercheurs, dont l’odeur éloigne le moustique des 
habitations. Il suffit de les planter près de la maison et le moustique ne peut 
pas s’en approcher. D’autres, par des méthodes modernes, ont fabriqué, à 
partir des herbes de la forêt, des huiles et crèmes qui, quand l’individu les 
oings, le moustique ne peut pas le piquer. Cette méthode s’avère très 
efficace car pouvant protéger l’individu à tout moment et en tout lieu. Il y a 
donc espoir que dans quelques années, le paludisme ne sera plus une 
pandémie pour l’Afrique. 
C’est dans cette perspective que la lutte contre le coronavirus doit s’inscrire. 
En Afrique, il existe des remèdes pour soigner la grippe normale. Et chaque 
région, par rapport à ses traditions, sa faune et sa flore, a développé ses 
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propres méthodes contre ce virus périodique. C’est pour cela que les 
Africains ne trouvent pas une urgence à la recherche du vaccin ou du 
médicament contre ce virus qui ne s’est jamais avéré être une pandémie sur 
le continent. Comme il en a été le cas pour le Madagascar avec le Covid-
Organics, les Africains peuvent bien s’adonner à la recherche, avec leurs 
savoirs endogènes, afin de chercher un remède efficace contre le 
coronavirus.  
Pour que cela soit possible, il y a des préalables, à la fois pour les 
chercheurs, les pouvoirs publics et les organismes des Nations Unies en 
général, et l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé en particulier. Concernant 
les chercheurs Africains, ils doivent d’abord prendre conscience du danger 
que représente la pandémie pour leur continent. Ensuite, ils doivent unir 
leurs efforts et savoirs pour travailler en équipe, en échangeant souvent les 
résultats de leurs recherches. Enfin, ils doivent éviter d’être complexé en 
face de leurs collègues des autres continents et défendre avec perspicacité 
leurs travaux.  
Concernant les pouvoirs publics, ils doivent cesser d’être indifférent et 
laxistes pour ne pas se réveiller dans le chaos. Les mesures concernant 
l’accessibilité des populations à l’eau, la subvention et le port des masques 
dans les lieux publics, l’équipement des centres sanitaires et le 
renforcement des capacités des agents de santé en matière de prévention 
et de soins contre le coronavirus devraient être prises et assorties de 
sanctions en cas de refus. Ils doivent également sensibiliser les populations 
pour un changement de mentalité et la prise de conscience du danger qu’ils 
courent.  
Quant aux organismes internationaux en général et l’OMS en particulier, ils 
doivent éviter les spéculations de leurs bailleurs ainsi que celle des 
scientifiques qui travaillent au profit des firmes pharmaceutiques. L’OMS 
doit encadrer au même titre les recherches qui se montrent plus 
prometteuses, sans privilégier un continent au détriment d’un autre. Le cas 
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du Covid-Organics méritait par exemple une attention plus soutenue que 
celle que l’on observe jusqu’aujourd’hui. 
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Global COVID-19 Pandemic Management Regimen in Africa:  
Same problem, different consequences 
 





Abstract: In response to the outbreak of the coronavirus disease in late 2019 
(COVID-19), infected and affected countries of the world, especially in Europe, the 
Americas and Asia began scouting for mechanisms for its containment and 
curtailment. The World Health Organisation (WHO) also reeled out a catalogue of 
protocols to be adopted while coordinating some solidarity trial measures. 
Prominent among the policies and mechanisms adopted by countries and 
governments was the lockdown policy with varying implications. We deployed 
simple developmental economic analysis differences between “the north” and “the 
south” implementation of lockdown policy on one hand, and the implication of the 
lockdown policy on following the WHO protocols on the other hand. We argued that 
the present situation of using foreign derived lockdowns to control the spread of the 
virus in highly dependent economies is neither very realistic nor capable of 
achieving the desired target. We demonstrated that the predominantly informal 
economy posed defeating challenges to the enforcement of the lockdown policy in 
African communities where daily life takes place in the streets. The implication of 
our study is that a home-grown approach that is amenable to the local economic 
realities will be more effective for the prevention and management of the COVID-19 
pandemic and other viral diseases, than the lockdown.  
Key words: COVID-19, lockdown policy, pandemic, informal economy, solidarity 




After many years, decades and centuries of threats of human-life 
termination from epidemics like the Black Death, the Spanish flu, Swine flu, 
Influenza, SARS, Bird flu, Ebola among others, another great “tsunami [is] 
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sweeping the world”1 again with astonishingly unprecedented rapidity. It is, 
of course, the tsunami of COVID-19 pandemic. All forces—corporate and 
governmental—have since entered into a synergistic alliance towards 
quenching this tempestuous tsunami. Although it began in Wuhan in the 
Hubei province of China in December 2019 as an epidemic, the novel 
coronavirus disease has become a global pandemic, affecting millions and 
killing hundreds of thousand across the globe. As of 12 July 2020, it had not 
only been reported in over 216 countries and areas of the world; it had also 
affected a total of 12,849,435 and had led to the death of 567,783 persons 
around the world (Worldometer 12 July 2020). 
Upon confirmation that the virus originated from China, coupled with 
allegations of Beijing’s effort at concealing it, international blame games and 
backlashes ensued. President Donald Trump of the United States (US) 
together with American right-wing media baptized the virus “Chinese / 
Wuhan virus” (Tharoor 2020, para.7). The US and Australia, in particular, 
have persistently insisted that China be independently investigated. The 
Italian leader, Matteo Salvini specifically accused the Chinese authorities of 
“engineering a new virus in their laboratories to spring on the world” 
(Tharoor 2020, para.8). Several other Western countries like Germany, 
Britain, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, Italy, Brazil, et cetera openly 
expressed their displeasure with China’s role in the spreading of the virus. 
To most of these countries, there is arguably nothing accidental or even 
natural about the outbreak of coronavirus. In their reasoning, COVID-19 is a 
deliberately contrived biological weapon (bio-war) launched against the 
international community by China in furtherance of its economic ambitions 
and gains. Angered therefore by this concerted apportionment of blame and 
backlashes, especially from the US, China took to conspiracy theory and 
counter-accused the US. Zhao Rijian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
                                                          
1
 The expression was made by Professor Johan Giesecke, a Swedish World Health 
Organizations’ veteran virologist, to describe the COVID-19 pandemic (see: “Was Sweden’s 
Covid-19 lockdown a gamble?” Shorttermrentalz.com, 1 June 2020). 
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spokesperson argued that the coronavirus did not originate from China, 
insisting instead that it was American soldiers that brought it to Wuhan 
(Westcott and Jiang 2020). Iran and Russia propaganda media outlets joined 
China in blaming and attacking the US for the pandemic (Tucker 2020). 
Meanwhile, the unprecedented nature of the pandemic, its speed of spread 
and absence of known cure / vaccine in the early days of its outbreak, 
compelled the World Health Organisation (WHO) to declare the virus a 
‘public health emergency of international concern’ and a ‘pandemic’ on 30 
January and 11 of March 2020, respectively. This is in line with the 2005 
revision of the 1969 International Health Regulations (IHR), which imbued 
WHO with the powers to act in the case of an emergency, including the right 
to declare a “public health emergency of international concern” as well as 
issue non-binding recommendations to member states on how they should 
respond (Timsit 2020). With such declaration, WHO reeled out a catalogue 
of protocols to be adopted by member states of the United Nations (UN) in 
preparing for and responding to Covid-19. Among the earliest moves by the 
WHO is the articulation of the COVID-19 “Strategic Preparedness and 
Response plan” (SPRP). This was immediately followed by the release of the 
“Operational Planning Guidelines to Support Country Preparedness and 
Response” (OPGSCPR) in February 2020. There was also the ‘solidarity trials’, 
which are efforts by WHO to jumpstart the search for vaccine / treatment of 
COVID-19. It was a systematic trial of untested treatments or vaccines in 
order to determine their potential efficacy for eventual recommendation for 
the treatment of COVID-19 pandemic.  
In spite of what appears to be a work well done prima facie, some countries 
and governments are neither impressed nor satisfied with WHO’s 
management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The US and Australia in particular 
have insisted that WHO is under Beijing’s influence, with the US openly 
threatening to defund the organization (Wood 2020). This accusation and ill-
feeling are not unconnected with the way and manner in which WHO 
praised China for allegedly rolling “out the most ambitious, agile and 
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aggressive disease containment effort in history” through “uncompromising 
and rigorous use of non-pharmaceutical measures [which] demonstrated 
that containment can be adapted and successfully operationalised in a wide 
range of settings” (Feldwisch-Drentrup 2020, para.4-5). WHO subsequently 
moved to prescribe and recommend China’s ‘messianic’ non-pharmaceutical 
epidemic control policy and containment strategy – “the big lockdown; 
centralised quarantine, and contact tracing” (Feldwisch-Drentrup 2020, 
para.6) for member nations of the organisation.  
Lockdown entails tying down the country from cities down to towns, 
villages, neighborhoods, and homes. It involves closing of public places, 
prohibition of social festivals and restriction of movements / forcing people 
to stay at home. Lockdown can be categorized according to degree and 
according to kind. By degree, lockdown can be partial or total. In terms of 
kind, however, lockdown can be preventive or emergency. Whereas a 
preventive lockdown is a preemptive action plan undertaken to avoid 
dangers or risks of insecurity, emergency lockdown is an on-the-spot action 
taken in the face of imminent threat to life or outbreak of insecurity/disease 
so as to reduce the chances of large-scale damages / infections. The COVID-
19 lockdown protocol is arguably a prototype characterization of both 
preventive and emergency lockdown, because it is targeted at preventing 
the spread of the coronavirus to unaffected areas and uninfected persons 
on the one hand, and to mitigate or reduce large scale infection in places 
already affected on the other hand. The coincidence of its recommendation 
by WHO with China’s claim of successful containment of the virus was 
however viewed by some concerned countries as a strategic connivance to 
weaken China’s rivals, edge them out and launch China to a strategic 
international prominence (Ghitis 2020). 
However, the US and other nations critique of China and WHO’s lockdown 
policy did not deter national and sub-national governments from religiously 
adopting and doggedly implementing the ‘almighty’ lockdown policy. With 
exception to about few countries—Sweden, South Korea, Turkmenistan and 
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Tajikistan (The Indian Express 12 May 2020)—virtually all countries of the 
world keyed into the lockdown policy for the mitigation of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Haunted by the experience of Ebola and currently beleaguered 
by the threat of imminent extermination by coronavirus, the African 
continent, aware of its weak health institutions, had to join the lockdown 
procession. Partly because of the wide publicity given to the much-taunted 
Chinese ‘successful containment’ of the virus through lockdown and partly 
because African leaders saw the adoption of the lockdown policy as a 
possible preliminary condition under which WHO may offer any assistance 
to badly hit countries or region, national governments of African extraction 
decided to experiment with the lockdown policy like others. While some 
African countries adopted partial lockdown, others opted for a 
total/comprehensive version of it. Unlike the former, a comprehensive or 
complete or total lockdown is one during which there is an overarching 
confinement of people to their homes, with no form of movement, except 
for certain individuals believed to be deliverers of essential services / 
commodities. Measures associated with a comprehensive lockdown are 
usually stricter. South Africa, for instance, imposed one of the strictest 
lockdowns in the world, with cigarette and alcohol banned throughout 
(Flanagan 2020).  
In view of the foregoing, this article assesses the appropriateness of the 
global lockdown policy in typical African communities which are 
predominantly informal economies and where livelihood is dependent on 
day-to-day income earned daily in the streets. The aim is to unravel the 
inherent variables that systematically posed a defeating challenge to the 
effective implementation of the ‘messianic’ lockdown policy in most African 
economies. Following the introduction is a brief assessment of the lockdown 
policy in the originating country of China as well as in the advanced 
countries of the global north. The next section critically examines Africa’s 
socio-economic realities vi-a-vis the implementation of the lockdown policy. 
The last section concludes the study with a preferred policy position. 
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Lockdown policy in China and the global ‘North’: A brief overview 
From China in Asia, through Italy in Europe to the US in the Americas—the 
earliest worst hits of their respective continents—the lockdown policy and 
its implementations have much in common, although with little variations. 
The common denominators, as elsewhere noted, range from closure of 
public places and prohibition of social festivals, restriction of movements / 
forcing people to stay at home and fining / punishing of defaulters. In France 
and few other countries, people could go for exercises, medications and 
essential groceries. 
In the originating continent of Asia, China became the first country to 
impose travel restrictions, starting with a citywide (Wuhan) lockdown on 23 
January 2020. Although other cities across the country soon followed suit, 
Wuhan’s lockdown lasted only for about seventy six days, as it ended on 8 
April 2020 (Wang 2020). Although a node lockdown, involving locking down 
the country from cities down to towns, villages, neighborhoods, and homes, 
Ren (2020) holds that China’s lockdown was not a nation-wide one given 
that big cities like Guagzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Hangzhou did 
not embrace Wuhan-style lockdown. At the peak of the lockdown, people, 
at a stage, could go out of their homes to procure certain home 
fundamentals. Be that as it may, only one family member was allowed to do 
so every two days. In some cities / neighborhoods, however, such freedom 
was entirely denied as residents were barred from going out, leaving them 
to the services of couriers who supplied food and other essentials to them. 
What could be termed an advanced phase of the lockdown came with the 
tightening of the already limited freedom. Officials were mandated to go 
door to door for health checkups. Anyone found ill was forced into isolation 
/ quarantine. Just as nose masks became the order of the day, security 
personnel whose duty was to check people’s temperature before entering 
became ubiquitous in public buildings. It was serious that drones had to be 
deployed in chasing people without masks back into their buildings 
(Graham-Harrison and Kuo 2020). Even after Wuhan suspended its 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
59 
lockdown, technology-assisted surveillance continued across the 
neighborhood, including Beijing and by extension, China. At the airport, 
arrivals were compelled to self-quarantine for 14 days, at the expiration of 
which those without COVID-19 symptoms might move around with app-
assisted health status identification (Ren 2020).  
In Europe, however, Italy was the first country to declare a nationwide 
lockdown in March 2020, placing its sixty million residents under lockdown 
as cases of COVID-19 surged throughout the twenty regions of the country 
(Godin 2020). Accordingly, Italy also became the first European Union 
country to ban flights to and from China. In strict implementation of the 
Italian government’s new lockdown legislation, schools and public spaces 
like gyms, theatres and cinemas all over the country were closed just as 
public events were out-rightly banned by the government. Movements were 
restricted, while those who must move were issued with permit. People 
who flout this order by travelling within or outside the country without 
permits could face about three months jail or a fine of $234 (Godin 2020). 
He also noted that the lockdown legislation also forbids relatives/friends 
from visiting inmates, and that this led to protests in 27 prisons in the 
country. Cognizant of the impending consequences of a total lockdown of 
such magnitude to individuals, households and businesses, the government 
deployed a “massive shock therapy”, which took the form of suspension of 
mortgages, taxes and other public bills. It (the government) went further to 
create a support package of $8.5 billion for families and business affected by 
the virus (Godin 2020). With these, the biting impacts of the lockdown were 
not severely felt by ordinary Italians. 
In the Americas, the US’s national government initially dilly-dallied in giving 
the lockdown orders like other countries. Up until 20 March, the Trump’s 
administration still insisted only on “testing and isolating” people with 
symptoms. By 19 March 2020, therefore, the state of California, as an 
alternative last resort in the face of a surging virus, declared a state-wide 
“shelter-in-place” lockdown. Having become a situation of ‘to your tent, O 
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Israel’, 41 other states, in two weeks, toed the line of California and 
declared a “stay-at-home” order. In comparison with China and Italy, the US 
imposed the lightest and least strict lockdown measures. In fact, the US’s 
version of lockdown is better contextualized as social distancing, because “in 
most U.S. states and localities, people can go for a walk, public transit still 
runs, private cars can be driven anywhere, and people can travel freely 
between cities, counties and states” (Ren 2020: 8). 
Africa’s socio-economic realities and the lockdown policy: When what is 
good for the geese isn’t good for the gander 
Having become the global trend and given Africa’s history of copying the 
West / global North, lockdown also became the ‘preferred’ policy option for 
combating the novel coronavirus in Africa. Rwanda was the first African 
country to impose a total nation-wide lockdown on 21 March 2020 following 
the confirmation of 17 cases of COVID-19. Since then, over 42 African 
countries have imposed partial or full lockdown, restricting movements on 
streets and to work/business places. Emulating the West, African authorities 
mandated people to stay indoors while also encouraging them to work from 
their homes. 
Unlike in China, Europe and North America (the global North) where the 
implementation of the lockdown policy recorded some substantial success, 
the policy seemed to have been dead on arrival to the African continent 
given the structural features of its predominantly informal economies. The 
ubiquity of Africa’s informal economy and its increasing preeminence in 
international development discourses in the 21st Century has been variously 
noted by Ezeibe et al (2017); Goodfellow (2016); Mbah and Nzeadibe (2016); 
Meagher and Lindell (2013) among others. An informal economy reflects 
and represents a nomenclatural taxonomy for referring to all economic 
activities which take place outside the framework of corporate public and 
organised private sectors, collectively called the formal sector / economy 
(Udeogu 2016). For this reason, activities in informal economies encompass 
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a wide range of small-scale, largely self-employment activities. Okoosi-
Simbine (2015) adds that the informal economy is amorphous, cutting 
across many and most all career; including the battery charger, the 
tailor/fashion designer, the hairdresser, the retail shop owner, the leather 
work and footwear person, manufacturing (carpentry, furniture-making, 
metal work, block making / laying, printing, photograph and so on), services 
(auto repairs and maintenance, transporters, including lately motorcycle 
‘Okada’ riders, etc). Included on this list are keke drivers, barrow pushers, 
food vendors, kiosk keepers, and indeed any form of day-to-day businesses 
that fall outside the known boundaries of formal / corporate businesses and 
jobs. One fundamental point about informal economies is that the economic 
activities that constitute its life-blood are such that can hardly be rendered 
or operated from home as the lockdown policy encourages. Very 
importantly, they are economic activities—business and services—that 
thrive on person-to-person contact and whose operators or those engaged 
in it depend on daily income accruable from them for their families’ survival.  
Africa’s economies have been noted to be dominated by their informal 
sectors which account for between 30% and 90% of all non-agricultural job 
and more than 40% of many African countries’ gross domestic product 
(Quartzs Africa, 4 April 2020). Needless therefore to state that African 
economies do not only reflect, but also typify economic informality as they 
bristle with all the known indices of economic informalism highlighted 
above. From South Africa through the Central African Republic to Tunisia, 
and from Senegal to Somalia over 75% of lives are sustained in the streets. 
An empirical study of street vending in African cities by Mitullah (2003) 
reveals that street trading is not only rampantly ubiquitous, but also a major 
source of employment and income for many urban dwellers. In Kenya, one 
of the six African countries sampled for the study, informal economic 
activities (excluding nonagricultural workers) employs over 70 percent of 
the urban population. 
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There are two categories of informal economy workers that people on the 
streets of African cities and suburbs. There are the itinerant ones who are 
always on the move, walking the streets and roads of African cities either 
vending wares of assorted forms and sizes or rendering services of diverse 
shades and colorations. There are, on the other hand, the stationary ones 
who unlike their itinerant counterpart attach themselves daily around the 
roads and vicinities of major markets, parks, and other public places. 
Although there is no hard and fast rule as to the nature of informal business 
that should fall under any of these two dichotomies, food vendors, informal 
transporters, day laborers et cetera, tend to be easily classified under the 
former, while craftspeople, kiosk keepers, battery chargers, hairdressers / 
barbers, et cetera are often brought under the latter. Be that as it may, what 
stands out most markedly is that most informal economic activities are 
founded on day-to-day earnings made possible by direct face-to-face 
interpersonal interactions / contacts. Put simply, outgoingness is the oxygen 
that sustains the life of informal businesses. Therefore, any policy that 
prohibits going out to the streets daily and direct physical social interaction 
is bound to be viewed as a pariah policy by informal micro-entrepreneurs. 
This point, when stretched a little further, reveals that the lives of people in 
the informal sector daily depend on the streets, and to force ‘people to keep 
off the streets’ as lockdown dictates, is to kick them out of life.  
With the above structural challenges on ground, a critical observer could tell 
that the nunc domittis of the Chinese / European model of lockdown as a 
panacea for combating the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa had been sung 
right from its conception. That notwithstanding, African states, being post-
colonial states with established history of coercive tendencies and over-
militarization of civil matters, were prepared to gamble the freedom, liberty 
and lives of their citizenry for the inglorious lockdown. Therefore, in strict 
enforcement of the lockdown and its occasional dusk-to-down curfews 
imposed on many African states like Kenya, Nigeria, et cetera, security 
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personnel, especially the police were deployed to streets, markets and other 
public places.  
It should be borne in mind that fear of contracting the deadly virus, 
especially due to the hyper-publicity given to it by mostly Chinese and 
Western media outlets made some African informal economy operators to 
initially succumb to the lockdown order by shutting themselves inside their 
houses. However, it soon became obvious that the recommendation to stay-
at-home and stock up one’s kitchen is only possible for those who had 
enough money at their disposal before the lockdown orders. This is however 
not the case with day-to-day informal businesses and traders with no money 
at home or banks. The already precarious plight of the people became 
further exacerbated by the apparent unavailability or inadequacy of social 
safety measures / packages promised / doled out by some African 
governments like South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, etc. So, 
when the barber in Nairobi; the commercial taxi operator in Lagos; the daily 
petty trader in Lusaka; the food vendor in Kampala; the roadside mechanic 
in Kigali, and their contemporaries in other African cities were faced with 
imminent starvation because of the impossibilities of operating / working 
from home to make their daily living, they decided to choose “the lottery of 
infection over the certainty of starvation” (BBC Africa 2020, par. 24). 
It became in effect a two-dimensional protest and pushback from the most 
vulnerable segment of the society. One was rather spontaneously organized 
to call to question both the rationale for the lockdown and the politics of 
palliative allocation. The other sought to demonstrate that locking oneself 
and family inside indefinitely without food was suicidal, and thus the 
audacious resolve to fling doors open in pursuit of sustenance / survival. 
Against all odds, African operators in the informal businesses decided to hit 
the streets and markets. They knew they had two forces to contend with—
the ‘less obvious’ coronavirus disease on the one hand, and the ubiquitous 
brutality of the security operatives on the other hand. In defiance to several 
appeals by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
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to African countries to uphold human rights in their responses to COVID-19 
pandemic, however, state security agents of African state and governments 
went ahead and literally declared ‘war’ on her citizens in the name of 
enforcing lockdowns and curfews. Variously armed with guns, whips and 
tear gas canisters, security officers in many African countries began beating, 
harassing and, in some cases, killing people as they enforced measures 
aimed at preventing the spread of Covid-19 (Olewe 2020, para.1).  
Moore (2020) observes that, in Kenya, the death toll from lockdown 
enforcement exceeded official COVID-19 death toll, with police killing at 
least 6 persons within the first 10 days of the lockdown. It was too 
gruesome that President Uhuru Kenyatta had to apologize for the violent 
enforcement of the curfew / lockdown that resulted in the killings of a 
commercial bike man and a 13-year old boy in Nairobi by the police. 
Similarly, just two weeks into the lockdown in Nigeria, the security forces 
had reportedly killed 18 persons while enforcing the lockdown order (NHRC 
Report, cited in BBC News on Africa, 16 April, 2020). This is against only 12 
deaths from COVID-19 as at the time. The implication is that lockdown 
enforcement was killing more people than the virus itself. On 9 of July again, 
the Nigerian Police justified people’s belief that it has a bad reputation for 
brutality (BBC News, 16 April, 2020), when a trigger-happy police officer 
shot dead a motorcycle taxi operator (Okada) in Imo state for not wearing 
face mask and refusing to give fifty-naira settlement for the ‘offense’. This 
lends credence to Okoosi-Simbine’s (2015) observation that the informal 
sector has had to contend with state violence commonly seen in the form of 
extortion by government officials who claim multiple taxes for operators’ 
‘inappropriate’ location and operation. As it is in Kenya and Nigeria, so also 
it is in most African countries, including Guinea where the country’s interior 
minister acknowledged a “high” death toll after motorcycle taxi drivers 
seeking to make ends meet clashed with security forces (Ramdeen, 2020, 
para.3). 
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Across Africa, the rampant high-handedness, brutality and human rights 
abuses by the security operatives, especially the police, in the name of 
lockdown enforcement are the same. So far in Nigeria, at least 105 human 
rights violations have been reported (Mugabi, 2020). In Kenya and Uganda, 
police officers reportedly beat up defenseless people found gathering in 
bars. Traders selling ware in the market without permission were assaulted 
and manhandled by police officers in Zambia and South Africa. While anti-
COVID-19 curfew protest had led to the arrest and detention of 74 persons 
in Senegal (Ramdeen, 2020), the same had resulted in the abduction and 
sexual harassment of three young female opposition activists by suspected 
state security agents in Zimbabwe (ABC News, May 15, 2020). 
Table 1: Anti-lockdown protests in selected African countries 
Country Nature of protest/demonstration Sources 
Guinea 
Conakry 
Anti-lockdown protesters forcefully 
reopened mosques, saying “we would 
rather die praying” after about 7 were 
killed in a clash with security operatives. 




Protester destroy a coronavirus testing 
centre at Abidjan 
BBC News of April 6, 
2020 
Kenya People protested against police brutality 
and killing of at least 6 persons in the first 
10 days of the lockdown; forced 
quarantining of persons and payment 
before releasing; destruction of 7000 
homes and markets in Kariobangi in the 
name of lockdown enforcement. 
BBC News of April 6, 
2020; 
Baltimoresun.com of 
May 9, 2020 
Malawi Protesters say “it’s better to contract the 
virus than die of hunger due to lack of 
www.aljazeera.com 
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work”. of April 17, 2020 
Nigeria Over 20 coronavirus patients forced their 
way out of the isolation centre to protest 
improper and worsening conditions; 
construction workers also protested 
against the lockdown measures debarring 
them from constructing Dangote’s oil 
refinery.  
NTS online of April 
27, 2020 
Rwanda Refugees brought to Kigali camp for want 
of space from Libya camp protested 
against the lock down. 
VOA news.com of 
May 9, 2020 
Senegal  Protesters burn tyres and throw stones at 
security forces, demanding for an end to 
the COVID-19 restrictions. They were 
subsequently fired tear gas and rubber 
bullets by the security operatives. 
Hague, Nicholas 




Fishermen protested and clashed with the 
police over lockdown related restriction 
to number of vessels authorized to go to 
the sea 
www.garda.com of 
May 8, 2020 
South 
Africa 
Resident protested the lopsided manner 
in which the palliative food parcels were 
being distributed to households; others 
protested their being disallowed to go 
surfing in the water while people were 
allowed to go for other exercises. 
Anciona, Fiona 
(2020, April 24) 
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Zimbabwe An anti-lockdown protest in Harare 
resulted in the abduction and sexual 
harassment of 3 young female opposition 
activists by suspected security agents. 
ABC News of May 15, 
2020 
Source: Compiled by the authors  
The imposition of lockdown (stay-at-home and dusk-to-dawn curfew) in 
African cities and the high-handedness of the security agents in its 
enforcement were, as expected, greeted with violent 
protests/demonstrations by the people. Table 1 shows that Kenya, South 
Africa, Nigeria, Serra Leone, Malawi, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, 
Zimbabwe are among the countries that recorded hot anti-lockdown 
protests in Africa. Others include Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, 
Madagascar, Ethiopia (Ramdeen, 2020). 
Conclusion  
Evident from the foregoing discourse is that the novel coronavirus of 2019 
(COVID-19) has occasioned a double tragedy for the African continent. The 
first tragedy is that it met Africa at its weakest moment, when its health 
system / infrastructure is arguably at its all-time sorry state of operation. 
Whereas Africa’s health / medical facilities’ history has never been so 
overwhelmingly outstanding, its capacity and preparedness to tackle the 
COVID-19 pandemic was further precariously incapacitated by the fact the 
even the WHO and the advanced countries that would always come to 
Africa’s aid are also scampering for safety and aid. The non-availability of 
testing kits and inadequacy of medical-based isolation centers seem to have 
entered into an unholy alliance with the global unavailability of vaccine to 
barter tens of thousands of African lives to the murderous coronavirus. The 
second and avoidable COVID-19-induced tragedy on Africa is the imposition 
of lockdown and its subsequent enforcement in Africa. The policy made it 
possible for those whose immune system resisted the disease to either 
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eventually fall for hunger or be fallen by security operatives who enforced 
the lockdown orders without recourse to people’s plights and rights. The 
true position is that the lockdown policy is not homegrown and as such fails 
to capture and reflect the economic vulnerability of informal businesses and 
micro-entrepreneurs that dominate the African economy. Therefore, the 
pushback and protests from this affected segment of the society, including 
court rulings obtained by human rights groups go to demonstrate the 
unpopularity of the policy in Africa. 
Specifically, in Malawi, President Peter Mutharika’s state of national disaster 
declaration which sought to impose a 21-day nationwide lockdown was 
challenged by a human rights group and was subsequently voided by a high 
court. The court insisted that the President failed to outline the measures 
for providing for the most vulnerable of the population (PSC Report, 2020). 
Implicit in the foregoing is that health security does not necessarily 
supersede food security, neither are they mutually exclusive. It became a 
pointer to the fact that any strategy of saving lives without protecting 
livelihoods is counterproductive. Such is the case of the lockdown 
policy/order which arguably seeks to preserve the health of people, but fails 
to ensure that it does not concurrently constitute a threat/danger to the 
food security of the people. 
Professor Alex Broadbent’s2 conclusive remarks after observing the shocking 
modalities by which the South African Police were enforcing the lockdown 
becomes very insightful at this juncture. In his exact words, “lockdowns do 
not make sense in Africa if it means destroying the economic livelihood of 
citizens”. This is a fact, because a comparative analysis of countries that 
stringently locked down such as Italy, UK and Spain and few others that did 
not lockdown like Sweden shows that “there is no correlation between 
                                                          
2
 Alex Broadbent is a Professor of Philosophy at University of Johannesburg, who in addition 
to the above statement described the actions of the South African Police as “senseless and 
unnecessarily violent”. See: <https://www.dw.com/en/do-coronavirus-lockdowns-in-africa-
make-sense/a-53228689>. 
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fatalities and lockdown stringency”, for neither Sweden’s “economy nor its 
healthcare system has collapsed” (Jekins 2020, para.1). Like the Swedish 
government, Africa, cognizant of its developmental trajectory, should look 
inwards and come up with autochthonous pandemic control measures 
amenable to its local economic realities. Such measures, unlike the copy-
and-paste lockdown measures, should be able to concurrently save lives 
while also preserving livelihoods. 
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Abstract: The spread of COVID-19 will have lasting social and economic impact on 
the world; however, the economic impact will be felt far longer in Africa, than in 
many other parts of the world. Taking a backward view, we analyse the impact on 
the flow of aid and FDI, as well as bond market issuance in Africa, following 
significant economic events in the past. Using this, we predict that Africa will not be 
receiving a ‘helping hand’ from large economies as they start to rebuild their 
economies. As such they will need to find a solution to restarting their economies 
and reengaging their workforces, elsewhere. This paper proposes that the countless 
Social Enterprises that are already established and functioning in high-impact areas 
of African society are best suited to deliver immediate, effective and lasting 
economic improvements to their resident economies. However, to achieve this, the 
authors outline key areas which Social Enterprises and Governments would need to 
consider to successfully leverage this often unsung, yet highly effective, solution to 
poverty. 
Key words: Social Enterprise, Africa, COVID, Economic Recovery.  
 
Introduction 
The social and economic impact of COVID-19 will long be felt by the poorest 
nations of the world, a disproportionate amount of whom are found in 
Africa. These nations are facing unprecedented demands on their social 
welfare systems while at the same time seeing a decline in some of the 
‘usual’ tools at their disposal, such as aid, FDI, bond issuances, loans etc. The 
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result, if not addressed, is that of fraying social welfare systems, an 
explosion in the number of people living in poverty, and the inevitable 
political destabilisation that the continents’ history has shown accompanies 
that.  
It is time for an old, often silent player to step up and take a far more 
significant role in addressing this issue. Social Enterprises (SEs) have been 
present in Africa for decades, quietly working away to solve pressing social, 
environmental and economic issues in their corners of the continent. These 
SEs have been created by inspirational people who recognise that the only 
sustainable solution to these problems, is to mobilise the resources at their 
disposal in a ‘business-like’ way, thereby producing solutions that are not 
only innovative and available immediately where they are most needed, but 
are also far more efficient and effective in doing so. This is not to suggest 
that SEs have taken the place of government sponsored social programmes.  
However, truly successful SEs operating widely will mean that when there is 
a sudden onset of a significant event, such as was the case with COVID-19, 
they can step in and quickly address the most immediate issues, thereby 
taking pressure off of government social welfare systems in the short term, 
allowing them the time to mobilise. Furthermore, the success of SEs can 
over time enhance nations through their skills transfer activities, reshaping 
economies towards robust entrepreneurial behaviour and reduce 
dependency on foreign aid.  
But not all SEs have been successful in achieving the honourable objectives 
they set out to. It has been found that successful SEs take the behaviours 
that have been perfected by the private sector, and leverage those to secure 
ongoing success for their organisations. These behaviours go beyond formal 
structures and processes. They focus on behaving in a more professional, 
managerial and ‘marketing’ orientated way in their business. 
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Impact of Covid-19 
On 31 December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan City, China 
was reported by the World Health Organisation. The causative agent was 
identified as ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2’ (SARS-CoV-
2) and was given the term ‘Coronavirus Disease 2019’, or COVID-191. By 
mid-February 2020, all continents across the globe had reported confirmed 
cases of COVID-19, with the first case in Africa confirmed in Egypt. As Africa 
is China’s leading commercial partner, the virus inevitably spread to the 
continent through large travel volumes, with the highest importation risk 
countries Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa demonstrating moderate to high 
capacity to respond, while moderate risk countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya showing variable capacity and 
high vulnerability. The reaction to this spread has included reprioritisation of 
resources, short notice country-wide shutdowns and self-isolation orders.2  
As the pandemic spread, and we started to assess its toll on society and its 
well-being, the impact on the global economy has already become evident 
and is clearly the largest global economic shock in decades. According to the 
World Bank3, a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP, and the largest per 
capita income contraction worldwide since 1870 is envisaged for 2020, with 
most countries forecast to slip into recession. The recession caused by the 
Covid-19 pandemic differs from recent economic downturns such as the 
mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obligation driven 2008 
economic downturn. The current economic crisis emerging is related to a 
supply shock, where the required lockdowns have resulted in between 25 
                                                          
1
 World Health Organisation (WHO), 2020, Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 
– 1, 21 January 2020. 
2
 Gilbert, M., Pullano, G., Pinotti, F., Valdano, E., Poletto, C., Boëlle, P. Y., ... & Gutierrez, B., 
2020, Preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against importations of COVID-19: 
a modelling study, The Lancet, 395 (10227): 871-877. 
3
 World Bank, 2020, The Global Economic Outlook During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A 
Changed World, June 2020. 
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percent and 30 percent decreases in economic activity4. Media reports 
predict a more severe economic impact than the Great Depression of the 
1930’s with direct hits to global supply chains as well as deflated demand 
across the globe as movement and purchasing became restricted5. Emerging 
economies are expected to be among the hardest hit, with forecasted 
growth downgrades of 2.8 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 4.2 percent in 
Middle East and North Africa6.  
Taking learnings from the 2008 Global Financial crises, central banks were 
early to step in and ease the credit crunch by purchasing both corporate and 
government debt. Africa in particular, has used the issuance of bonds as a 
means to raise cash aimed at reigniting their economies through 
infrastructure developments etc. In fact, in the decade following the 2008 
financial crisis, Sub-Saharan countries, excluding South Africa, saw a 23 
percent increase in their debt levels, representing around 50 percent of 
their GDP.7 Unlike previous economic disasters, central banks acted in a 
coordinated fashion to widen the network of liquidity swap lines, and thus 
played a significant role in stabilizing the global economy. In addition, fiscal 
responses across affected countries have seen unprecedented levels, with 
the US government alone doubling the stimulus action taken in 2009. The 
actions have been both faster and more effective than during previous 
shocks, which raises hope for a faster global economic recovery. This, 
                                                          
4
 Holden, R., 2020, Vital Signs: COVID-19 Recession Is Different – And We Need More 
Stimulus To Deal With It, [online] The Conversation, Available at: <https://the 
conversation.com/vital-signs-covid-19-recession-is-different-and-we-need-more-stimulus-
to-deal-with-it-141037> [Accessed 7 September 2020]. 
5
 Sogani, A., 2020, The Great Lockdown Vs. The Great Depression And The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, [online] E-International Relations, Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/ 
2020/07/02/the-great-lockdown-vs-the-great-depression-and-the-2008-global-financial-
crisis/> [Accessed 7 September 2020]. 
6
 World Bank, 2020, The Global Economic Outlook During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A 
Changed World, June 2020. 
7
 Isaac, A., 2020, Africa Debt Boom May Store Up Trouble For The Future, [online] WSJ, 
Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/africa-debt-boom-may-store-up-trouble-for-
the-future-11580216277> [Accessed 20 August 2020]. 
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however, is reliant on multilateral collaboration taking place across the 
globe to lessen the long-term impact of pandemic.8  
The path to economic recovery therefore lies in policy reform to promote 
growth while strengthening healthcare service delivery and targeted 
stimulus and interventions for supporting social welfare tied in with global 
cooperation to alleviate economic damage.9 However, due to the 
restrictions on physical interactions, these interventions need to transcend 
into an increasingly digitally connected world. 
African and European Government Responses 
As Covid-19 has threatened both the health and wealth of African nations 
with the imposition of lockdowns and a multitude of business restrictions. 
Based on current trajectories, the previous business environment for many 
African countries has been thrown into upheaval10 and according to United 
Nations Economist Elliott Harris, this could result in an additional 160 million 
people falling into poverty, of which 34 million would live in what is 
considered ‘extreme poverty’.11  
African countries were losing the battle against poverty before COVID-19 
became a current news issue. In an Institute for Securities Studies report, it 
was reported that 150 million people living in extreme poverty are found in 
2 African countries, Nigeria and the D.R.C. Sub-Saharan Africa is considered 
                                                          
8
 Sogani, A., 2020, The Great Lockdown Vs. The Great Depression And The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, [online] E-International Relations, Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/ 
2020/07/02/the-great-lockdown-vs-the-great-depression-and-the-2008-global-financial-
crisis/> [Accessed 7 September 2020]. 
9
 World Bank, 2020, The Global Economic Outlook During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A 
Changed World, June 2020. 
10
 McKibbin, W. J., & Fernando, R., 2020, The global macroeconomic impacts of COVID-19: 
Seven scenarios. 
11
 UN DESA | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020, COVID-19 To 
Slash Global Economic Output By $8.5 Trillion Over Next Two Years, [online] Available at: 
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/policy/wesp-mid-2020-report.html> 
[Accessed 7 September 2020]. 
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the poorest region in the world, with roughly 40 percent of people living on 
less than US$1.90 a day. This was projected to increase
2020.12 That was before COVID-19.  
With economies that have been struggling for some time, many African 
countries have for decades relied heavily on aid to provide citizens many of 
the basic services and duties which the governments themse
fulfil, including provision of food, clean water, medical provisions and 
services etc. In 2017 the Organisation for Economic Co
Development13 reported that Africa was the number one recipient of aid in 
the world, receiving over 32 percent of all aid. Aid levels to Africa have, over 
the decades, steadily increased. See Fig 1. The U.S. is the largest contributor 
of aid to Africa and directs over 20 percent of their foreign aid to the 
continent.14  
Figure 1. ODA to Africa, 1970-2017. Adapted from Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development
                                                          
12
 Donnenfeld, Z., 2020, What Is The Future Of Poverty In Africa? 
Intitute for Security Studies Africa, Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss
future-of-poverty-in-africa> [Accessed 20 August 2020]. 
13
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017, 
Glance, Africa, [online] Organisation for Economic Co
Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/Africa
at-a-Glance.pdf> [Accessed 21 July 2020]. 
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 Kwemo, A., 2020, Making Africa Great Again: Reducing Aid Dependency
Brookings, Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa
making-africa-great-again-reducing-aid-dependency/> [Accessed 21 July 2020].
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The provision of aid has helped governments hold onto fraying social 
welfare systems and stagnant economies, avoiding unstable political 
conditions. However, has aid had the desired effect? Although significant 
goals have been achieved through the effective use of aid, such as the 
eradication of Polio recently announced by the World Health Organisation15, 
it has been argued that aid has harmed Africa. In a 2019 report, the UN 
reported an increase in malnourished people in almost all regions in Africa, 
which has the highest percentage of malnourished people around the 
world16.  
In a study conducted by James Cobbe17 it was found that aid negatively 
impacted the development of local skilled labour in southern Africa. The 
particular area aid is known as ‘technical assistance’ or TA, and relates to all 
funded programs that address availability of human resources and skills 
development in host countries by aid donor countries.  
It was found that although TA paid for training programs for locals, it relied 
heavily on the employment of foreign expats to fulfil that training. Examples 
of the side effect of TA programs, Cobbe reported, is that both Lesotho and 
Botswana had more expatriates working there, than 20 years previously. 
These expats are paid substantially higher than locals are, and as a result of 
the continuous flow of these expatriates into host countries, influence and 
even a level of control is retained by the Western donors. 
                                                          
15
 Who.int, 2020, Global Polio Eradication Initiative Applauds WHO African Region For Wild 
Polio-Free Certification, [online] Available at: <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/25-
08-2020-global-polio-eradication-initiative-applauds-who-african-region-for-wild-polio-free-
certification> [Accessed 2 September 2020]. 
16
 United Nations, 2020, The State Of Food Security And Nutrition In The World, State of the 
World, [online] Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Available 
at: <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/state-of-food-security-and-nutrition-in-the-
world-2020> [Accessed 9 September 2020]. 
17
 Cobbe, J., 1990, Possible Negative Side Effects of Aid to South Africa’s Neighbours, African 
Affairs 89 (354): 85-96. 
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Aid in itself is also not sustainable. During times of political or financial crisis, 
rich donor countries are forced to reassess budgets, which often lead to a 
review of the level of foreign aid that they provide. In fact, economic crises 
in donor countries have been found to be a powerful predictor of foreign 
aid.18  
Frot19 found that since 1970, foreign aid budgets fell in six donor countries 
immediately following a financial crisis. Of even more concern is the 
suggestion that aid flows decrease for at least ten years after a crisis has 
started.20 Furthermore, Heinrich et al.21 stated that as ‘major donors are 
democracies, we expect politicians that make decisions of foreign aid in such 
countries to be responsive to their citizens’ wishes in general.’ Using the 
Eurobarometer, Heinrich et al. showed that the public’s support for foreign 
aid strongly decreases when their personal financial situation worsens. 
Examples of these reactions can clearly be seen in Fig. 1, which graphically 
illustrates aid levels before and after the 2008 Subprime lending crisis. We 
see aid levels to Africa dip from 4 of the 5 Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) donors, with the US being the only exception.  
It is worth noting that the US aid data in this figure reflects the decisions of 
the Obama administration. The Trump administration won the U.S election 
by focusing on a ‘Make America Great Again’ campaign, which has resulted 
in a proposed reduction in aid to Africa of 28 percent in 2020, compared to 
                                                          
18
 Alesina, A., & Dollar, D., 2000, Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of 
Economic Growth 5 (1): 33-63. 
19
 Frot, E., 2009, Aid and the financial crisis: Shall we expect development aid to fall? 
Working Paper. 
20
 Mendoza, R., Jones, R., & Vergara, G., 2009, Will the global financial crisis lead to lower 
foreign aid? A first look at United States ODA, Fordham University, Department of 
Economics, Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series. 
21
 Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y., and Bryant, K., 2016, Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in 
Economic Crises, World Development 77, 66-79. 
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2019.22 The Trump administration has also shown that the aid they provide 
to Africa, comes with political implications. In a recent decision, the US 
announced the withdrawal of significant amounts of aid to Ethiopia because 
they felt there was a ‘lack of progress’ on talks on a disputed Nile dam 
project, between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt.23  
Of significant concern, is the time it takes for aid levels to return to pre
levels. This is illustrated in the graph lines for the UK, Germany, France and 
Japan in Figure 2. This means that aid, at the time when it’s needed most, is 
likely to reduce, and not return to previous levels for some time.
Figure 2. ODA to Africa by Largest Bilateral Donors since 2000. Adapted from 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De
                                                          
22
 Everycrsreport.com, 2020, U.S. Assistance To Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview
Available at: <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R46368.html> [Accessed 20 Au
2020]. 
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The economic and social impact that COVID-19 is having on Africa means 
that much more help is needed than ever before to stabilise economies, let 
alone to create the economic growth that is required to sustain change.  A 
study conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa by Gillanders25 showed that aid was 
capable of generating low levels of economic growth but not to an extent 
that could be called transformative. This conclusion is similar to findings by 
Dovern and Nunnenkamp26 who stated that higher levels of aid are 
associated with a small, though statistically significant, increase in the 
probability of a growth acceleration event.  
Therefore, if Africa is to deal with the shock of COVID-19, short term aid, 
that can be described, at best as unpredictable, aid alone will not achieve 
this. 
The economic impact of COVID-19 has resulted in significant contractions in 
national GDP levels of major donor countries. Figure 3 illustrates just how 
significant these contractions are in comparison to what was experienced in 
2009 following the subprime financial crisis.This means that unlike in 2009, 
donor countries may not be in a financial position to provide this immediate 
and significant aid to African countries. This makes the COVID-19 scenario 
particularly unique from any other crises this generation has faced. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/Africa-Development-Aid-
at-a-Glance.pdf> [Accessed 21 July 2020]. 
25
 Gillanders, R., 2016, The Effects of Foreign Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, The Economic and 
Social Review 47 (3): 339-360. 
26
 Dovern, J., and P. Nunnenkamp, 2007, “Aid and Growth Accelerations: An Alternative 
Approach to Assessing the Effectiveness of Aid”, Kyklos, Vol. 60, No. 3, 359-383. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Contraction of GDP in Major Donor countries, 
Following Subprime and COVID-19 Financial Crisis. Adapted from World 
Bank GDP growth (annual %) and WRAP and Politics
Businesses and markets across Africa have been significantly affected by 
macro economic issues such as currency shocks and commodity pricing 
declines – the price of oil, which alone accounts for 40 percent of Africa’s 
exports, has halved. A report by the United Nations E
for Africa28 found that growth on the continent is expected to slow from 
around 3.2 percent to -2.6 percent. Overall the report estimates a 50 per 
cent drop in demand for business across Africa.A key output of the African 
Union negotiations has been the establishment of the African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), with a drive to remove ninety percent of trade 
                                                          
27
 Data.worldbank.org, 2020, GDP Growth (Annual %) | Data
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG> [Accessed 9 September 2020] 
and WRAP, B. and Politics, E., 2020, Which Top Economies Have Suffered 
Due To COVID-19? [online] Businesstoday.in, Available at: <https://www.businesstoday.in/ 
current/economy-politics/which-top-economies-have-suffered
19/story/414683.html> [Accessed 2 September 2020]. 
28
 Uneca.org, 2020, Without Adequate Protection, Estimates Show That Over 300,000 
Africans Could Lose Their Lives Due To COVID-19 - ECA Report | United Nations Economic 
Commission For Africa, [online] Available at: <https://www.uneca.org/stories/without
adequate-protection-estimates-show-over-300000-africans
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restrictions between participating countries and achieve sustainable and 
inclusive socio-economic growth.29 While a significant percentage of African 
countries are now on board, the COVID-19 has negatively impacted the 
progress of the agreement as governments refocused energies on 
protecting lives and lessening the impact of the pandemic. It does, however, 
also provide a long-term opportunity for African countries to further 
establish intra-Africa trade and bolster sustainable growth in Africa30. 
African countries may rely on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to grow their 
economies. Yet amid the global uncertainty and economic insecurity, 
international investors are retreating from Africa, at a time when capital is 
needed to support the economic activity which underpins jobs and 
livelihoods. This is clearly illustrated in a United Nations World Trade 
report31 which projects that FDI into Africa will contract by 25 percent in 
2020.  
Furthermore, it reports that the 5 main FDI host countries (Egypt, South 
Africa, Congo, Nigeria and Ethiopia) all experienced double-digit reduction in 
FDI in 2019. This trend is set to continue under current conditions.  
Unsurprisingly, FDI is correlated to global financial crises. Figure 4 shows FDI 
from 6 of the major global investor nations declining following the Subprime 
crisis. The impact of these declines are visible in FDI Inflows into Africa. See 
Figure 5 A.  
                                                          
29
 Odijie, M. E., 2019, The need for industrial policy coordination in the African Continental 
Free Trade Area, African Affairs, Volume 118, Issue 470, January 2019, 182-193, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady054. 
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Figure 5 B provides more recent FDI Inflows into Africa, and goes further by 
providing forecasted scenarios for 2020, following COVID
impact. According to the United Nations, the best case scenario will be a 
reduction of FDI Inflows into Africa of 22 percent year on year, with the 
worst case scenario being a reduction of over 44 percent year on year. 
economic impact of COVID will be felt on the continent for the foreseeable 
future. 
Figure 4. Global FDI Outflows from Major Global 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
                                                          
32
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Figure 5. A) FDI Inflows into Africa 2007-2009. Figure 5. B) FDI Inflows into 
Africa 2017-2019, 2020 Forecast. Adapted from United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development,
The African Research Group (ARG), hosted by Nottingham University 
Business School, is a meeting place of minds across academia and 
professionals, all of whom focus on Africa through their work. In a recent 
ARG webinar, several key insights into decisions African Governments would 
be forced to make as a result of the economic impact COVID
were discussed. 
The ARG propose that:  
1. African Governments are more likely to buy shares in ailing 
companies than to make social investments (e.g. SA’
bailout of SA Airline due to cash flow difficulties);
2. That companies will no-longer be able to invest in social issues 
because of immediate cash preservation tactics and future cash flow 
concerns; 





-19 was having, 
s repeated 
 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
87 
3. That non-listed companies (such as SEs) will consequently need to 
look to Banks for unsecured loans at, typically, include high interest 
rates;  
4. That SEs will need to secure funding and resources, locally and 
overseas as aid or at very low interest rates that are sustainable over 
short timescales.  
The Role that Social Enterprises (SEs) play in relief and recovery plans 
SEs use business methods to respond to social problems. A key factor that 
sets SEs apart from normal businesses is that benefits or profits generated 
by SEs are focused on social enhancement or alleviation of a social problem 
and are often reinvested into the business rather than distributed as profits 
to stake or shareholders. One definition of SEs is that they use 
“entrepreneurial behaviour for social ends rather than for profit objectives, 
or alternatively, that the profits generated from market activities are used 
for the benefit of a specific disadvantaged group.”34  
The very definition of ‘performance’ within an SE is expanded from purely 
economic metrics (profit) to include social metrics, known as the double 
bottom line35 or more recently the triple bottom line, where environmental 
metrics were added to the measurement.36  
SEs have stepped up to “find innovative new solutions to intractable social 
problems” then “often deliver services far more efficiently than the public 
sector” thanks to being “driven, ambitious leaders, with great skills in 
                                                          
34
 Leadbeater, C., 1997, The Rise Of The Social Entrepreneur, [online] London: DEMOS, 1, 
Available at: <https://www.demos.co.uk/files/theriseofthesocialentrepreneur.pdf> 
[Accessed 19 January 2020]. 
35
 Boschee, J., and McClurg, J., 2003, Towards A Better Understanding Of Social 
Entrepreneurship - Some Important Distinctions, [online] Caledonia, Available at: 
<http://http:www.caledonia.org.uk> [Accessed 24 February 2020]. 
36
 Cornelius, N., Todres, M., Janjuha-Jivraj, S., Woods, A., and Wallace, J., 2008, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Social Enterprise, Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2): 355-370. 
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communicating a mission and inspiring staff, users and partners.”37 
Bennett38 reports that SEs have become major providers of social welfare 
services, previously provided by the state.  
SEs can be categorised as either for-profit, not-for-profit, or a combination 
of the two, known as a hybrid. Doherty, Haugh and Lyon39 define hybrid SEs 
as organisations that uniquely combine “structures and practices that allow 
the coexistence of values and artefacts from two or more categories.” These 
‘categories’ refer to traditional economic sectors being: private sector 
organisations, driven by market forces to maximise financial returns; public 
sector organisations, guided by public benefit and collective choice; and 
finally not-for-profit organisations, focus on social and environmental goals. 
The authors state that by pursuing financial, social and sometimes 
environmental aims, SEs are classified as hybrid organizations as they 
combine properties associated with private, public and non-profit 
organisations.  
The important role that SEs play through the creation of employment and 
solving pressing social issues, means it is increasingly at the forefront of 
social agendas and has resulted in the establishment of numerous public 
and privately owned philanthropic organisations that promote social 
entrepreneurship (see Table 1). 
Economies with advanced reporting modes are able to illustrate the 
economic contribution which SEs make, for example reports that suggest 
that SEs employ 13 percent of the EU workforce, and roughly 1.44 M people 
                                                          
37
  Leadbeater, C., 1997, The Rise Of The Social Entrepreneur, [online] London: DEMOS, 1, 
Available at: <https://www.demos.co.uk/files/theriseofthesocialentrepreneur.pdf> 
[Accessed 19 January 2020]. 
38
 Bennett, R., 2008, Marketing of Voluntary Organizations as Contract Providers of National 
and Local Government Welfare Services in the UK, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 19 (3): 268-295. 
39
 Doherty, B., Haugh, H. and Lyon, F., 2014, Social Enterprises as Hybrid Organizations: A 
Review and Research Agenda, International Journal of Management Reviews 16 (4): 417-
436. 
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in the U.K. In 2019, SEs in Australia made up roughly 2
GDP40, we also know that this so-called ‘third sector’ creates work for 
women, who are considered more economically vulnerable.
Sadly, this level of clarity on the significant contributions SEs make in Africa 
is completely missing from the record, both at an individual 
well as a continental view point. Some may argue this could be due to the 
sheer number of states present in Africa, yet it can also be argued that it is 
as a result of SEs in Africa largely operating as informal businesses outside of 
formal structures and thereby not creating the required reporting that 
accompanies such organisations, such as annual reports, tax returns etc.
Table 1. Sample of Government and Private Sector organisations that fo
on Social Entrepreneurship
                                                          
40
 Social Change Central, 2020, Social Enterprise: Statistics From Around The World 
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enterprise-statistics-from-around-the-world/> [Accessed 9 March 2020].
41
 Guerrero, D., 2020, Women In Nonprofit Leadership: Is There A Gender Gap? 
Missionbox, [online] MissionBox, Available at: <https://www.missionbox.com/article/127/ 
women-in-nonprofit-leadership-is-there-a-gender-gap> [Accessed 8 March 2020].
 
-3 percent of its 
41  










1 7 / 2 0 2 0  
 
90 
Social Enterprises stand as a potential saving grace for African economies. As 
small entrepreneurial ventures, SEs are by nature, more agile and 
responsive than large organisations and are therefore better equipped to 
respond very quickly to immediate needs that would undoubtedly arise in 
communities following a shock such as Covid-19.  
SEs are also uniquely positioned to help shape the long-term outcome of 
economies through the use of lobbying and collaboration with governments, 
as well as large public and private institutions to bring about proactive, more 
sustainable change. In a 2006 paper on the role of social networks in 
informal manufacturing in Nigeria, Kate Meagher42 says that where states 
and markets are considered weak, social networks can effectively fill in the 
gaps present in formal institutional provision and regulatory capacity. She 
goes on to say that successful social networks not only create trust and 
enhances flexibility, but can also help ‘facilitate the integration into the 
global economy.’  
The RFIC Global Social Franchise Index43 ranks 131 countries according to 
the impacts social entrepreneurship and social franchising can have on the 
well-being of their citizens and the top 10 countries are all in Africa.  
SEs have proven to be an effective vehicle to encourage community building 
between diverse groups and facilitate development in Africa. This is done by 
cultivating the creative involvement of community groups with priority 
placed on communal needs and ideas to drive development of community 
skills44. 
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 Meagher, K., 2006, Social capital, social liabilities, and political capital: Social networks 
and informal manufacturing in Nigeria, African Affairs 105 (421): 553-582. 
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 Rosenberg International Franchise Center, 2020, RIFC Global Social Franchise Index™, 
[online] Available at: <https://www.unh.edu/rosenbergcenter/rifc-global-social-franchise-
index™> [Accessed 20 August 2020]. 
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 Nega, B., & Schneider, G., 2014, Social entrepreneurship, microfinance, and economic 
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Social Entrepreneurs often operate without access to the resources 
necessary to be truly successful. In a study by Heike Schirmer45, it is 
suggested that a way to overcome this is to build ‘efficient and effective’ 
partnerships. This requires a shift from a ‘means-driven’ approach to 
partnership building (what do we have, what do we need) towards a ‘goal-
driven’ approach to partnership building (what do we want to achieve, who 
do we need to work with to achieve this). It is this approach that SEs in 
Africa will need to master to build the partnerships they need to be 
effective. 
In another example of the required change in behaviour of SEs, a study of 
SEs done by Desa and Basu46 reviews how SEs mobilise resources to achieve 
their goals. He suggests they take one of two routes: bricolage or 
optimisation. A ‘Bricolage’ approach is when SEs take the approach of 
‘making do with what you have’ and seek to address ‘opportunities and 
problems with existing undervalued, slack or discarded resources that are 
often available for free or cheaply’. Whereas an ‘Optimisation’ approach is 
when the SE accesses ‘standard, high quality resources’ that have proven 
capabilities in their area to provide the organisation the means to enhance 
or maximise efficiencies and achieve goals. In both cases, it is clear that SEs 
who set their own goals and access better partnerships, will be more 
successful and sustainable in the long run. Tello-Rozas, Pozzebon and 
Mailhot47 suggested that large-scale socially driven partnerships (they call 
these collaborations) can both scale-up social value creation and lead to 
more purposive collective action. 
                                                          
45
 Schirmer, H., 2013, Partnership Steering Wheels: How the Formation Process of a Cross-
sector Partnership can Influence its Governance Mechanisms, The Journal of corporate 
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in Global Social Entrepreneurship, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 7 (1): 26-49. 
47
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Why are these points so important to African SEs? With aid and FDI reducing 
across Africa, SEs will be required to proactively recruit supporters and build 
partnerships directly, both within their local contexts, but also in foreign 
territories. This will result in them, possibly for the first time, competing 
directly with the market for customers, donors and advocates. They will 
need to enhance and organise their performance. They will need to 
‘professionalise’. This will require SEs to look for and adopt principles and 
practices from the private sector48.  
Key Findings 
Based on the literature reviewed, it is clear that SEs may be used to 
operating as ‘bricolage’ organisations, however, to be effective in this new 
and daunting post-COVID world, they will need to behave as ‘optimised’ 
organisations to continue making the impact they wish to make. 
Davies, Haugh and Chambers49 conducted an in-depth study of SEs and 
identified 3 barriers to growth and suggested a response to overcome each 
barrier. These are detailed in table 2.  
Barrier to SE 
Growth 







values as relates 








suppliers etc, in 
                                                          
48
 Miles, M., Verreynne, M., and Luke, B., 2013, Social Enterprises and the Performance 
Advantages of a Vincentian Marketing Orientation, Journal of Business Ethics 123 (4): 549-
556. 
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the SE.  
Table 2: Davies, Haugh and Chambers Barriers to growth and Strategies to 
overcome 
It is clear from their analysis that the barriers to growth need to be 
addressed through professional interventions, though it is particularly 
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noteworthy that both ‘leveraging social mission’ and ‘anchoring’ would 
require communications and tactical marketing know-how on behalf of the 
SE.  
An example of the results of taking a professional marketing approach by 
SEs can be illustrated using the research conducted by Akhtar50 in which he 
shows that communications was a key aspect to increased levels of social 
value creation, which in-turn could be translated into social gain for SEs. 
One of the channels being identified as a tool to achieve this form of 
enhanced communication is social media. Significantly, the research 
suggested that the use of social platforms could provide SE’s a way to 
overcome the limited resources they have.  
This leads us to consider what is commonly known as the ‘4th Industrial 
Revolution’, which relates specifically to digital commerce and 
communications technologies.  SEs progression to digital has been slow due 
to lack of resources and know-how, however, COVID-19 has sped this 
process up and has created an opportunity for greater innovation, removing 
geographical restrictions and reducing costs while improving efficiencies. 
SE’s are grappling with this new way of working and require these skills to 
address the threat of widening the digital divide.51 
Gupta, Beinger and Ganesh52 developed a five-part model following an in 
depth study of 2 SEs based in Africa, that they believe will help other SEs 
develop sustainable and innovative solutions. In the table 3, it is illustrated 
how marketing, especially digital marketing tools, can efficiently and 
successfully achieve these outcomes. 
                                                          
50
 Akhtar, G., 2019, Social Media And Knowledge Sharing, Ph.D. University of Bradford. 
51
 Amadi-Echendu, J., & Thopil, G., 2020, Resilience is paramount for managing socio-
technological systems during and post Covid-19, IEEE Engineering Management Review. 
52
 Gupta, S., Beninger, S., and Ganesh, J., 2015, A hybrid approach to innovation by social 
enterprises: lessons from Africa, Social Enterprise Journal 11 (1): 89-112. 




Table 3: Gupta, Beinger and Ganesh Five Part Model Of SE Sustainability and 
Success with Digital Application illustrated by Authors 
Conclusion 
Based on the analysis conducted, it can be surmised that, like the majority of 
the world, governments in Africa have entered the COVID-induced economic 
and social crisis ill-prepared for the full impact it may have on their societies. 
They are facing decreasing levels of aid and FDI inflows into their markets, 
which severely limits their ability to provide the services required to 
maintain social welfare during these difficult times. 
SEs in Africa have a unique and important role to play in providing social 
support during, and following, COVID-19. They are positioned to work 
quickly, measurably and sustainably, often being more efficient and 
innovative than governments or aid organisations can be.  
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Research has demonstrated that SEs who have largely operated as ‘informal’ 
or ‘bricolage’ organisations will be required to take a more managerial 
approach to their business operations, which will be vital in securing support 
from foreign investors and volunteers, and ensuring their success in the long 
run. 
In addition, areas which SEs must improve on include reporting, networking, 
communications and marketing and in doing so, they will benefit from 
forging relationships with stakeholders, both within their own countries, 
including their immediate community, government agencies and other SEs; 
but also, with international stakeholders such as aid organisations, 
philanthropic organisations and consumers.  
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The Securitisation of COVID-19: Governing the Animus of 





Abstract: The securitisation theory has been used variably to explain global affairs. 
However, in securitisation literature, the ‘audience’ remains under-researched, 
often treated as passive and without agency. The Coronavirus, which hit the entire 
globe in unprecedented ways, has put different types of governments and leaders 
to the test. Countries around the world are experiencing or experienced either 
partial or total lockdown to curb the spread of the virus which saw infections in the 
millions and deaths in the hundreds of thousands. The government of Uganda, in 
particular, opted for a total lockdown, with only essential services allowed to 
operate. Between mid-March and July 2020, President Yoweri Museveni had 
addressed the nation 16 times, including a state of nation address where he 
reiterated the lockdown restrictions and guidelines for citizens. At the beginning of 
the lockdown, Museveni instituted state security machinery to make sure the 
guidelines were strictly followed. In this paper, I will argue that in Uganda, COVID-
19, a public health issue, was co-constructed as an existential security threat that 
inspired motivation and drew animosity from different publics (audiences), with 
public trust gaining and waning. Governing this animus became the preoccupation 
of Museveni’s government during the lockdown, putting him at the centre stage. 
Key words: Securitisation, trust, COVID-19, publics, Uganda. 
 
“There is no Coronavirus in Uganda. It is just politics”.1 
“A five-time elected dictator? That must be a wonderful dictator”.2 
  
                                                          
1
 Author’s informal discussion held on 26.06.2020 with a young business-owner discussing 
the shutdown of small businesses in Gulu district. 
2
 President Yoweri Museveni in a TV interview on Talk to Al Jazeera in April 2017 when 
asked if he thought Ugandans were tired of him because of his long stay in power and his 
dictatorship-tendencies. 




The year 2020 witnessed an unprecedented global pandemic. At the time of 
writing this article in September 2020, over 25 million people were infected 
and over 700,000 deaths from the Coronavirus had occurred, globally. 
COVID-19, as it came to be called, originated in the city of Wuhan, China in 
December 2019, and later spread across the globe, forcing countries to 
begin looking in-ward by locking down their borders, restricting 
international travel and following strict health guidelines on preventing the 
spread of the pandemic. 
On 5th July 2020, renowned journalist, Fareed Zakaria of the CNN’s GPS 
show, hosted Francis Fukuyama, Professor of political science. Zakaria 
paused a question as to whether it was democracies or dictatorships that 
fared better in the fight against COVID-19. Professor Fukuyama’s analysis of 
the issue is very telling. He summed it up as an issue of governance (or 
government) and state capacity, of which there have been examples of both 
democracies and dictatorships that have fared better or worse. Experience 
has shown that the US, a democracy, has not managed the pandemic as well 
as was expected and instead witnessed increased numbers of infections 
while it was going down in the rest of the world. On the other hand, New 
Zealand and South Korea, also democracies, managed to get the numbers of 
infections in check in the shortest time possible. The president of New 
Zealand a woman, and the health minister of South Korea, also a woman, 
received global praise for their efforts in fighting the pandemic, which in fact 
brought about debates as to whether it was a gender issue in leadership 
that could have been responsible for the lowered numbers of infections 
around the world. 
In some countries, the crisis of COVID-19 witnessed a further decline of 
democracy, e.g. in Ethiopia and Hungary where leaders and ruling parties 
used the pandemic as an excuse to hold on to power. In many countries 
across the African continent, the months of March to August 2020 were 
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marred by political arrests, imprisonment for failure to adhere to the rules 
of the lockdowns, crackdowns on free press, freedom of expression and the 
right to peaceful protest. However, what is also revealed is people’s 
increased desire for democratic governments and governance. In Mali, 
people took to the streets demanding the resignation of President Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita for his poor handling of the country’s economic crises, 
armed rebel groups, inter-ethnic violence and corruption.3 By August 2020, 
Keita had been undemocratically ousted from power through a military 
coup. 
Since the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global 
pandemic in March 2020, it became evident that it was more than a public 
health crisis, but had indeed revealed fault lines in other aspects of society 
including government and governance. Leadership in many countries – 
developed and developing alike – faced both praise and criticism for the way 
they handled the pandemic. Countries like Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and South 
Africa, which already had existing underlying structural problems, witnessed 
public protests against the lockdown measures because it infringed on 
livelihoods and civil liberties. 
Even though some curbs on freedom are necessary during emergency 
periods, Covid-19 has created opportunities for autocratic governments to 
tighten their grip on power, arguing that strong measures are needed to 
keep the public safe.4 According to Hautz, the danger to hang on to this 
power is greatest in democracies that have weak institutional safeguards, 
whose mischief may not be ‘seen’ because the world’s attention is on the 
pandemic which is raging everywhere at once. Tightening grip on power has 
been witnessed in for example Algeria, India, Russia, Fidji, Kenya, El 
                                                          
3
 M. Ramdeen, “Social and political protests, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, on 
the increase in Africa,” ACCORD Conflict and Resilience Monitor, July 2020. 
4
 M. Hautz, “Would-be autocrats are using covid-19 as an excuse to grab more power,” The 
Economist, 23 April 2020, Available at: <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/ 
04/23/would-be-autocrats-are-using-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-grab-more-power>. 
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Salvador, where governments have quashed demonstrations and protests, 
arbitrarily arresting and detaining people and thus precipitating 
constitutional crises in those countries.  
China, an authoritarian country and where the virus originated, managed 
the pandemic swiftly and efficiently. Fukuyama raised an important 
element, i.e. citizens’ trust in institutions (and the expertise of individuals 
running those institutions) which seemed to have been more effective in 
bringing the numbers of infections down, as there is no proven correlation 
between the type of government (dictatorship or democracy) and low / high 
prevalence of COVID-19. Trust in institutions is the basis for citizens to 
adhere to lockdowns, wear face masks, wash hands regularly, etc. Trust is 
also extended to those individuals in positions of power because of their 
education, expertise and leadership skills, acting in the best interests of their 
countries. 
By August 2020, Africa had recorded one million infections and thus far, was 
least hit by the virus even though experts warned of a new epicentre on the 
Continent, moving away from the United States (US) and Latin America, 
particularly Brazil. The East African Community (EAC) governments looked 
towards the West – IMF, the World Bank and the European Union (EU) for 
support to combat possible effects of the pandemic. Collectively in the EAC, 
by July 2020, there were just over 10,000 infections. The approach to 
combating the pandemic took different forms. Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda 
opted for partial lockdowns while Tanzania and Burundi did not lockdown 
any sectors.  
This paper highlights the efforts made by Uganda’s President Yoweri 
Museveni in dealing with the Coronavirus and how governing the animus – 
both motivation and animosity – of the publics, has become the 
preoccupation of his government. It is anchored in securitisation theory to 
understand how the Coronavirus, a public health issue, becomes a political 
and security issue and thus, threat. To understand the animus of publics 
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(audience), the concept of trust is used to argue how motivation and/or 
animosity is engendered and governed in the period of distress and public 
suspicion. 
I use the term public / citizens and audience interchangeably, while 
remaining critically aware that the ‘audience’ in securitisation studies does 
not always mean ‘population’ or ‘citizenry’.5 The Ugandan public / citizens 
have taken part in the discursive politics of the securitization of COVID-19 in 
practice, and thus are the focus of this paper. I argue that COVID-19 was co-
constructed as a security threat by the government in relation with different 
audiences, in a mutual relationship that bred both motivation and 
animosity. 
Theoretical and conceptual underpinnings 
Securitisation theory which gained impetus after the 9/11 terror attacks on 
the US, has been used to explain much of global politics6 including global 
public health. The concept ‘securitisation’ was first articulated in the 
working paper in 1989 by the Danish scholar, Ole Wæver. Wæver later 
developed the concept to understand security and in 1998, together with 
colleagues, led to a co-authored book as a framework for analysing security. 
In their book, they defined securitisation as when an issue is “presented as 
an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.7 Succinctly, securitisation 
                                                          
5
 S. Leonard and C. Kaunert, “Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory,” in 
Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve, ed. T. Balzacq, 59 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 
6
 S. Jenkins, “The politics of fear and the securitization of African elections,” Journal of 
Democratization 27, 5 (2020): 836-853.  
7
 B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO; 
London: Ly, 1998), 23-24. 
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is “the public framing of an issue as a national threat accompanied by a 
strategy to act”.8 
‘It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one’.9 By stating 
that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing 
actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent 
object’s survival. Security is a social and intersubjective construction. 
According to Taureck, a successful securitisation consists of identification of 
existential threats, emergency action and effects on inter-unit relations by 
breaking free of rules,10 and its successful use involves the ability to socially 
and politically construct a threat.  
The referent actor, such as the leader of a country chooses a referent object 
such as a pandemic, and makes that referent object a security issue. The 
referent actor requires an audience e.g. citizens or voters (to gain support), 
opposition (to intimidate or control behaviour) and international actors like 
the EU (to gain support and tolerance) to believe in the cause. The 
legitimacy of the extraordinary measures solely depends on the audience 
who must be convinced by the securitizing actor of the need to take such 
actions.11 
COVID-19 has witnessed the securitisation of global health.12 It has been 
framed as a threat to humanity and the proper functioning of societies, to 
the overwhelming collapse of health systems. The language of ‘security’ has 
                                                          
8
 R. Sjostedt, “Health issues and securitization: The construction of HIV/AIDS as a US 
national security threat,” in Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and 
dissolve, ed. T. Balzacq, 151 (London & New York: Routledge, 2011). 
9
 O. Wæver, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the 
Origins between Core and Periphery,” Montreal: ISA Conference, March, 2004, 13. 
10
 R. Taureck, “Securitization theory and securitization studies,” Journal of International 
Relations Development 9, 1 (2006): 54. 
11
 A. O. Ogunnoiki, “The Securitisation of COVID-19 in a globalised world,” Unpublished 
academic paper, University of Lagos, 2000. 
12
 J. Nunes, “The COVID-19 pandemic: neoliberal crisis, and global vulnerabilization,” Cad. 
Saúde Pública 36, 5 (2020), Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-311X00063120>. 
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been used by states and the international health system before, claiming 
that pandemics constitute imminent security threats.13 In 2000, the Clinton 
administration formally declared AIDS a major threat to US national security, 
the first time a disease was viewed in terms of security implications with the 
ability to topple governments, spark ethnic wars and destroy free-market 
democracies.14 In Africa, the language of instability of international peace 
and security has been applied to outbreaks such as HIV/AIDS and Ebola.  
These speech acts have been given around the world, declaring ‘a war’ 
against an invisible enemy, e.g. US, France, UK, etc. It can safely be said that 
COVID-19 was successfully securitised by WHO and various states, which led 
to the adoption and execution of extraordinary measures to contain and 
possibly eradicate the deadly virus.15 Confinement and social distancing can 
be seen as acts of securitisation that have given additional powers to 
governments leading to militarisation of response measures against the 
pandemic16 and societies have accepted this state as unprecedented as it is.  
Trust is a concept that has concerned social scientists for decades. Trust – 
beliefs about how others are behaving in a specific society or in politics, 
plays an important role in the understanding of governance in the times of 
COVID-19. According to Khemani the segment most relevant for 
understanding governance in the times of COVID-19 concerns corruption, 
viewed as the lack of trust in public institutions.17 Where corruption is 
perceived to be high, public mistrust in institutions follows when people 
believe that resources are being stolen for private gain. Trust in the role of 
                                                          
13
 A. O. Ogunnoiki, “The Securitisation of COVID-19 in a globalised world.” 
14
 Sjostedt, “Health issues and securitization: The construction of HIV/AIDS as a US national 
security threat,” 150. 
15
 A. O. Ogunnoiki, “The Securitisation of COVID-19 in a globalised world.” 
16
 Nunes, “The COVID-19 pandemic: neoliberal crisis, and global vulnerabilization.” 
17
 S. Khemani, “An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the 
Time of COVID-19,” World Bank Group Research & Policy Briefs (World Bank: Malaysia Hub, 
2020). 
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governments and public institutions to improve lives and economies, is high 
in developing countries.  
Citizens’ trust in government is necessary for the attainment of societal 
goals, as well as securing compliance without coercion.18 Early debates on 
trust focused on whether declining trust reflected citizens’ disaffection with 
the political system / regimes or the dissatisfaction with incumbent political 
leaders. More and more, however, attributes have been made to a variety 
of causal social, economic or political factors, going up or down depending 
on citizens’ perceptions of their governments’ performance in different 
sectors of society.19 
Most fundamentally, institutional trust has commonly been conceived of as 
a democratic good in and of itself as well as an important gauge of a 
democracy’s political health.20 A number of studies have also argued that a 
public’s trust in the actors and institutions of political authority facilitates 
democratic consolidation, in that institutionally trusting individuals have 
been found to be more supportive of democratic principles. In addition, 
existing research underscores the importance of institutional distrust as a 
determinant of political participation, especially nonelectoral participation 
such as protest activity and political consumerism. This idea that 
institutional trust is fundamentally the product of a performance-based 
evaluation finds a great deal of support in many studies that have examined 
the effects of public-sector corruption on attitudes related to political 
support.21 
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As a result of mistrust and suspicion, in many countries, the state came to 
be seen as predatory and protests against lockdowns erupted in several 
hotspots.22 Khemani23 has asked some important questions relating to 
governance under COVID-19: Will people comply with public health 
regulations? Will there be protests and social chaos? And will the global 
nature of the pandemic further authoritarian politics and human rights 
violations? I argue that these questions can be linked to the notion of public 
trust in government and its institutions. In Uganda, the citizens (public / 
audience) have reacted to the COVID-19 restriction measures and lockdown 
in varied ways, accepting and being part of the securitisation narrative as 
well as rejecting it totally. 
Presidential addresses to the Nation: Securitisation of COVID-19 
After independence in 1962, Uganda grappled with civil wars and political 
unrest until Yoweri Museveni seized power through a coup d’état, and has 
ruled, under his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, since 1986. 
Since then, Uganda has carried out democratic elections, Museveni having 
emerged winner in all five of them. Museveni came to be known and praised 
as a “new breed” leader, a Statesman in Africa whose ideas were aligned to 
and fashioned after Western ideas of democracy.24 The NRM government 
has made huge strides to promote law and order, equal rights for women, 
access to education and healthcare, and the fight against HIV/Aids. 
Museveni was courted by Western governments and money poured into 
Uganda pegged on conditionalities of these efforts being made.25 After 
                                                          
22
 Hautz, “Would-be autocrats are using covid-19 as an excuse to grab more power.” 
23
 Khemani, “An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time 
of COVID-19.” 
24
 J. Oloka-Onyango, “’New-breed’ leadership, conflict, and reconstruction in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa: A sociopolitical biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,” 
Africa Today 50, 3 (2004): 29-52. 
25
 J. Oloka-Onyango, “Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and 
Social Rights in Africa,” California Western International Law Journal 26, 1 (1995): article 3; 
Oloka-Onyango, “’New-breed’ leadership, conflict, and reconstruction in the Great Lakes 
1 7 / 2 0 2 0  
 
112 
decades of bad rule and violent dictatorships, Museveni laid out plans and 
strategies with a vision for a new Africa; his vision for leadership and 
responsibility for change and democratic transition in Uganda brought 
hope.26 The NRM government has made many strides in infrastructural 
development, gender equality, education, healthcare and the fight against 
HIV/Aids. Freedom of expression, peaceful protest and human rights, all 
enshrined in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, were all expressions of the 
importation of the normative power of the West that promoted rule of law 
and human rights, in short, democracy. 
Thirty-four years and five (re-)elections later, Museveni’s rule has taken on 
what has come to be described as a dictatorship.27 Museveni’s government 
has been accused of being hostile towards opposition parties, vote rigging, 
as well as controlling independent branches of government including the 
judiciary and legislature. In the last 34 years of his rule, Museveni has 
changed the constitution of Uganda – lifting the age limit of presidential 
candidates, extending ruling terms from 5-7 years and abolishing 
presidential term limits – effectively making him a ruler for life. In his 
addresses to the nation, Museveni is well known for his anecdotes about the 
“bush war” that he fought in order to bring peace and stability to Uganda as 
well as save the country from past brutal dictatorships. He often refers to 
how far Uganda has come since before 1986, citing infrastructural 
development, good road networks, electricity and scientific innovations.  
Without discounting these achievements, it is also notable that there are 
high illiteracy levels, high unemployment rates, poverty in a population with 
70 percent young people, and a healthcare system in shambles. The gap 
between the rich and the poor continues to grow unabated, and high levels 
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of corruption within government continues with impunity. Government 
critics are treated as criminals, facing arrest and assault by police officers. 
The elections are often treated as security threats that must be dealt with 
swiftly so as not to “destabilise” the country. With the growing numbers of 
dissention and citizen disgruntlement, often expressed through social 
media, in 2018, the government instigated the over-the-top tax (OTT) also 
known as the “gossip tax”, a tax levied on social media apps including 
messenger, WhatsApp, Facebook and others. This was done in a bid to deter 
the digital sharing of critical material including material from opposition 
parties who seemed to be gaining support from the masses.  
In March 2020, the Government of Uganda initiated a partial lockdown, only 
permitting the “essential” workers and services including medical, 
supermarkets, food markets, banks, etc., to operate. Public transportation, 
schools, universities and tertiary institutions, shopping malls and non-food 
markets were immediately closed for 14 days. People were encouraged to 
“work from home” and only walk to purchase food, medicine or other 
essential services. The work from home regime consisted of among others, 
people in formal employment who could afford or were able to establish an 
on-line presence that was required by their jobs. Vast sections of formal and 
informal markets were shut down. Usually jammed streets were suddenly 
emptied of cars and pedestrians. Bars, hotels and popular ‘hangouts’ lost 
their patrons as people listened to the news updates on the numbers of 
COVID-19 cases in the country. Information continued pouring from the 
Ministry of Health that the growing numbers – still in double digits between 
March and April – were people who had been abroad and returned home 
with the virus. On this realisation, the international airport at Entebbe was 
closed in order to guard against ‘imported’ infections. Ministry of Health 
followed guidelines of testing, contact tracing and isolation for people who 
tested positive for the virus. This first lockdown was met with approval from 
majority of Ugandans some believing in the leadership of President 
Museveni and most because they had no choice but to accept the new 
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reality. The government also instituted state security machinery to make 
sure the guidelines were strictly followed. It was commonplace to see 
soldiers, military police and other paramilitary units patrolling the streets at 
all times of the day, sometimes using violence and brutal force to enforce 
the lockdown restriction measures. In March and April of 2020, security 
personnel would be seen beating up people, men and women alike, until the 
President addressed the nation, stopping these violent acts. Security 
personnel followed the presidential guidelines to the letter, indeed acting 
like machinery without human faculties to ‘interpret’ vulnerability. 
In early April, as eager Ugandans gathered around their radios and television 
sets in hopes of the easement of restrictions due to low numbers of 
infections and no reported deaths from the pandemic, Museveni announced 
an extension of the lockdown for another 21 days as the “government 
assessed the situation”. Between March and June 2020, Museveni, 
addressed the nation approximately sixteen times, some of these addresses 
being clarifications of previous ones, in an effort to govern the COVID-19 
situation and keep relating with his audience. 
President Museveni reached out to Ugandans to give donations towards the 
efforts to fight the pandemic, a drive that was met with a positive response. 
The president read out long lists of donations that had been given in cash 
and in-kind to support the COVID-19 Taskforce. Donations in cash, food 
items, medical personal protective equipment, vehicles, hand sanitizers and 
soap, worth billions of shillings were donated to be distributed to the most 
vulnerable sections of society, hardest hit by the lockdown. It began to be 
clear, judging from comments on social media, that citizens had gained a 
new form of respect and confidence in Museveni’s leadership in trying to 
combat the virus before it hit the country on a massive scale. All the while, 
Museveni and different government officials unleashed emergency plans to 
create quarantine units in hospitals, increase the number of patient beds, 
provide ambulances and generally improve the response time and 
responsiveness. Indeed, COVID-19 was a public health issue that was dealt 
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with in a crisis mode right from the beginning and transformed into a 
national security issue. 
The President announced government’s plan to distribute food to poor and 
vulnerable households. In one of his nation-wide addresses, he justified this 
move, explaining that many households within and around the capital city 
lived day to day from hand to mouth and did not have any savings in the 
bank or any cultivation fields to fall back on in lean times. He therefore 
promised that the government would procure maize flour or posho, and 
beans which would be distributed at the village level where it would be easy 
for the village leaders to identify those vulnerable people. This move was 
met with applause and true to its promise, the government delivered. But 
this was not without contention and elaborate drama. Scandals of 
corruption were reported and videos made rounds on social media of some 
female-headed households who ‘missed’ the food distributions and were 
feeding their children on scraps and dumpsters. Some politicians, including 
the Speaker of Parliament, went on record stating that the food 
procurement process had been marred by corruption and that the beans 
that had been distributed were rotten, not fit for human consumption.  
Despite the uproar, however, President Museveni cautioned “opportunistic 
politicians” who tried to distribute food aid to their needy constituents that 
they would be charged with “attempted murder” because only the State 
had the mandate to procure food aid and therefore, take care of Ugandan 
citizens during a crisis such as this. Food distributions done in a haphazard 
manner would draw large crowds and therefore put people’s lives at risk. As 
it were, this declaration drew outrage from different publics. One member 
of the opposition, Hon. Francis Zaake was assaulted and brutally handled by 
the police for distributing food in his constituency. Zaake was hospitalised 
and pictures of him lying in a hospital bed also made rounds around the 
country. 
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Besides the ‘no food distribution except by authorised persons’ rule, no 
gatherings of any kind were accepted. Museveni also reiterated how people 
in developed countries were dying in large numbers because of “their 
lifestyle” which was very different from that of Africans, and possibly why 
Africa was not reporting as many deaths as a direct result of the 
Coronavirus. He pushed for what he called ‘scientific’ weddings, funerals, 
burials and other necessary gatherings. For him science is the road to 
development and these scientific gatherings were to be the new reality – 
people gathering in small numbers (usually no more than 10-15), wearing 
masks, sanitizing and maintaining social distance. In his addresses he 
sometimes comically explained what social distance meant, usually in 
different locally spoken languages to make certain that all Ugandans 
understood the concept and adhered to it as part of the prevention 
measures. 
Presidential and parliamentary elections are due to take place in February 
2021, meaning that 2020 was to be a year of intense campaigns. As of July 
2020, there were several presidential candidates vying to unseat president 
Museveni after his 34 years in power. A number of countries are holding 
elections on schedule, but some with a hidden agenda, knowing that the 
opposition will not be able to campaign effectively due to stringent 
lockdown measures, while the incumbents ‘campaign’ on television28 using 
the pandemic as a platform. Most campaigns in Uganda have taken on a 
‘scientific’ nature with severe restrictions on large gatherings and the 
promotion of use of other means including social media, and internet 
platforms even though a new public notice was sent in early September by 
the Uganda Communications Commission, requiring anyone seeking to post 
on-line information to get authorisation. 
The lockdown period was a difficult one on the average Ugandan where 
COVID-19 overshadowed everything else. Livelihoods and incomes were 
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disrupted and some stopped all together. Access to hospitals and healthcare 
seeking became difficult for ailments other than COVID-19, schools shut 
down leaving students and their guardians uncertain about the future. The 
lockdown also made openly glaring the divide in society based on gender, 
age, income strata or refugee status. Inequalities and vulnerabilities were 
exposed and exacerbated. For a country with a fast-growing population with 
over 70% young people, mostly unemployed, this made the situation even 
more dire. Vulnerabilities, both real and perceived fed into previous 
grievances against different public institutions.  
For a time, it seemed that Ugandans had accepted the security narrative; 
the president lending legitimacy to it through his hands-on approach and 
regular televised updates on the COVID-19 situation in Uganda. But as 
Jenkins29 reminds us, audiences are not passive recipients of speech acts 
and can indeed be active agents in the construction of threats, engaging 
with moves in different ways, (re-)shaping security narratives.30 Like the 
quote that opened this article, a growing narrative among the populace was 
that there was no Coronavirus in Uganda, and that it was all ‘politics’, 
revealing sentiments of mistrust in public institutions.  
A focus on audiences in the securitisation of COVID-19 in Uganda 
Several papers written on COVID-19 note that the conditions of inequality 
and vulnerability already existed and created avenues through which the 
pandemic pushed its way into society, creating even deeper social, 
economic and political cleavages.31 Health systems in the global South are 
riddled with precarious healthcare capacities, staff, resilience and access 
and other diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/Aids continue to 
plague the African continent. According to Saad-Filho and Ayers, the 
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problems of the global South are a direct consequence of neoliberal 
structural adjustment which dismantled state capacities, institutional 
resilience, job stability, manufacturing capacity and incomes leaving them 
exposed to disruptions in global trade, finance and production. Turse,32 
suggests that under pressure from COVID-19, deaths from secondary 
impacts – poverty, hunger, diseases, and violence exacerbated by the 
pandemic – may dwarf the number of those who die of the novel 
Coronavirus itself. A more desirable response and outcome based on public 
trust would require the expansion of democracy, transparency, and 
accountability of the state, which unfortunately, does not seem to be the 
case in much of the Global South.33 
Hautz34 has argued that where governments are seen as legitimate (or 
trustworthy), and where they try to ease the economic pain, people are 
more likely to comply with lockdowns. Using game theory, Khemani35 shows 
how the Coronavirus pandemic can be understood to have conferred a 
legitimacy (the ability of leaders to win compliance with new laws and public 
orders because people share a widespread belief that everyone is 
complying) windfall on governments in many developing countries, a 
legitimacy which carries a risk of being abused by politicians who could try 
to use it to expand or entrench their power. Indeed COVID-19 has been 
perceived as a security threat around the world, with both governments and 
their citizens participating in the construction of the security narrative. 
The Copenhagen School theorised that “an issue is transformed into a 
security issue after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat 
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and this ‘securitizing move’ is accepted by the audience.36 A securitizing 
actor will be successful if he/she correctly perceives the feelings and needs 
of the audience, cultivating a relationship that allows for a mutual discursive 
co-construction of the securitizing act and the threat itself. “Something 
becomes a security issue through discursive politics”,37 where legitimacy is 
given to the securitizing actor. 
Motivation or animosity towards a ‘security threat’ can be a result of 
strengths and/ or structural weaknesses displayed or revealed by an entire 
governance system, and in this case, the governance of the Coronavirus. 
Environmental, social, economic and political aspects of countries have been 
tested to the core. Murray38 argues that when forecasting the pandemic’s 
trajectory and socio-economic impact, the reinforcing feedback loops at play 
must be considered, that is, the spread of the virus and the preventive 
measures to contain it, exacerbate individual and community vulnerabilities 
and in turn, increasing vulnerabilities and distress create more conditions 
for the disease to spread. Murray continues to argue that it is ‘public trust’ 
in governance and institutions that emerges as an important element that 
helps societies cope with the effects of the pandemic; and perhaps explains 
why some governments have been able to maintain onerous lockdowns 
effectively while others with strong economic and health systems such as 
the US, are struggling to contain its spread. 
In Uganda, as the pressures grow and people begin to get more and more 
distressed with food insecurity, lost jobs and incomes, public trust continues 
to wane. By early September 2020, Uganda had reported over 5,000 
infections and more than 50 COVID-19 related deaths. However, not many 
people believed these statistics and it was clear that many were no longer 
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willing to comply with the preventive measures that had been closely 
followed in March and April. What was more plausible was that the 
reported deaths were due to other diseases that government had ignored 
during the lockdown. 
There are different audiences in Uganda, including rural poor, youth, 
educated elite and opposition politicians, who exhibited both motivation 
and animosity towards the government’s decisions. Khemani39 suggests that 
despite the low levels of trust, people in developing countries complied with 
lockdown measures. In the beginning of the lockdown, and with the 
extensive news of the deadly effects of the pandemic around the world, 
Ugandans easily followed the measures to prevent the spread of the disease 
and readily listened to the President as he gave updates, almost every week, 
on the status of the disease in the country. Social media was awash with 
stories and photographic images of mass graves in South America due to the 
pandemic, therefore confirming Museveni’s advice on treating the disease 
as a security threat to Uganda. For a time, Museveni took centre-stage and 
gained popularity even among his critics, for steering the country right in the 
face of a deadly pandemic.  
Institutional trust or public trust in institutions becomes an important factor 
for understanding the animus of the public under any circumstances, more 
so, one as unprecedented as the Coronavirus pandemic. Public trust, 
however, began to breakdown when social media became awash with 
stories as well as pictorial evidence of human rights violations and 
widespread corruption, all happening during the lockdown. Donations made 
towards the fight against the pandemic that individuals, businesses and 
organisations had been motivated to give in the beginning, were no longer a 
subject of presidential addresses by August. Perhaps there was a sense of 
exasperation and lack of confidence due to the stories in the media. When 
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some restrictions were lifted in July, it was not uncommon to see people 
moving around in crowded spaces without masks, even though the 
government had made efforts to provide them for free. Taxis were allowed 
to operate at half capacity, but some drivers together with their passengers 
were often arrested for not following these rules. 
One theory that was boosted to life was that President Museveni was 
planning to continue the lockdown until presidential elections due to take 
place in February 2021, thus giving little chance to the opposition parties to 
campaign. Uganda is governed under multi-party politics, although 
opposition politicians often face harassment, arrests and detention in 
various public and private spaces. This has not been different during the 
COVID-19 lockdown period. It was not uncommon to hear people saying 
“Covid-19 is not in Uganda, it is just politics”. Mistrust in the government 
was precisely because for a moment it seemed like a few people were 
benefitting immensely from the lockdown situation while majority of the 
population who live hand to mouth were forced – often threatened – to 
adhere to the lockdown restrictions. 
A public health issue soon became a security one, with some audiences 
actively shaping the security narrative. When evidence revealed that 
increasing cases of COVID-19 infections were coming from truck drivers 
moving along the East African regional corridors, mandatory testing was 
instituted and drivers had to wait for their results at the borders before 
crossing into Uganda. Some individuals who were ‘suspected’ of, or had 
tested positive for COVID-19 were hurriedly put into ambulances and 
escorted with security personnel to designated centres of quarantine. 
Contact tracing was done by medical officials, often with security officers in 
tow. Some reportedly went into hiding to avoid being treated like criminals 
rather than patients in need of healthcare. 
In Gulu district, northern Uganda, opposition MPs organised a peaceful 
protest to block the transportation and admission in a Gulu hospital, of a 
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truck driver who tested positive for the coronavirus. Their argument was 
that northern Uganda had suffered enough with first, the twenty-year long 
armed conflict that had devastated the region and second, with the Ebola 
virus that struck in early 2000s. They wanted the government to admit those 
patients in other regions of the country – these sentiments ringing true of 
ethnocentric intonations and conspiracy theories about how the 
government wants to ‘finish’ people of northern Uganda. These sentiments 
drew familiar support from certain sections of the population and yet for 
others, it was a cruel reminder of how the past feeds into the present and 
future events. The securitisation of COVID-19 in Uganda can be said to have 
drawn both motivation and animosity from various publics. 
Conclusion 
COVID-19 was co-constructed as a security threat in Uganda in a mutual 
relationship between the securitising actor – the government and the 
audience – various Ugandan publics. Uganda’s response to COVID-19 
contains all the vital ingredients of securitisation: securitising actor(s), 
speech act, existential threat, referent object(s), audience(s), and 
emergency measures. Ugandans accepted the news from WHO that the 
pandemic was a deadly disease, however, the Ugandan government – a 
securitizing actor – framed it as a security threat, taking measures to control 
its spread. At first, Ugandans accepted this, trusting in government 
institutions to fight this disease, even if they had to make severe sacrifices 
that impacted on their very existence e.g. food and livelihood security.  
Uganda, and the global South in general is no stranger to deadly pandemics. 
Ebola, SARS, Zika, etc. have had devastating effects on different countries, 
although it can be said that a wealth of knowledge, technical know-how and 
physical infrastructure has resulted from these experiences.40 
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President Museveni did well by shutting down everything immediately 
which could have first been motivated by health reasons due to inadequate 
institutional capacity to manage the pandemic but was later peppered by 
political motives that were difficult to miss by his audiences. The brazen 
corruption by state officials and politicians during a time when humanity 
should have come first was not seen in a good light. How this plays out in 
the next presidential elections in 2021, for which Museveni will be 
contesting, remains to be seen. 
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Globalisation and International Cooperation in a post-COVID-19 
World. The Case of South Sudan 
 





Abstract: South Sudan is a land-locked, large country, sparsely populated, but with 
high population growth. It only became independent in 2011. While its remoteness 
shields it from the Covid-19 pandemic, weak governance, high poverty, 
underdeveloped health services, and unbalanced economy make it vulnerable. The 
incipient pandemic worsens the severe civil conflict. In a fast-changing international 
environment, needed change will have to come largely from within. 
Key words: Pandemic, governance, post-conflict countries, international 
cooperation, South Sudan, EAC, EU, China. 
 
1 Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic hit a highly integrated world. In difference to 
previous epidemics that had most victims in developing countries, this time 
Europe and the US were strongest affected at least in the first phase after 
the spread from China. While the pattern of the evolving pandemic is quickly 
changing, it is not yet possible to predict its scope and scale. However, it is 
clear that the economic fallout and the massive fiscal responses in Europe 
and the US will lead to substantial changes in their longer-term policies. One 
implication will be that the relationship and cooperation between the world 
centres of power will change. 
While Africa has not yet been directly hit very strongly by infections and 
deaths, infections are rising, and the health systems of its countries are 
much less able to meet such crises. Moreover, the continent is already 
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suffering from the economic impacts, as supply interruptions, falling 
demand for its exports and declining remittances of its workers abroad.  
This article considers South Sudan. After introducing characteristics of the 
country and its health sector, we look at the direct health impact of the 
pandemic and government’s response in the second section. We also look at 
that of its international partners, giving particular emphasis to the role of 
the region, the EU and of China. The responses we discuss in the context of 
the evolving economic, political and social crisis of the country. The third 
section provides the – as yet very incomplete - information on the economic 
and social impact on the country. In the final section we discuss the 
economic and political perspectives of South Sudan and its relationships 
with its neighbours, the EU and China. 
1.1 Overview of South Sudan 
South Sudan is a young (independence in 2011) and landlocked country. The 
country borders Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Central Africa. Infrastructure is underdeveloped and to cross 
borders is time consuming and costly. 
The country has a young, mainly rural population of 13.3 million with a low 
population density of 20.6/km2 on a large land area (644.000km2). However, 
the population is rising rapidly, at 3.1% annually (2010-19)1. The population 
is expected to be double its present number within 30 years. An estimated 
80% of the population lives in rural areas (as compared to 60% in overall 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2018)2. Half of the population was estimated to be 
living under the national poverty line in 2009.  
South Sudan is endowed with rich natural and mineral resources. In addition 
to oil, the backbone of its income and exports, these include agriculture, 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Country Profile South Sudan 
2017 (2018), 168. 
2
 Ibid., 14. 
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forestry and fishery. However, these are so far mainly used for subsistence 
and only marginally marketed and hardly exported. The agricultural sector is 
the largest source of income and employment (85-95% of the workforce). 
More than 70% of total land is estimated to be suitable for agriculture. With 
the abundance of water, rich and diversified soil, and adequate 
temperature, agriculture has the potential to be a key driver to take the 
country out of poverty and food insecurity. Currently, the sector is still 
largely subsistence-oriented and contributes less than 15% to GDP. 
Extensive land is virgin. Notwithstanding the abundant supply of land, the 
agricultural area currently under farming is estimated at only 3.8%. Livestock 
is another major potential that is only marketed to a small degree. Since 
South Sudan is located within the Nile River basin, including one of the 
largest wetlands in the world, the country has also abundant fishery 
resources. 
Notwithstanding the abundant supply of land, the agricultural area currently 
under farming is estimated at only 3.8%. With mostly simple technology, 
agricultural productivity is very low, a key reason for chronic food deficits 
and shortages that are increasing in frequency and aggravate poverty, 
hunger and malnutrition. Moreover, government only gives low priority to 
agriculture: Only 2% of the budget is allocated to agriculture.  
The country had been part of Sudan, but had been locked in civil conflict for 
most of the common time of joint independence (1956) and had remained 
utterly poor, remote, and undeveloped. After a Common Peace Agreement 
in 2005 South Sudan benefited from an interim period of six years with 
massive aid inflows, capacity building and investments in health and 
education, followed by a vote deciding on a common future in a unified 
Sudan or as an independent country. The interim period was meant to make 
unity attractive. However, the vote was overwhelmingly for independence.  
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Simmering conflict among political leaders erupted into violence and led to 
ethnically tinged civil war in 2013. Although a peace agreement was signed 
in 2019, its stipulations are not yet fully implemented.  
Despite substantial improvements in social sectors and substantial growth of 
Juba, development remained lopsided. The agricultural sector, home of the 
population majority, is hardly developed like road infrastructure. Poverty 
remains endemic. 
A key underlying factor is the reliance of South Sudan’s exports and revenue 
on its oil resources. Oil has turned out to be a ‘resource curse’ leading to 
weak governance and weak institutions. Arguably, the massive foreign aid 
has also turned out as a resource curse as donors have largely turned a blind 
eye on weak accountability and high levels of corruption.  
Stagnating or declining governance show the precarious status of the 
country. Voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are all 
lower than at independence and among the world’s lowest3.  
In 2016 South Sudan became the sixth member of the East African 
Community (EAC), including its most important trade partners Uganda and 
Kenya, an important market and source of qualified labour. Once the 
country has fully adopted the EAC laws, regulations and policies, it will be 
part of a growing and deepening common market. The obligations to the 
EAC will also be an important instrument to deepen the rule of law, be a 
driver of reform, improve the business climate, and enhance investment 
confidence. Once South Sudan develops its largely still dormant agriculture, 
East Africa that often faces crop failures induced by drought or pests with 
malnutrition, will be a key market.  
                                                          
3
 World Bank, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project,” <https://info.world 
bank.org/governance/wgi/#home> (accessed 2 July 2020). 
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However, climate change is also increasingly visible in South Sudan. Climate 
change contributes to the causes of floods and droughts and thus food 
insecurity and conflict4. It will also reduce resilience to pandemics that must 
be expected in future. South Sudan needs to adopt ‘climate-smart 
agriculture’ in order to mitigate climate-induced food shortage and improve 
food production.5  
1.2 South Sudan’s health sector6  
South Sudan started with very limited health services at the end of its long 
civil conflict in 2006. But health was one of the major funding areas of 
foreign donors since then. Between 2011 and 2015, ODA funding for health 
(and population) was the category of highest priority, second only to 
humanitarian aid. However, the returning civil conflict in 2013 interrupted 
many of the efforts. Domestic public spending has remained very low (e.g. 
1.9% of the public budget in 2018).  
As a result of the massive funding by the international cooperation partners 
(ICP), health indicators improved markedly: Life expectancy rose to 58 years 
as compared to 46 in 1994. But the indicators are still lower than the sub-
Saharan Africa average. For instance, life expectancy is 57.6 years (sub-
Saharan Africa: 61.3) – the gap had been narrower in 2011.  
Despite the progress made, the country's health indicators are still worse 
than the African averages and of most of its neighbours. For instance, South 
Sudan’s neonatal mortality rate of 39.6 (2014) improved by 40% compared 
to 1993, but still compares to an African value of 29.0. The infant mortality 
                                                          
4
 Jean-Francois Maystadt, Margherita Calderone and Liangzhi You, “Local warming and 
violent conflict in North and South Sudan,” Journal of Economic Geography 15, 3 (2015): 
649-671. 
5
 Augustino T. Mayai, “Improving Gender Equality Quota Implementation in Post-conflict 
South Sudan,” Weekly Review, Sudd Institute, 6 November 2018. 
6
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Country Profile South Sudan 
2017 (2018). 
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rate fell by more than half in the 21 years (1993-2014). It is now only 11% 
higher than that of the African average. South Sudan’s HIV prevalence is 
considerably lower (37.2%) than the African average in 2014, due to the 
country’s relative isolation.  
2 The COVID-19 pandemic and the responses 
Although South Sudan is shielded to a degree by its remote location and 
weak connections to the world, a number of factors make it vulnerable to 
pandemics7. As discussed above, its healthcare system is underdeveloped 
and much weaker than that of neighbouring countries. Furthermore, health 
services are highly concentrated on Juba, the only major urban area. 
Although they were able to detect, isolate and provide some care for Covid-
19 patients, the health system would be clearly overwhelmed by any 
substantial number of cases. Not only will the system’s ability to cope with 
the Covid-19 infected be challenged, many Covid-19 cases would also 
endanger the treatment of other serious diseases as malaria.  
In fact, the head of the UN Mission on South Sudan (UNMISS) raised deep 
concerns about additional pressure of responding to COVID-19 on the 
already weak health system will disrupt vaccinations, maternal health 
services and treatment for curable diseases like malaria, and pneumonia, 
resulting in a devastating increase in preventable deaths.8  
The poor governance and high fragility imply weak law enforcement 
institutions to penetrate the wider country to enforce the standard 
measures to combat the spread of the virus as travel bans, social distancing 
protocols, and hygienic practices. The high population density in settlements 
                                                          
7
 See Nhial Tiitmaner and Abraham Awolich, “The COVID-19 Pandemic vulnerability factors 
in South Sudan,” Policy Brief, The Sudd Institute, 15 May 2020. 
8
 Radio Tamazuj, “COVID-19 and conflict threaten health system and ceasefire in South 
Sudan: Shearer,” <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/covid-19-and-conflict-threaten 
-health-system-and-ceasefire-in-south-sudan-shearer> (accessed 2 July 2020). 
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and high household sizes (often beyond 30) provide an ideal environment 
for the spread of the virus.  
The actual state of part of the country under civil conflict and/or criminal 
activity this part of the country is inaccessible to testing the population and 
providing health care.  
Previous natural disasters to which South Sudan is susceptible as floods and 
droughts overstretch state capacity and make the population more 
vulnerable. Many are displaced and lost their livelihoods.  
The concentration of the country’s income on a single source – oil export – 
make its economy in general and its health services in particular vulnerable. 
The country is not able to generate resources sufficiently and to cushion its 
people and business against economic shocks.  
The high degrees of poverty and illiteracy make people’s access both to 
information and to economic resources to combat infections as Covid-19 
limited. 
The high reliance of the country on humanitarian assistance and on imports 
of basic commodities make the country very vulnerable. While official trade 
comes almost exclusively through one customs entry point (Nimule 
bordering Uganda on the country’s only tarmac overland road), there is also 
smuggling, mainly from Kenya and Sudan.  
The lack of transparency on part of government and severe restrictions on 
press freedom impair citizens’ ability to inform themselves form well 
informed opinions, voice their concerns and hold government accountable. 
As a result, there is a high level of mistrust in government institutions. This 
was only heightened in the course of the pandemic. In fact, numerous 
misperceptions and conspiracy theories emerged concerning the existence 
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of Covid-19, being a ploy to earn money or being directed at specific groups 
of people.9 
South Sudan reported its first case of Covid-19 on 5 April 2020, when a 
patient arriving from Netherlands via Ethiopia was tested and quarantined. 
The second and third patients confirmed and quarantined were also United 
Nation female staff arriving from Nairobi in South Sudan on 7 and 9 of April 
respectively. The first death was reported on 15 May.10  
The pandemic is progressing and the first Vice President tested positive for 
coronavirus along with some other high-ranked government officials.11 
National data are published by the Public Health Emergency Operations 
Centre at the Ministry of Health.12 The latest available weekly report (dated 
7 July) reports a cumulative total of 2106 infected and 40 deaths. 11477 
tests were performed. The Juba Infections Disease Unit had still 90% of its 
capacity available at that time.  
Most respected international figures by Johns-Hopkins University reported 
2153 infections and 41 deaths in South Sudan on 16 July.13 
The following figure shows the evolution of the pandemic in South Sudan so 
far in terms of numbers of infections and deaths. After having risen sharply 
over May and June, the infection rate seems to have been halted in July.  
                                                          
9
 “Citizen’s Taskforce on Covid-19, South Sudan,” Policy Brief, No 2, June 2020. 
10
 Waakhe Simon Wudu, “First COVID-19 Death Reported in South Sudan,” Voice of 
America, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/first-covid-19-death-report 
ed-south-sudan> (accessed 2 July 2020). 
11
 International Monetary Fund, “Policy responses to Covid-19,” <https://www.imf.org/en/ 
Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#S> (accessed 2 July 2020). 
12
 OCHA Services, “South Sudan Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC). 
COVID-19 Weekly Situation Update Report Reporting Period: June 8-14, 2020,” Relief Web, 
June 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-public-health-emer 
gency-operations-centre-pheoc-covid-19-weekly-0> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
13
 Johns Hopkins University, “Covid-19 dashboard,” <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map. 
html> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
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Epicentre has been Juba, the capital and only urban centre, where 97.4 of 
cases were reported. 17 of the 80 counties have reported Covid-19 cases.  
Chart 1: Total coronavirus Infected-deaths cases in South Sudan 
 
Sources: (https://www.worldometers) 
The reliability of data is limited by the low level of testing. Data published on 
numbers of infected people by South Sudanese authorities, WHO and 
national media are varied.  
Clearly the reported numbers of infections and deaths are much below 
actual figures – but it is unclear by how much. While it is credible that 
infections are concentrated on Juba that is most connected to the outside 
world, there will be a considerable degree of underreporting elsewhere 
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Health speaker estimates that the real number may be 2.5 times as high as 
official figures.14  
Early, in mid March, the government announced various precautionary 
measures to curb the spread of the virus. These included (i) International 
flight suspension15 (with few exceptions for planes bringing in health-related 
cargo, such as medicine and medical equipment, and essential/critical food 
items); (ii) land border restrictions; (iii) passenger bus prohibitions; (iv) 
evening curfews; (v) social distancing16; and (vi) a mandatory 14-day 
quarantine period for any traveller arriving from a virus-affected country.  
South Sudan suspended all flights and passengers to or from countries 
affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. The Issuing of visa for passengers from 
countries affected by the Covid-19 pandemic such Egypt, United Arab 
Emirates, Europe were halted until further notice.  
The government also encouraged businesses to allow their employees to 
telework, the business community against increasing prices and hoarding 
essential goods and commodities17.  
However, lockdown measures were partially lifted on May 7, even though 
the number of Covid-19 cases continued to increase. Regional flights were 
to resume, and markets, shops and bars were allowed to reopen. However, 
                                                          
14
 Waakhe Simon Wudu‚ “First COVID-19 Death Reported in South Sudan,” Voice of 
America, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/first-covid-19-death-report 
ed-south-sudan> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
15
 Eye Radio, “South Sudan bans international flights,” <https://eyeradio.org/s-sudan-bans-
international-flights/> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
16
 Benjamin Takpiny, “Coronavirus: South Sudan bans social gatherings,” Anadolu Agency, 
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/coronavirus-south-sudan-bans-social-gatherings/17683 
78> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
17
 Eye Radio, “Kiir imposes night curfew, asks employers to have some staff stay home,” 
<https://eyeradio.org/kiir-imposes-night-curfew-asks-employers-to-have-some-staff-stay-
home/> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
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schools, churches, mosques, and nightclubs remain closed. Sports, funerals, 
and other public gatherings remain suspended.18  
The South Sudan Doctors Union called the decision rushed, premature, and 
risky. A public health expert at the University of Juba assumes that 
government prioritized the economic impact of the pandemic over lives.19 
Reports on the effectiveness of the lockdown indicated the difficulties of 
enforcement. In particular, rules of social distancing were difficult to follow 
in a culture of intensive social interaction and in large households. Reports 
confirmed that traders at different markets are still behaving the same way, 
by not following the government directive of keeping social distance and 
washing hands with soap and running water. In some parts of South Sudan, 
handshakes are part of the culture. Not to follow this practice is sanctioned.  
Generally, reports say that the policy to clamp down on social gathering has 
not been effective. Although streets have been empty, the crowds have only 
shifted elsewhere: to residences, neighbourhoods, clubs, and commercial 
facilities.20  
The lockdown has also proven to be ineffective in other respects. For 
instance, the restrictions of operational banking hours to only four lead to 
higher crowds than before implying higher risks of infection. Furthermore, 
the practice hampered economic interactions threatening livelihoods. 
Nevertheless, the lockdown and social distancing is believed to have had 
some positive impact on the spread of infections.  
                                                          
18
 Waake Simon Wudu and Dimo Silva Aurelio, “South Sudan Lifts Covid-19 Restrictions 
despite rise in cases,” Voice of America, <https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/ 
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In addition to the lockdown, government allocated a Covid-19 fund of $8.0 
million to alleviate the impact of the infections. Of these, $5.0 million was 
allocated to the Ministry of Health to combat the pandemic. The 
government has also redirected $7.6 million from the World Bank’s grant of 
$105 million for the UNICEF and ICRC, a third party implementing agency of 
the grant, to purchase items for pandemic prevention and treatment. On 24 
April 2020, the Bank of South Sudan cut the Central Bank Rate by 2 
percentage points, from 15% to 13%, and reduced the Reserve Requirement 
Ratio from 20% to 18%.21 
As elsewhere, the EAC members have dealt with the rising Covid-19 
pandemic mainly on the national level. However, the EAC is also taking a 
regional initiative. This is formulated in the Regional Health Sector 
Coronavirus Plan. The regional response includes: establishing a well-
coordinated mechanism to overcome the pandemic; enable the movement 
of goods and services in the region; minimize number of infected people 
with Covid-19; reduce disease and mortality from the pandemic in the 
region; coordinate between urgent needs of coronavirus patients and the 
need of the regular health care system; make sure that the EAC region 
health system is well equipped with necessary capacity for surveillance, case 
detection management; special support should given to protect staff family 
members and the communities against spread of the infection; and others. 
The EAC Adhoc Regional Coordination Committee (EACRCC) is coordinated 
by the EAC and linked to the National Task Force of each Partner State. It 
works closely with GIZ, Trademark, JICA and USAID.  
The EU has been one of the key donors since 2006. With the US, it is also 
main donor for humanitarian assistance. In fact, since the outbreak of the 
armed civil conflict in 2013, most development aid has been replaced by 
humanitarian assistance. 
                                                          
21
 International Monetary Fund, “Policy Responses to Covid-19,” <https://www.imf.org/en/ 
Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#S> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
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South Sudan received € 4 million to train healthcare staff as part of the 
Emergency Trust Fund for (EUTF) for the Horn of Africa. The EU also supplied 
sanitation and nutrition services to more than 4.4 million people in needs in 
areas affected by the Coronavirus pandemic. On top of that, the EU also 
provided one million $ to WHO to increase lab capacities in South Sudan. 
China has been a main partner to Sudan and South Sudan since the 
exploration of oil in the first decade of this century. It has been the key 
customer of its oil.  
During 1990, the government of Sudan involved Chinese and Mali 
petroleum companies to invest massively in South Sudan. Records showed 
political conflicts, humanitarians catastrophic, and environmental damages 
were witnessed in the areas surrounded by oil fields in Upper Nile. 
Population in the areas complained about health problems include 
deformed and early born babies, lost of livestock contaminated drinking 
water, bad quality of soils. Indigenous people in concerned areas were 
forced to vacate ancestor lands with no compensation in kind or in cash. 
Political conflicts amongst clans were witnessed. The only support to the 
region was given by humanitarian organisations, while oil companies did 
little so far. 22  
China is appreciated by government because of its policy of non-
interference in domestic affairs. However, its image has been damaged by 
its involvement in corrupt deals at the 400 km road building from Juba to 
Aweil, centre of the North-West. Only two weeks after completion, the road 
has been destroyed through heavy rains. Investigations have started against 
the company for failing to deliver quality services. The company had been 
contracted in 2019 in return for 30,000 barrels of oil per day. Investigation 
took place, one of the senior staff from the Office of the President was 
removed and is currently investigated. 
                                                          
22
 Unpublished report, Polouge “Dar Petroleum Operating Company,” February 2015. 
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In line with support to fight Covid-19, the Chinese embassy donated medical 
items in kind to the government of South Sudan including protected suits, 
facemasks, surgical masks, protective goggles, and gloves, packets of 
diagnostic kits. This reflects new trends in terms of the South Sudan China 
relationship. 
3 Economic and wider impacts of the pandemic  
As reported, the direct effects by Covid-19 seem to be rather limited as yet, 
although it is clear that the reported figure are only a fraction of actual 
figures. More important for economic development were and are the results 
from other countries and from the lock-down measure in South Sudan. Lock-
downs and economic depressions in other countries trading with South 
Sudan impacted imports and the demand for exports. In sum, the Covid-19 
impacts have exacerbated the political-economic crisis of the country.  
The virus started when farmers entered into post-harvest lean season and 
when access to food is limited. The enforcement of lockdown may cause 
delaying of livelihoods activities of small farmers, placing additional strain on 
poor households’ abilities to buy food, seeds and other essentials. The risk 
may spill over to poor urban households and those living in displacement 
sites.23 
According to national experts, agriculture exhibits severe loss of production 
throughout the country because of labour scarcity due to the movement 
restrictions and possibly Covid-19 infections. As a result, export earnings will 
decline, driving further currency depreciation. Since most of the restrictions 
are lifted, a slow improvement is expected.  
Prices for transports, and food items dramatically increased in some cases 
by more than 50%. These are major consumption items for the majority of 
poor people. Majority of citizens are relatively poor relaying on daily 
                                                          
23
 Ibid. 
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subsistence economy, as street venders, selling foods or tea, other goods in 
the street.  
Consumers complained increasing prices of foods such as cocking oils, 
beans, rice, sugar, and flours. Cost of public transport including buses and 
motor cycles was dramatically increased, in order to compensate for the 
reduction of the number of passengers per trip directed by the Coronavirus 
Taskforce.24  
Firms and individuals are going through severe economic stress because of 
restricted ability to undertake economic activities. Many firms and 
individuals have hardly any savings to bridge times without earnings.  
The pandemic and resulting lockdown further reduce the demand for labour 
of the urban poor, resulting in fewer jobs and lower payment rates. This is in 
the face of rising inflation (due to stockpiling and the supply shocks), 
resulting in declining purchasing power.  
The low level of economic activities also leaves many youths unemployed. 
This is a recipe for disaster in a country without safety nets, while small arms 
are readily available. This only further worsens a situation where there is 
already high unemployment and vagrancy, gang-related violence and crime.  
In fact, the evolution of the crisis so far has shown that both the public and 
private sectors have been unprepared to respond. Government has only 
been able to devote a minimum of resources to the pandemic. This results in 
fewer equipped health facilities, fewer trained health professional, and 
strained health education. On top of this, the cost of medical and public 
health services increases, neglecting access to the poor. Thus, the demand 
for other health services has plummeted. The resulting slash of incomes has 
added to the inability to respond to the pandemic. The escalating transport 
                                                          
24
 Radio Tamazuj, “Explainer: The Covid-19 situation in South Sudan,” <radiotamazuj.org/ 
en/news/article/explainer-the-covid-19-situation-in-south-sudan> (accessed 22 July 2020). 
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prices further restricted the operations of health services. Further, personal 
protection equipment and hygiene items are increasingly scarce. – The 
closure also of small businesses like food and hardware stores, network 
kiosks and charging stations, hardly attract crowds.25 
The peace agreement is in jeopardy again. Two factors can be held 
accountable: the usual brinkmanship of both parties over a number of minor 
issues in the agreement. But more importantly, the implementation process 
has skipped over fundamental steps in order to rush to form a unity 
government – in the hope that such an undertaking would create the trust, 
between the partners and with the wider public that is needed for reform 
and development. However, experts observe that a unity government 
lacking both political will and capacity would be ‘unable to address the 
fundamentals of peace, namely, security, basic services, and justice and 
accountability’26.  
The emerging pandemic also added to the delaying factors for the peace 
agreement. Implementation of the peace agreement requires finance. While 
government had committed itself to this, the stark decrease of the oil price 
(it has reduced by half since the beginning of the crisis) reduces the funds 
availed for the implementation. Moreover, these funds now compete with 
the fight against Covid-19. The reduced level of economic activities, due to 
the pandemic, also reduce the public revenues, in particular in the hotels, 
restaurants, transport, and other small businesses. On top of this, in light of 
the weak public accountancy system, much of the funds left is likely to be 
siphoned off through corruption.  
In particular, the sums for transitional security related activities as 
cantonment and training for military forces and the disarmament, 
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 Mayai, Awolich and Tiitmamer, “The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
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 Abraham A. Awolich, “The boiling frustrations in South Sudan,” Weekly Review, The Sudd 
Institute, 7 June 2020. 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
143 
demobilization, and reintegration process are threatened to be reduced or 
halted. This will contribute to making the fate of the peace agreement highly 
uncertain.  
The political stalemate, on top of the COVID -19 lockdown, has caused 
conflict to intensify particular in the Greater Jonglei region. Conflicts, 
previously inter-communal, became militarized, and mainly between 
fractions of the army. Organized forces in uniform have been spotted among 
fighters risking the uncertain ceasefire. Frequent inter-communal tensions 
are observed between the Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities. The cycles 
of violence is often accompanied by cattle raids, child abductions and other 
revenge inducing crimes27. 
The country is now at more risk of becoming undone at its seams than any 
other time since the liberation war ended in 2005. While the unity 
government had first moved well, it had already been unable to deal 
successfully with previous crises as the locust infection, floods, and 
communal violence. The Covid-19 crises has been used as a cover for 
political failures. The optimistic mood of mid-February and March has 
virtually dissipated. Citizens on the streets are reported to fast losing hope. 
Monitoring social media outlets noticed an upsurge in negative campaigns 
and hate messages. Moreover, the political parties have reactivated 
propaganda websites spreading false information in order to fuel discontent 
and trigger violence. Overall, indicators are said to suggest that the country 
‘faces a major risk of a large-scale, spontaneous violence, unless the parties 
to the Agreement act fast’28. 
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4 Outlook: Post-Covid-19 South Sudan and its relations 
The effects of the Covid-19 pandemics has further destabilized the deep 
political and economic crisis in South Sudan. It appears that this will be so in 
the future. The main power holders in the country are locked in a stalemate 
in a climate of low trust. The fall in international oil prices has made it more 
impossible to raise the funds that government committed to in order to 
implement the peace agreement. At the same time, the continued flow of 
oil is providing a minimum of finance for government to continue operating. 
The political class is largely self-interested and propagates a tribal 
orientation.  
The experiences of government handling the pandemic and further delaying 
the implementation of peace have further eroded public trust. In a climate 
of complete disillusion, failed experiences of armed rebellion, and distrust 
on part of the wider population, various groups of youth and intellectuals 
have formed, also including members of the diaspora. These groups aim at a 
peaceful change, led by a process of awareness building and discussion of 
the way forward via the internet (for instance in facebook groups).  
Some authors also argue that the Covid-19 crisis may present an 
opportunity to challenge the status quo, by calling for strengthening the 
health, economic, governance and food production systems across the 
nation. 29 
However, it is likely that this process will take time. Rather, a process will 
build up a momentum for change over time. Meanwhile, the country will be 
affected by what happens elsewhere.  
South Sudan’s neighbours have no interest to support change in South 
Sudan at this time. There is a fear of the unknown, of further destabilisation 
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in the country that may spill over to the region. Furthermore, there are a 
number of competing interests among the neighbours: a traditional rivalry 
for leadership concerning South Sudan between Uganda and Sudan, a 
similar rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya within the EAC, and a water 
conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan also concerning South Sudan.  
The process of regional integration of the EAC will slowly continue. The 
Covid-19 crisis has not helped to accelerate the process, but rather 
relegated it on the priority list. South Sudan’s integration into the bloc is 
also delayed. While the transition period is officially over and the country is 
a full member, the implementation of EAC rules and regulations moves 
below targets.  
South Sudan’s leaders are hesitant to cede sovereignty. Much of the 
population does also not seem to be ready. In particular many intellectuals 
believe regional integration undermines building of a sovereign state and 
fear other EAC members will exploit the weak South Sudan.  
The failure of government to pay membership fees is threatening its status. 
So far, other EAC members are fearing destabilisation and setting an 
example by calling South Sudan to order. Despite the current problems and 
slow speed, the integration process is an important process of stabilisation 
in the region and particularly for South Sudan.  
The same is true for South Sudan’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation. Besides WTO membership, the accession process is an ideal 
process to accompany the economic reform process that is needed to reach 
sustainable and broadly-based growth, peace and resilience. South Sudan 
has started the accession process in 2018. While encouraging process was 
made until 2019, the process has not progressed since then – as the overall 
economic reform process.  
Beyond the region, the post-Covid-19 world is characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty. Multiple crises of a global nature are threatening: this 
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and other pandemics expected in the future for which the world is not 
prepared. Likewise, the climate change calls for global responses. 
Meanwhile, flight and economic migration and trade conflicts are apparent. 
These conflicts need strengthened and additional global cooperation 
mechanisms. Instead, we see a threatening of the organisations by the US, 
who has been their main guarantor. Meanwhile, there is a degree of de-
globalisation.  
Globalisation has helped many countries to converge to a high degree to the 
first world: notably Asian countries, most importantly China. The period of 
high-speed globalisation may have ended: since 2011 we see a degree of de-
globalisation. We may not see the end of an epoch, but witness major 
changes in world powers and blocs. This will also affect their relations.  
With a major crisis between the US and China, international cooperation is 
threatened. But the EU and China as well as the small countries have a 
common interest to uphold multilateralism.  
One lesson of the Covid-19 crisis is the importance of good governance and 
strong institutions. Better governed countries have been able to cope with 
the Covid-19 pandemic.  
The EU has a cooling relationship with the US. Formerly strong relations of 
allies are replaced by a more distanced one, where each sees immediate 
own interests. While the EU with its dependence of the US for defence, the 
crisis gives a push for deeper integration. There are signs for a 
transformation to a more social, less unequal, more ecological and climate-
conscious societies, more European with strengthened democracy.  
The autocratic systems in the EU are on the defence. The EU is becoming 
more self-assertive in foreign relations towards the US and China. While the 
relations to the US are more distant, the common values for open societies 
with freedom remain. The relations with China will also be more distant. 
Rather than a strategic partner, China is seen as a competitor. However, the 
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common interests for multilateralism and the search for areas of common 
interest remain.  
In the process, there is less energy to drive the process of cooperation with 
and assistance to Africa. However, there may be momentum for a trilateral 
cooperation. Germany that leads the EU during the second half of 2020 
plans an EU-China summit in September to be attended by all 27 European 
heads of government. Climate change and Africa are among Germany’s 
priorities.30 
China is seemingly emerging stronger from the Covid-19 crisis. At least, it is 
getting more assertive in international relations. However, it faces 
underlying weaknesses in its growth model in a climate of a degree of de-
globalisation, hostility by the US, more sceptical distance from the EU. Like 
other countries in the growth process, it will not be able to keep on with the 
same growth rates. It will be a challenge to meet domestic expectations.  
Internationally and with respect to South Sudan, China keeps its traditional 
policy of supporting developing countries irrespective of their domestic 
policy and state of governance. China will continue its support to South 
Sudan as a dependent client state, in return for its support in the UN and 
internationally. China is also starting to contribute to humanitarian support. 
However, China’s image in South Sudan is not as rosy as it has been. It is 
overshadowed by corrupt undertakings as the building of the road Juba-
Aweil that turned out as of low quality. Principally, the emergence of China 
as major actor has given South Sudan – as other African countries) more 
autonomy from the West, as it has more choice among partners.  
Concerning South Sudan, the international community takes a pessimistic 
outlook. While there is hesitance to interact with government because of its 
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track record of reform and its legitimacy, actors are aware of the danger of 
state collapse. The US, EU, UK and Norway regard themselves as midwifes of 
South Sudan’s independence as a state, they see themselves as responsible 
for its success. While the development process has taken a back seat, 
humanitarian assistance continues.  
On this background, implication for South Sudan is that change has to come 
from within. And it has to come peacefully. The ruling system is seemingly 
strong, but brittle. Actors for change are the young generation, combined 
with intellectuals and professionals, progressive CSO, parts of the business 
community, technocratic public service staff, disgruntled SPLM members 
and the diaspora.  
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Abstract: This paper analyses the key issues and challenges which make Africa more 
vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic than other parts of the world. COVID-19 is a 
global public health pandemic that has wrecked economies. The paper specifically 
focuses on the pandemic’s consequences on youth, and education in Somalia. It 
points out that for the East African country of Somalia, which has been in political 
turmoil for decades, COVID-19 is a “triple tragedy” exacerbating the already 
existing conflict and drought. It also handles the pandemic’s influence on Africa’s 
relationship with major European countries (France, Germany, UK). The pandemic 
may positively influence Africa’s relationship with major Europeans countries. Due 
to the pandemic, poverty levels in Africa are forecasted to rise, increasing the need 
to seek for economic support for recovery from European countries and multilateral 
institutions such as World Bank and IMF. Africa will have to abide by the regulations 
provided by these countries and the multi-lateral institutions. 
Key words: COVID-19, Pandemic, Africa, impact, Economy, Triple tragedy. 
 
Africa’s vulnerability to the pandemic: The specific case of Somalia 
COVID-19 is a global public health pandemic, which has wrecked 
economies. Many countries are on lockdown forcing people to stay at 
home, and businesses have been shut down in an attempt to stop the 
spread of the Coronavirus. This has resulted in the loss of jobs globally, 
poverty as well as loss of lives. Thus, the global pandemic has without 
exception, negatively impacted on economic activity and lives across the 
world. The COVID-19 pandemic threatens African progress. It will aggravate 
long-standing inequalities and heighten hunger, malnutrition and 
vulnerability to disease. Already, demand for Africa’s commodities, tourism 
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and remittances are declining. The opening of the trade zone has been 
pushed back and millions could be pushed into extreme poverty.1 
In the East African region, the Coronavirus pandemic has worsened the 
effects of climate change and the locust invasion that the Horn of Africa 
had already been grappling with. FAO reports that the Horn of Africa is 
facing the worst desert locust crisis in over 25 years, and the most serious 
in 70 years for Kenya.2 The current potential regional plague upsurge 
represents an unprecedented threat to food security and livelihoods in the 
region leading to further suffering, displacement and conflict. The situation 
is alarming, particularly in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia where widespread 
breeding is in progress and new swarms are beginning to form.3  
For the East African country of Somalia, which has been in political turmoil 
for decades, COVID-19 is a “triple tragedy” exacerbating the already 
existing conflict and drought. Drought exacerbates conflict by increasing 
competition for resources. Al-Shabaab feeds off these tensions and exploits 
vulnerabilities. Conflict thus worsens the impact of the drought by 
depleting family assets, disrupting traditional coping mechanisms, including 
migration and impeding humanitarian access. Conflict and drought force 
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internal displacement.4 While COVID-19 poses an invisible threat to 
Somalia, the conflict has not stopped, and still drives displacement and 
suffering. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased vulnerability due to 
ongoing conflicts by Al-Shabaab and drought. Recent clashes in Janaale, 
Lower Shabelle region, affected over 20,000 people, with an estimated 
8,000 people displaced from their homes to Marka, Afgooye, Shalanbood 
and Mogadishu.5 Similarly, the COVID-19 locked down of huge populations 
has resulted in increased reports of domestic and gender-based violence. 
Consequently Somalia, which has one of Africa’s most fragile health care 
systems, millions of internally displaced people, and recovering from state 
collapse and civil war is potentially less prepared for the COVID-19 
pandemic than any other country in the world.6 
Globally, China reported tripled domestic violence cases during their 
shelter in-place mandate, France saw a 30% increase in domestic violence, 
while in Brazil domestic violence stood at 40–50%, as Italy also reported 
rise in domestic violence.7 In Somalia, the pandemic is occurring amidst 
already alarming levels of hunger due to climate shocks, conflict and 
economic instability as well as the locust invasion in the country. Internally 
displaced children and women are the most vulnerable. The social and 
economic effects of COVID-19 are far reaching, and further compound the 
debilitating consequences of conflict; desert locust infestation, droughts 
and perennial flooding that impact the most vulnerable populations. There 
are reports that seven health workers and a civilian were killed in a village 
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 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), “Somalia Crisis Response Plan,” 31 January 
2020, <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/somalia-crisis-response-plan-2020>. 
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north of the Somali capital after being abducted by masked men in military 
uniforms.8 Meanwhile evictions of displaced persons by landowners have 
complicated the situation during the duration of the COVID-19. The Somali 
authorities and private landowners have been urged to stop evictions of 
displaced persons for the entire duration of the COVID-19 response.9 
The exponential rise in the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Somalia 
continues. As of 26 April to 3 May 2020, confirmed cases rose from 390 to 
722, with 32 deaths and 44 recoveries. The measures taken by individual 
agencies working in Somalia have also impacted negatively on 
humanitarian activities and development programmes. An OCHA survey of 
NGO partners in South West State found that 40 per cent had reduced field 
presence to focus on immediate lifesaving activities.10 
The consequences on youth and education of the pandemic 
The African continent, which has the youngest populations in the world, is 
exposed to many of the collateral impacts of the COVID-19. Youth are 
directly affected through the closure of schools, businesses and streets, 
jobs losses, stoppage of games such as football matches, closure of 
markets, construction works, entertainment centres, hotels and 
restaurants. COVID-19 has enormous consequences on education in Africa 
and Somalia in particular.  
In the educational sector, the pandemic could compromise outcomes for a 
generation. “It is estimated that, with the sudden interruption in education, 
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262.5 million children are out of school and millions among them are at risk 
of not returning to school, especially girls,” said Doris Mpoumou, Director 
of Africa Union Liaison Office for Save the Children.11 For some, it means 
missing class altogether, or struggling with online learning, facing 
difficulties with online connections, as well as motivational and 
psychosocial well-being challenges.12 In addition youths will be affected by 
the impending school closures and jobs losses.  
Aggressive restrictions on daily life in sub-Saharan African paint a pretty 
grim picture of the lockdown’s failures in other sectors that also affect the 
youth indirectly. For example, shopping for food and essential supplies or 
attending medical appointments including compassionate visits is a 
challenge as only 18% of the population have convenient access to public 
transport.13 These strict measures have led to more disastrous health 
effects, heightened poverty, high levels of malnutrition, and increased 
domestic violence among the youth as well as the general population use 
of public and private cars as means of transportation have been banned. 
Walking and cycling remain among the main means available for the 
majority of urban commuters to go shopping or to work. In countries such 
as Uganda, bans have been excessive and lockdown restrictions are 
complemented by a 7 pm to 6:30 am curfew. Additional measures included 
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restricting markets to selling only foodstuffs, shutting down shopping malls 
and arcades, prohibiting of people movement.14 
For Somalia, young people are in addition at high risk of facing abuse such 
as sexual exploitation in exchange for good food or water due to being in a 
conflict torn country. They are at risk of getting sick and dying from COVID-
19 since they are the most active age group in the society although 
mortality due to pandemic is low among youths. Thus, while African 
governments have responded quickly to the pandemic, they now need to 
ensure that this leadership is aligned to their continental commitment and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the child.15 
The Africa-European countries (France, Germany, UK) relationship in the 
pandemic 
The pandemic will influence Africa’s relationship with major Europeans 
countries positively. Due to the pandemic, poverty levels in Africa are 
expected to rise, and thus increasing the need for economic support from 
European countries and multilateral institutions such as World Bank and 
IMF. Africa will have to abide by the regulations provided by these 
Countries and the multi-lateral institutions.16  
Furthermore, the coronavirus pandemic, which is crippling economies the 
world over, is set to trigger into motion Africa’s first recession in 25 years. 
Africa may lose half of its GDP with growth falling from 3.2% to about 2% 
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for a number of reasons, which include the disruption of global supply 
chains. Thus, the Economic Commission for Africa and its partners have 
proposed several interventions to promptly and effectively address COVID-
19 challenges on the continent at the urban level.17  
Also because of the continent’s interconnectedness to the other affected 
economies of the European Union, China and the United States, it is facing 
ripple effects.18 Many African economies are still in a state of dependency: 
exporting primary raw materials that are highly sensitive to exogenous 
shocks such falling prices of minerals and crude oil. Thus, African countries, 
having failed to diversify and build their own industrial base find 
themselves in the deplorable situation of being extremely vulnerable to a 
change in their economic situation due to COVID-19.19  
In the circumstances, global solidarity with Africa is an imperative as 
COVID-19 spreads across the continent, although the continent has 
responded swiftly to the pandemic. The pandemic threatens African 
progress, and it will aggravate long-standing inequalities and heighten 
hunger, malnutrition and vulnerability to disease. Already, demand for 
Africa’s commodities, tourism and remittances are declining. The opening 
of the trade zone has been pushed back and millions could be pushed into 
extreme poverty. Vigilance and preparedness are critical. African countries 
should also have quick, equal and affordable access to any eventual vaccine 
and treatment, which must be considered global public goods. 
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Somalia, like many other countries, is grappling with the deadly COVID-19 
pandemic, with over a thousand laboratory-confirmed cases and dozens of 
associated deaths registered so far. With the support of international 
partners, the government is implementing various medical, public health, 
and social interventions to curb the spread of the contagion and mitigate 
its impact on the country.20 COVID-19 is likely to have even worse and 
longer lasting economic impact on Somalia, since it is still recovering from 
decades of civil war. Not only is the country’s own economy affected by 
travel bans and lock downs, but it is estimated that Somalia receives 
approximately USD$1.6 billion per year in remittances from countries 
around the world that are also facing lock downs that affect those working 
in informal labour disproportionately.21 
Conclusion  
The COVID-19 pandemic seriously threatens progress in Africa. It will result 
in the loss of jobs, poverty as well as loss of lives. It will aggravate long-
standing inequalities and heighten hunger, malnutrition and vulnerability 
to disease. Crippling healthcare expenditure, limited fiscal capacity, and 
stringent lockdown measures might make it difficult for African countries 
especially Sub Saharan African to save lives. Governments will be unable to 
inject much needed cash into the financial system to boost economies and 
increase the demand for goods and services. Thus, the global pandemic will 
without exception, negatively impact on economic activity and lives across 
Africa.  
                                                          
20
 Abdisalam Bahwal, “The Somali Health and Demographic Survey Report - A Tool to Fight 
COVID-19 in Somalia,” Reliefweb, 2 June 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/ 
somali-health-and-demographic-survey-report-tool-fight-covid-19-somalia>. 
21
 Walter Mawere, “Somalia: One of Countries Least Prepared to Cope with Covid-19 Virus,” 
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In Somalia COVID-19 is likely to have an even worse and longer lasting 
economic impact, since it is still recovering from decades of civil war and 
drought. The travel bans, lockdown and the drastic falling of the yearly 
remittances it receives from countries around the world that are also facing 
lock downs will worsen the economic outlook of the economy.  
The pandemic will cause Africa to have an increasing need for economic 
support from European countries and multilateral institutions.  
Recommendations  
To mitigate the effects of the pandemic: 
There is need for a consolidated effort from all authorities – humanitarian 
and development actors – to help mitigate the direct and collateral impacts 
of the virus. This requires clear, two-way communication and partnerships.  
African countries require support in designing and implementing 
coordinated policy responses from global financial institutions. Cooperation 
with regional partners in Africa such as the African Union and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, as well as international partners 
is very important for the economic recovery. 
Africa remains an absolute priority to the international community in 
regard to substantial investment to combat the effects of COVID-19 and to 
support the economies of developing countries. Advocacy is needed for a 
comprehensive debt framework starting with an across-the-board debt 
standstill for countries unable to service their debt, followed by targeted 
debt relief and a comprehensive approach to structural issues in the 
international debt architecture to prevent defaults.22 
                                                          
22
 Chioma Obinna, “COVID-19: Nigeria, 38 Other African Countries to Benefit from GPE 
US$250 Fund,” Vanguard. All Africa, 6 April 2020, <https://allafrica.com/stories/202004060 
863.html> (accessed 25 June 2020); Department of Global Communications, “UN 
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The pandemic requires unity within countries, between neighbours and the 
region. Efforts to encourage Somalia and the countries of the region to 
reduce infection, reinforce health systems, and strengthen community 
resilience, as well as to keep key trade routes open, and facilitate vital 
private financial flows should be enhanced.  
Lastly political differences among the Somali people will require dialogue 
and willingness to forge consensus. States should resume constructive 
collaboration to advance national priorities and to collaborate to mitigate 
the threat of COVID-19.  
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Abstract: Total or partial lockdown and curfew coupled with the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) hygiene precautionary measures have emerged as the 
preferred responses by governments all over the world to curb the spread of COVID-
19. Within the East African region, and more specifically Kenya, states have 
employed partial and total lockdowns with the police and security personnel being 
at the forefront in enforcing these measures meant at handling the health crisis. 
The state has turned to legitimate use of force and security apparatus to tackle 
health matters. The paper shall begin with a brief overview of state response to 
COVID-19 within the East African Community. It will then focus on the response 
within the Kenyan context. 
The writers theorize that Kenya has been witnessing rise in securitization of issues 
and COVID-19 has accelerated this trend. Extrajudicial measures are invoked by the 
state in the guise of fighting the health pandemic. Media reports at one time 
suggested that there were more deaths from police brutality than from COVID-19. 
The paper details the measures put forward in Kenya to combat COVID-19, which 
include dusk-to-dawn curfew, restriction of inter-county movement involving 
hotspot counties, closure of schools and universities and criminalisation of failure to 
take precautionary measures such as wearing of face masks in public areas, social 
distancing and provision of hand washing facilities of some counties, restricting 
movement to and from certain counties, and closure of inter-county travel. The 
article then will analyse the approach taken by the Kenyan government to respond 
to the COVID-19 pandemic from a human rights perspective. Further, the paper will 
critique the legality of government responses and their efficacy in combating the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the article recommends effective non-police and 
people-centred ways to handle the pandemic. 
Key words: Human rights, Kenya, lockdown, public health, security. 
 
  




Background: Setting the stage 
When COVID-19 was initially reported in Wuhan, the concept of ‘lock-
downs’ was as alien as the disease itself. China quickly instituted this 
measure to curb the community spread of the virus, through total lockdown 
of neighborhoods, road, rail and air transport from the city of Wuhan, and 
later the whole of China. This affected millions of people in the country. As 
the virus spread across the globe, countries employed an array of measures 
to try to mitigate its spread. International air transport was the first to stop. 
Later regions in Italy, the United States of America, and borders in the highly 
interconnected European Union were locked down. 
In Africa, and specifically within the East African region, countries followed 
suit. Perhaps having learnt from previous battles with the Ebola virus 
disease, Uganda and Rwanda were first to institute lockdowns even before 
the first case of COVID-19 was reported within their territories (Margini, 
Pattnaik and Nakyanzi 2020). This was quickly followed by Tanzania and 
Kenya, while Burundi was the outlier in the response, with former late 
President Nkuruzinza opting for less strict measures, opting to let life 
continue as normal. Dusk to dawn curfews and cessation of movement into 
provinces, districts and counties (depending of which country) followed suit 
to limit movement of people, and by extension the spread of COVID-19. The 
lockdowns were seen as a logical way of preventing entry of the disease in 
light of weak healthcare systems found in the region. Prevention was seen 
to better than offering curative medicine. Security apparatus within these 
countries was tasked with enforcing these measures. 
However, as soon as these measures were instituted, and security apparatus 
tasked with enforcement, accusations of police brutality were rife across the 
EAC countries collectively, with the pandemic ceasing to be a health issue, 
and quickly metamorphosing into a security issue. However, as Amartya Sen 
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is quoted while writing about India’s response to COVID-19, ‘tackling a social 
calamity is not like fighting a war, which works best when a leader can use 
top-down power to order everyone to do what the leader wants — with no 
need for consultation’ (Aikande 2020). It is imperative that states get a 
balance between COVID-19 as a health and security issue. 
The article begins by describing the methodology that was employed by the 
writers. Thereafter, the paper comparatively analyses the state responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic by members of the East African Community more 
specifically, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The article then 
focuses on the Kenyan experience of COVID-19. It analyses the legal and 
policy framework that supports securitization of the pandemic. Further, the 
article proceeds to examine the judicial and non-state response to the 
securitization approach. Finally, concluding thoughts and recommendations 
are highlighted. 
Research Methodology 
The article herein involved a desk review. A conventional legal and policy 
analysis approach was employed the involved the review of statute books 
and policy manuals that address the response to COVID-19. The article 
employed secondary data collection by use of official documents, 
newspaper reports, and survey results by state and non-state actors. The 
writers participated in webinars involving human rights defenders and 
practitioners within the justice sector where expert opinion was shared, 
focusing on the role of police and human rights-based approach during the 
pandemic. The secondary data was analysed qualitatively by using the 
thematic areas. 
Comparative Analysis of COVID-19 Pandemic Prevention and Protection in 
the East African Region 
Within the East African region, different countries initially responded in a 
similar way to the coronavirus. Gradually, the states changed tact in battling 
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the pandemic. This revealed the different political systems and leadership 
styles found across the region. Having tasked the enforcement measures to 
curb spread of COVID-19 to the security apparatus across the region, several 
human rights issues have arose in all member states of the East African 
Community.  
Rwanda 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that Rwanda has been on a 
high-level alert since the 2018 Ebola fight, which enabled the country to 
quickly adopt and respond to COVID-19 pandemic. The country reported its 
first case in 14th March but even before that, it had instituted mandatory 
quarantine for all international travelers, hand washing, temperature checks 
at ports of entry, physical distancing as well as mandatory use of face masks 
(World Health Organization Rwanda 2020). This was complimented by 
community awareness campaigns across the country including 
#GumaMuRugo (stay home, save lives) and #NtabeAriNjye (let it not be me), 
to drum up support for these measures among the community members.  
Later on, contact tracing, surveillance and case management were 
instituted. Security apparatus were key in surveillance, contact tracing and 
enforcement of physical distance measures instituted by government. 
(Bower, et al. 2020). Bracelets that contained tracking devices were used to 
enforce travel restriction and quarantine for inbound travelers. In Rwanda, 
soldiers enforcing COVID-19 measures have been accused of raping women, 
arresting and detaining people arbitrarily without cause (Human Rights 
Watch, 2020). This happens while bloggers and journalists who criticize the 
government have also been arrested for ‘flouting COVID-19 guidelines’. 
Uganda 
The country closed borders before the first case was reported. Schools were 
closed, public transport banned or operated at half capacity, religious and 
other social gatherings banned, and a dusk to dawn curfew was instituted 
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(UNHCR 2020). The response was partly influenced by the fight against Ebola 
that Uganda went through earlier on. In Uganda, police have been accused 
of extortion, harassment, beatings, detention and in some cases deaths 
(Biryabarema, 2020). Twelve deaths during the pandemic are directly 
attributed to police excesses in enforcing curfews and other public health 
measures in Uganda (BBC, 2020). 
Tanzania 
President Magufuli has treated COVID-19 as a war and not a health calamity. 
While initially the country went on lockdown and instituted measures to 
curb the spread, he gradually questioned the entire COVID-19 narrative. The 
country lifted COVID-19 restrictions in May, after positive tests for COVID-19 
were returned on non-human samples including a papaya (Ohikere 2020). 
Since then, the President terminated the services of the head of the 
National Laboratory, and the Deputy Minister of Health and appointed 
replacements, and declared Tanzania COVID-19 free after God ‘removed it 
from Tanzania (Odula 2020). Since then, life in Tanzania has gone back to 
normal, with no mask wearing, social gatherings allowed and international 
travel lifted. In Tanzania, police have confirmed arrests of at least three 
people for ‘spreading misinformation’ about COVID-19 (Xinhua, 2020). 
Online TV stations and journalists have been suspended for criticizing 
government response to COVID-19, after the government passed the 
‘Access to Information Act’ aimed at controlling improper release of state 
data.1 President Magufuli has continued to hold political gatherings ahead of 
the 2021 presidential elections while prohibiting opposition rallies under the 
guise of COVID-19 (United Nations News, 2020). 
Burundi 
When COVID-19 came around, Burundi was in the middle of Presidential 
elections and campaigns. Outgoing President Nkuruzinza (who has since 
                                                          
1
 Center for Strategic and International Studies 2020. 
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passed on) encouraged people to pray for it, while going about normal 
business. There was no fact-based information coming from government, 
with healthcare works living in fear of government reprisal should they raise 
alarm over COVID-19. Campaigns went on normally, and election of the new 
president was done (Human Rights Watch 2020). The head of World Health 
Organization in Burundi was expelled by government, accusing the 
organization with interfering with COVID-19 response (Reiter and Creedon 
2020). It was noted that, testing of suspected cases was difficult. However, 
with the new president formally taking over, Burundi has changed tact, 
opting for mass testing of COVID-19 beginning with the capital Bujumbura 
(Tih 2020). The president has declared COVID-19 ‘worst enemy of Burundi’ 
and introduced compulsory mask wearing (Al Jazeera 2020). 
The Kenyan Experience: Legitimisation of Use of Security Apparatus in 
COVID-19 Response 
Like other East African states, Kenya closed the borders with neighboring 
countries in light of COVID-19, instituted dusk to dawn curfew, cessation of 
movement in and out of some key hotspot counties, closure of schools, 
banning of big social gatherings, mask wearing in public and quarantine for 
inbound travelers.2 The government has continuously given updates on the 
status of COVID-19 in the country. The Kenyan government progressively 
put in place a legal and policy framework founded on the Constitution of 
Kenya 2010, the Public Health Act Cap 242 of the Laws of Kenya (hereinafter 
“the PHA”), the Health Act No. 21 of 2017 (hereinafter “the HA”), the Public 
Order Act Cap 50 of the Laws of Kenya (hereinafter “the POA”) and the 
National Police Service Act No. 11 of 2011. In this section, the legal and 
policy framework is discussed and analyzed. The application of these laws 
and policies requires a paradigm shift in the mode of human interactions, re-
interpretation and limitation of rights. To achieve this, the police have 
become “frontline workers” in enforcing directives such as curfew, contract 
                                                          
2
 Maleche and Were 2020. 
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tracing and targeted testing. This has led to some unintended 
consequences, as the focus of the pandemic transcended from being a 
public health issue to a law and order issue (Gathara, 2020). The 
Independent Police Oversight Authority has confirmed over 30 deaths 
directly related to police enforcement of the curfew.3 This is aside from 
allegations of bribery, extortion, brutality and arbitrary arrests of citizens by 
the police. The use of disproportionate force and corruption are in total 
disregard to the Constitution and other laws and policy discussed 
hereunder.4 Under this part, the article examines the Kenyan case, its legal 
and policy framework that legitimizes the securitization of the response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  
2.1 Legal Framework  
The Constitution of Kenya provides comprehensive rights for every human 
being including first, second and third generation rights.5 It is the 
                                                          
3
 Zhu 2020; Amnesty International and media reports on police brutality. 
4
 A case in point involves the Likoni Ferry incident, which took place on 27
th
 March 2020, 
the first day of the 7pm to 5am curfew. At the Mombasa County, commuters crossing the 
Likoni channel rushed to beat curfew hours only to find themselves queuing for hours to 
board the ferry. At 5pm- one hour to ferry closure and two hours to the National curfew, a 
few rowdy and frustrated youths began throwing stones at police officers. In retaliation, the 
officers threw teargas canisters and started shooting in the air. This caused the large crowd 
of commuters to start running. They were all ordered to lie down while being physically 
abused by the officers. The citizens, many of whom were women and children were 
coughing, sneezing and crying. Media personnel were not spared for filming the chaos. A 
police officer was caught on camera assaulting a journalist who was covering the story. This 
was despite that licensed Broadcasters and Media Houses provide essential and critical 
services and are exempt from the curfew. Many lost their property and got injured while 
running. The Government apologized for the incident. This was an infringement of the 
citizens’ right to freedom and security of the person provided under article 29 of the 
Constitution of Kenya. Every person has the right not to be subjected to corporal 
punishment or treated or punished in a cruel, inhumane or degrading manner. Their right to 
human dignity was also violated.  
5
 Civil and political rights under the Constitution include right to vote, freedom of 
movement and residence, freedom of assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition, 
freedom of expression, right to privacy, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour, 
freedom and security of the person, right to human dignity, freedom of conscience, 
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fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil these rights and fundamental freedoms.6 That 
notwithstanding, the Kenyan Constitution allows for “the limitation of rights 
by law and only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open democratic society and in line with human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.7 De Schutter expounds on the conditions for limitation of rights. 
He argues that the State must meet six conditions to invoke its power to 
limit rights (De Schutter2014). Firstly, it must be established that a public 
emergency that threatens the life of the nation exists. Secondly, there is a 
need to limit the rights. Thirdly, the limitation is non-discriminatory. 
Fourthly, there must be compliance with international standards and 
obligations. Fifthly, the non-derogable rights are not in any way affected by 
the limitation. Finally, there is international notification of the emergency. In 
other words, the limitation of rights cannot be done in a legal vacuum. 
Within the Kenyan Constitution, not all rights and freedoms can be limited. 
Article 25 enlists rights and freedoms that can never be limited by legislation 
or otherwise.8 
The Government has imposed criminal sanctions against individuals or 
organisations that fail to comply with restrictions to contain the spread of 
                                                                                                                                                      
religion, belief and opinion, freedom of the media, freedom of association, access to 
information, access to justice, right to fair labour practices and right to property. The socio-
economic and cultural rights include right to highest standard of health, accessible and 
adequate housing, right to be free from hunger and to have adequate food, clean and safe 
water, right to social security and right to education. 
6
 Article 21(1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
7
 Article 24 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.The limitation of rights and freedoms must be 
within the following purview:  
(a) the legislation must specifically express the intention to limit the right or fundamental 
freedom; and 
(b) the provision is clear and specific and the nature and extent of the limitation; and 
(c) the legislation shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate 
from its core or essential content. 
8
 The following rights are non-derogable: freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery or servitude; the right to a fair 
trial; and the right to an order of habeas corpus. 
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COVID-19. Section 2 of the Public Health Act Cap 242 Laws of Kenya 
(hereinafter “the PHA”) begins by defining an infectious disease as ‘any 
disease, which can be communicated directly or indirectly by any person 
suffering therefrom to any other person.’ The PHA then provides guidelines 
for the prevention and suppression of any infectious diseases.9 The SARS 
COVID-19 has been classified by the MOH as a highly infectious respiratory 
disease that falls under the ambit of the PHA. The Cabinet Secretary of 
Health gazzetted regulations under the PHA, which criminalise conduct that 
jeopardises containment measures. 
Under section 28, the PHA provides that any person infected with COVID-19 
who exposes himself or herself to the public without taking proper 
precaution is guilty of an offence that leads to a fine of up to Kshs 30,000, 
imprisonment of up to three years or both. This section was applied in two 
prominent cases involving the Kilifi County Deputy Governor Gideon Saburi 
and a Catholic priest Richard Oduor.10 
The Public Order (State Curfew) Order, 2020 (Legal Notice No. 36 of 2020) 
was issued under section 8 of the Public Order Act, which provides for 
curfew orders in the interest of public order. The order exempts essential 
services including medical professionals and health workers, supermarkets 
                                                          
9
 Kiragu Kimani, “COVID-19 – “New” criminal offences in Kenya,” JD Supra, 17 April 2020, 
<https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/covid-19-new-criminal-offences-in-kenya-76521/> 
(accessed 16 July 2020). 
10
 In the case of the former, the Director of Public Prosecutions sought to detain and isolate 
the accused at a maximum security prison as investigations were ongoing on his failure to 
self-quarantine upon arrival in the country from Germany. The Court in its ruling dismissed 
the application noting that a certificate of a medical officer confirming COVID-19 positive 
status of the Deputy Governor had not been provided. Further, the Honourable Court held 
that under the Public Health Act, prisons facilities are not envisaged as places of isolation as 
such it would pose a risk to the prison population. On the other hand, Fr. Richard Oduor 
was arrested at the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi County on 9 April 2020, after he 
was discharged following recovery from COVID-19. Fr. Richard Oduor is alleged to have 
failed to self quarantine upon arrival from Italy and hence accused of knowingly spreading 
the virus by travelling to his rural home and conducting a mass and attending a funeral. The 
hearings of these two cases are yet to begin.  
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among others. The Public Order (State Curfew) Variation Order, 2020 (Legal 
Notice 43 of 2020) requires all employers shall ensure that their staff who 
are not designated as critical or essential services providers leave the 
workplace no later than 4.00 o’clock in the afternoon to facilitate 
compliance with the Order. On 6th July 2020, the curfew hours were moved 
to 9pm to 4am from 7pm to 5am throughout the territory of Kenya. The 
penalty for failure to observe the curfew includes fine of up to KShs 10,000, 
imprisonment of up to three months, or both.  
In a decided case, the court found that “any declaration of a curfew is not a 
small matter”. The Judge stated: “…a curfew is heavy artillery that should be 
deployed with circumspection. Since it affects constitutional rights and 
fundamental freedoms, it ought to be premised on substantive law.”11 A 
total lockdown was not preferred by the Government of Kenya so as to keep 
as much of the economy going as possible, for recovery to be rapid and 
avoid prolonged recession.12 The legislation exempted thirteen (13) groups 
of workers offering essential services.13 
Legal, judicial and paralegal services, which are crucial during a pandemic 
that impacts the social, economic and cultural fabric of the society, were 
omitted from the list of exempted services. However, the recognition of 
national security, administration and co-ordination services as essential 
services placed pre-eminence on their role in management of the COVID-19 
                                                          
11
 Nrb HCCC Petition No. 120 of 2020. 
12
 Mathew Kirk, “How do I Know if What I do is an Essential Service?” The National Law 
Review (March 19, 2020), <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-do-i-know-if-what-i 
-do-essential-service> (accessed 1 April 2020).  
13
 Medical professionals and health workers; National security, administration and co-
ordination officers; Public Health and sanitation officers in the county governments; 
Licensed pharmacies and drug stores; Licensed broadcasters and media houses; Kenya 
Power; Food dealers, distributors, wholesalers and transporters of farm produce; Licensed 
supermarkets, mini-markets and hypermarkets; Licensed distributors and retailers of 
petroleum and oil products and lubricants; Licensed telecommunication operators and 
service providers; Licensed banks, financial institutions and payment financial services; Fire 
brigade and other emergency response services; and licensed security firms.  
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pandemic. The national security, administration and coordination 
department guarded all county border points and carried out patrols to 
ensure compliance with the curfew hours.  
Under section 36 of the Public Health Support, the Public Health (COVID-19 
Restriction of Movement of Persons and Related Measures) Rules 
2020(Legal Notice No. 50 of 2020) provides the following rules for 
prevention of disease: 
1. Restrictions on Movement: Rules 3 and 4 empower the CS Health to 
declare an area as infected and restrict movement into and out of the 
restricted areas.14 
2. Use of face masks in public and private transport: Rule 5 criminalizes 
public and private transport vehicles that carry more than 50% of their 
licensed capacity and motorcycles and bicycles that carry more than one 
passenger. In addition, it is now mandatory for all public and private 
transport operators to wear proper masks that must cover the person’s 
mouth and nose. 
3. Restrictions in public places: Rule 6 provides for the maintenance of 
physical distancing of no less than one meter from the next person, and the 
use of a proper face mask that must cover the person’s mouth and nose. In 
addition, organizations and business entities have to provide a hand-
washing station with soap and water or an approved alcohol-based sanitizer, 
enforce physical distancing within their premises or business location, and 
regularly sanitize their premises or business location. 
4. Prohibition of Public Gatherings: Rule 2 defines public gatherings as, ‘any 
private gathering or meeting for a social, cultural, economic or other 
purpose or public gathering, meeting, grouping, assembly, crowd, or 
                                                          
14
 In exercise of such powers, the CS Health published the Public Health (COVID-19 
Restriction of Movement of Persons and Related Measures) for Nairobi Metropolitan Area, 
Kilifi County, Mombasa County and Kwale County on 6 April 2020. The infected areas were 
later reduced to Nairobi Metropolitan Area, Mandera and Mombasa Counties. Since 6
th
 July 
2020, the cessation of movement was lifted. 
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procession, in or on any public road or space, any building, place or premises 
including wholly or partly in the open air, and including any premises or 
place used for sporting, entertainment, religious, cultural, political, 
academic, and fundraising purposes, for any barber shop, massage parlour 
and beauty salon activities or as bars or similar establishments, theatres and 
cinema, gymnasium, spa, dine-in restaurants and food courts, but does not 
include a market. The Public Health (Covid-19 Restriction of Movement of 
Persons and Related Measures) Variation Rules, 2020 (Legal Notice 58 of 
2020) excluded an ordinary family gathering within a single household or 
living unit from the definition of a public gathering. 
Rule 7 prohibits gatherings during the restriction period. A funeral is not 
regarded as a public gathering provided that: 
(a) attendance at the funeral shall be limited to fifteen people; 
(b) night vigils shall not be held in relation to a funeral; 
(c) hygiene conditions under rule 6 are adhered to; and  
(d) all the conditions under rule 8 (1) of the Public Health (Prevention, 
Control and Suppression of COVID-19) Rules, 2020 are adhered to. 
5. Disposal of bodies 
Rule 8 provides that where a person infected with COVID-19 dies, the body 
shall be interred or cremated within forty-eight hours from the time of 
death. 
6. Penalty 
Rule 11 imposes a penalty of either a fine of up to KSh20,000, imprisonment 
for a period of up to six months, or both, for contravention the measures set 
out in the above Rules. 
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The Public Health (Covid-19 Restriction of Movement of Persons and Related 
Measures) Variation Rules, No. 2 of 2020(Legal Notice 58 of 2020) was 
issued under section 36 of the PHA. It provides that transportation of 
passengers by ferries shall only take place between 5:30 o’clock in the 
morning and 6:30 o'clock in the evening and Ferry operators shall not 
engage in cargo transportation during the period. Additionally, the hygiene 
conditions under Rule 6 shall be adhered to, with the necessary 
modifications, to users of ferry services and ferry operators. 
In the same vein, rule 10 of the Public Health (Prevention, Control and 
Suppression of Covid-19) Rules, 2020(Legal Notice No.49 of 2020) defines 
the offence of escaping from isolation and quarantine. A person who 
commits the offence is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two months or a fine not exceeding twenty thousand (KShs 
20,000) shillings. 
Still under the PHA, the Cabinet Secretary of Health recently gazetted The 
Public Health (COVID-19 General Public Safety) Rules, 2020 on hygienic 
conditions for every organization, business entity or trader.15 Any person 
who commits an offence under these rules is liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding KShs 20,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
six months or both.  
                                                          
15
 Legal Notice No. 129 (14
th
 July 2020). Rule 3(2) states: “every organisation, business 
entity or trader, whether in an enclosed premises or open space, shall: 
(a) provide a hand-washing station with soap and water or an alcohol-based sanitizer 
approved by the Kenya Bureau of Standards for use at the entrance of its premises; 
(b) put in place measures to ensure that a physical distance of at least one (1) metre is 
maintained between persons accessing or within its premises; 
(c) disinfect its premises using a disinfectant approved by the Kenya Bureau of Standards at 
least three times a day; 
(d) for premises where employees operate in shifts, disinfect its premises using a 
disinfectant approved by the Kenya Bureau of Standards at the end of each shift; 
(e) screen every person entering its premises using a thermometer gun and a person whose 
body temperature exceeding 37.3°C shall not be allowed into the premises. 
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The Public Health (COVID-19 General Public Safety) Rules, 2020 generally 
prohibits public gatherings. Rule 4 of the Public Health (COVID-19 General 
Public Safety) (2020) reiterates the same position under rule 7 of the Public 
Health (Restriction of Movement of Persons and Related Measures) Rules by 
excluding funerals as prohibited public gatherings and setting the same 
conditions for conducting them. A person who contravenes rule 4 in relation 
of public gatherings commits an offence that is liable to a fine not exceeding 
KShs 20,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or 
both.  
Finally, the National Police Service Act stipulates the functions of the police 
service. None of the functions relate to public health or using excessive 
force in their exercise; there is focus on maintenance of peace, law and 
order including providing assistance to the public.16 In addition, section 87 
establishes the Internal Affairs Unit that receives and investigates 
complaints against the police all with the aim of promoting uniform 
standards of discipline and good order. Police officers that have committed 
illegal acts will be subjected to criminal proceedings. 
2.2 Policy Framework 
Various government agencies developed guidelines in response to the 
pandemic. For purposes of this article, the writers focus on the guidelines 
                                                          
16
 Section 24 provides the following roles: 
(a) provision of assistance to the public when in need; 
(b) maintenance of law and order 
(c) preservation of peace 
(d) protection of life and property 
(e) investigation of crimes 
(f) collection of criminal intelligence 
(g) prevention and detection of crime 
(h) apprehension of offenders. 
(i) Enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged; and 
(j) Performance of any other duties that may be prescribed by the Inspector-General under 
this Act or any other written law. 
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from the National Police Service (NPS). There are eleven (11) guidelines to 
commanding officers for enforcement of the nationwide curfew or other 
COVID-19 restrictions. The guidelines are hinged on article 244(c) of the 
Constitution of Kenya, which places an obligation on the NPS to comply with 
standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms in pursuit of its 
objectives. However, the NPS guidelines are silent on the use of non-violent 
means for enforcement of the COVID-19 restrictions. Guideline 7 places 
ultimate responsibility for management of the curfew on the National Police 
Service. Ancillary forces may be incorporated in curfew management with 
full knowledge of the Constitution, Police Service Standing Orders and the 
NPS principles and guidelines. That notwithstanding, the guidelines do not 
provide guidance on non-violent measures in curfew management. 
The NPS guidelines instructed officers to identify themselves as police 
officers, enforce the curfew by stopping, searching and detaining vehicles, 
individuals and premises, and to use proportionate force where non-violent 
means were inadequate. Guideline 1 provides that “the Office of the 
Inspector-General declares a zero-tolerance policy for all acts of unlawful, 
excessive and disproportionate use of force, including sexual and gender-
based violence.” As such no law enforcement operation would be conducted 
in a way that kills or seriously injures any person. The guideline further 
stresses the importance of police officers providing assistance to persons in 
need as opposed to resorting to violence. Guideline 3 specifically states that 
police officers should not use firearms, police cordons, tear gas and water 
cannons to manage public movement and compliance with curfew hours. It 
further notes that congestion, water and tears may exacerbate transmission 
of COVID-19 to large numbers of people. Instead, law enforcement officers 
should identify and communicate roads or escape routes for the crowds to 
disperse. Gender sensitivity must be maintained during rapid responses and 
crowd control operations. 
The NPS guidelines also did not provide for permissible exceptions for 
emergencies during curfew. This might include people taking themselves or 
1 7 / 2 0 2 0  
 
180 
others for medical treatment and lawyers attending to clients who are 
arrested and need assistance with bail or bond. Lastly, they did not outline 
distance conscious policing procedures to protect the public and officers 
from the further transmission of COVID-19. These gaps and the choice to 
release the guidelines on the very day of the curfew, left very little time for 
officers to internalise or to receive clarification and training on the 
guidelines. 
According to an Amnesty International report, in the first five nights of the 
curfew at least seven people were killed, sixteen hospitalised and tens hurt 
in the police operations across seven counties (Amnesty International 
2020).17 Journalists, health-workers and human rights defenders complained 
of intimidation and assaults by police officers. Four Police Officers have been 
interdicted on allegations of use of excessive and lethal force, use of teargas 
and batons. On April 1, His Excellency the President apologised for the 
excessive force that was used during the curfew. 
The NPS Guideline 2 stipulates that urgent consideration be given to the 
protection and wellbeing of police officers deployed to manage the COVID-
19 pandemic. As such, personal protective equipment must be availed and 
excessive length of duty should be prevented. All police officers are required 
to be provided with training, psychosocial support and counselling when 
needed. 
The NPS Guideline 4 also place personal criminal responsibility on police 
officers and commanding officers who engage in unlawful acts or issue 
unlawful orders in the course of duty. The role of the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority (IPOA) and Internal Affairs Unit to receive reports, 
investigate, remove and punish police officers that have engaged in unlawful 
acts. In line with this, guideline 5 and 6 require police officers and 
                                                          
17
 Amnesty International, “Human Rights-Based COVID-19 Policing Guidelines for the 
National Police Service,” 7 April 2020, <http://www.amnestykenya.org/human-rights-
based-covid-19-policing-guidelines-for-the-nps/> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
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commanding officers to inform and allow victims to file complaints, seek 
medical, legal and psychosocial support and pursue compensation, 
reparation and rehabilitation. The guidelines reaffirm that not all 
compensation for rights abuses will be borne by the state but also by 
officers that are found to be criminally liable. Further, a special team is 
established for documentation, investigation and monitoring of complaints 
against police officers that have perpetrated human rights violations against 
the public. The team has special expertise on gender-based violence, rights 
of children and persons with disabilities 
1. Health or Security issue: How Police Intervention in the COVID-19 
pandemic was Legitimised 
Generally, a pandemic such as COVID-19 should be viewed as a health issue 
that would necessitate health related interventions to contain its spread 
amongst the populace. The role of healthcare workers would be central in 
addressing the pandemic. However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
has been multifaceted, complex and beyond matters public health. The 
impact of COVID-19 has transcended economic, social, cultural and political 
spheres due to its unique preventive measures. These preventive measures 
require strict compliance for containment of the virus. The criminalization of 
breaches of COVID-19 restrictions legitimized the use of police in the 
management of these government responses. Therefore, the focus on the 
fight against the pandemic mutated into a law and order issue; the police 
were pushed to the frontline to enforce the restrictions.  
In addition to sanctioning restrictions, the law and policy guidelines 
expressly conferred on the police powers to oversee enforcement. For 
instance, the law conferred powers on the police to provide bond and bail 
for persons arrested for misdemeanour offences without reference to court 
procedures. The use of police to manage COVID-19 restrictions was 
exacerbated by the initial temporary downscale of court operations.  
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A landmark court case sought to address the issues posed in this article with 
reference to the curfew. HCCC Petition No. 120 of 2020 (Covid 025) Law 
Society of Kenya –vs- Hillary Mutyambai, Inspector General-National Police 
Service and 4 Others; Kenya National Commission for Human Rights and 3 
Others the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), Kenya National Commission for 
Human Rights (KNCHR), Kituo cha Sheria-Legal Advice Centre (KITUO)and 
Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya) joined efforts with the 
Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) in suing the Attorney-
General and the Inspector General of Police on the alleged 
unconstitutionality and illegality of the curfew order, use of police brutality 
in execution of the curfew imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
recognition of legal services as essential services.18 
The Petitioners argued that the curfew failed to comply with section 8 of the 
POA; they asserted that a curfew should have been legislated under the PHA 
as the COVID-19 pandemic was a health issue and not a security issue. The 
Petitioners argued that the curfew was unlawful as it limited the enjoyment 
of some fundamental rights and freedoms yet did not meet the elements of 
article 24 of the Constitution, did not specify the time frame for its 
execution and it could only be used to deal with crime or state of emergency 
not a health issue such as the COVID-19 pandemic.  
On the other hand, the Respondents contended that the main objective of 
the curfew order is to minimize the spread of the coronavirus and hence 
protect the lives of people which is a legitimate constitutional responsibility 
of the Government and hence in compliance with the POA. The curfew 
order was brought under the POA as complementary to the PHA.  
The COVID-19 pandemic can hence only be categorised as a public 
emergency if the Government of Kenya finds it necessary. The President has 
                                                          
18
 Kenya Law, “Petition 120 of 2020 (Covid 025),” <http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ 
view/193192/> (accessed 16 July 2020). 
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not declared an emergency arising out of the pandemic.19 The 4th interested 
party hence argued that since the President had not declared an emergency, 
then a curfew order was not necessary and limitation of rights within the 
context of a curfew could only happen within a state of emergency that was 
open to oversight by the National Assembly and the Judiciary. The parties 
further argued that there was no evidentiary support that curfew would 
contain the spread of COVID-19. Further, they challenged police harassment 
and brutality of persons undertaking essential services. The omission of legal 
services as essential services was said to be unconstitutional due to the 
importance of such services. Persons arrested during the curfew were 
barred from receiving legal representation contrary to articles 22, 23, 48, 49 
and 50 of the Constitution. 
The Court acknowledged that rights may be limited as provided in article 24 
of the Constitution of Kenya.20 The Honourable Court held that the POA was 
enacted to combat criminal activities; its main purpose was to bring law and 
order. He however noted although some statutes were multipurpose, a 
statute cannot be used for a purpose for which it was not intended. In this 
case, the Court found that POA is multipurpose and applicable to public 
                                                          
19
 Article 58 of the Constitution of Kenya empowers the as follows: 
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only under Article 132(4) (d) and only when- 
(a) the State is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster 
or other public emergency; and  
(b) the declaration is necessary to meet the circumstances for which the emergency is 
declared. 
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken 
in consequence of the declaration, shall be effective only- 
(a) prospectively; and 
(b) for not longer than fourteen days from the date of the declaration, unless the National 
Assembly resolves to extend the declaration… 
(3)  A declaration of a state of emergency, or legislation enacted or other action taken in 
consequence of any declaration, many not permit to authorise the indemnification of the 
State, or of any person, in respect of any unlawful act or omission; See also article 132 of 
the Constitution of Kenya.  
20
 Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows for limitation 
of rights in times of public emergency that threatens the life of the people. 
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health emergencies. Section 16 of the PHA allows for application of 
provisions of other relevant statutes to matters relating to health. In this 
particular case, it was necessary to supplement the PHA with the curfew 
provisions under the POA.21 
The court noted that the temporary limitation of rights was essential and 
backed in law to preserve the right to life of Kenyans. However, the manner 
of implementation of restrictive and precautionary measures was 
unconstitutional, unprocedural and illegal. Furthermore, it has been 
acknowledged by the State in this particular case that the curfew order was 
not for security purposes but for a public health purpose. Therefore, public 
health and not security measures should be utilized in the enforcement of 
any precautionary measures. 
The Honourable Court, in its dicta, indicated that the issuance of permits 
under the curfew order should hence not be the preserve of police officers 
but rather that of medical officers, local or county administrators. Further 
the restrictive measures should not be implemented through the use of 
force but rather through intensive public education and campaign on the 
coronavirus, its symptoms, preventive and protective measures so as to 
inspire behavioural and attitude change. More specifically, the Court stated: 
“…in confronting the coronavirus, which is by all means a faceless enemy, 
the police brought the law and order mentality to the fore. Diseases are not 
contained by visiting violence on members of the public. One cannot 
suppress or contain a virus by beating up people. The National Police Service 
must be held responsible and accountable for violating the rights to life and 
dignity among other rights...” 
                                                          
21
 Section 16 of the PHA provides: Provisions of the Act in relation to other Acts (1) Except 
as is specially provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be in 
addition to and not in substitution for any provisions of any other Act which are not in 
conflict or inconsistent with this Act; (2) If the provisions of any earlier Act are in conflict or 
inconsistent with this Act, the provisions of this Act shall prevail.” 
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The Court proceeded to issue a declaratory order that the unreasonable use 
of force in enforcing the Public Order (State Curfew) Order, 2020 is 
unconstitutional. Further, the Court compelled the Cabinet Secretary of 
Interior to amend the law within five days to include the Independent Police 
and Oversight Authority and members of the Law Society of Kenya (qualified 
advocates) in the list of “services, personnel or workers” exempted from the 
curfew order. The amendment of the curfew order has not been 
undertaken. However, legal services are now regarded as essential services.  
2. Conclusion and Recommendations 
An analysis of the legal framework on COVID-19 prevention and protection 
clearly shows that the State has adopted the approach of criminalisation of 
conduct that encourages the spread of the virus. In other words, compelling 
behavioural and lifestyle change of communities through deterrent criminal 
measures i.e. imposition of fines and imprisonment terms. The functions of 
law in society are broad. Other than regulation, the law has been viewed as 
an educational and stimulatory tool. While the law can legitimize the 
restrictive measures, it cannot forcefully be applied to effectively control the 
spread of the coronavirus. These preventive measures demand a paradigm 
shift in human relations, social interactions and lifestyle. Consequently, 
attaching sanctions to the restrictions is inadequate to inspire fear and 
compel change in human behavior. 
The manner of transmission of COVID-19 and its appurtenant preventive 
measures make a strictly health related response strategy inadequate and 
inefficient. The success of restrictive measures such as curfew and any 
possible future lockdown depends on collaborative, inclusive human rights-
based and distance conscious approach. Preventing COVID-19’s transmission 
requires authorities to foster trust with communities. This will ensure their 
participation and behavioural change in following sanitation and social 
distancing guidelines. The restrictive measures should also be contextualized 
and informed by the socio-economic status of people. The justiciability of 
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the restrictive measures is essential, but it should be accompanied by 
intensive public health education and awareness on the disease and 
developmental projects that enhance socio-economic status of the people. 
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Résumé: Le présent texte analyse les risques que présente le quotidien burundais 
face à la pandémie Covid 19. Se servant d’une nouvelle écrite en mars 2020, il 
démontre combien la salutation et la mise en quarantaine constituent en elles-
mêmes des façons de disséminer la maladie. En effet, la nouvelle met en scène une 
mère, brave paysanne «descendue» des collines pour serrer dans ses bras sa fille, 
religieuse de son état, qui arrive de l’étranger. Quelle n’est pas son amertume 
quand on lui empêche de saluer son enfant! Qui plus est, son fils lui recommande de 
se laver les mains! Infantilisation! Du côté des personnes mises en quarantaine (dite 
quatorzaine), la proximité fait renaître de vieux mais agréables sentiments: la 
religieuse retrouve un ancien amant, et les masques que les deux portent pendant 
leurs promenades n’empêchent pas les yeux de se parler et de renouer les sens. 
Quand l’homme meurt de Covid 19, expire dans les bras de son ex, lèvres contre 
lèvres à travers des masques. Baisers masqués. 
Mots clés: confinement, masque, salutation, quarantaine. 
 
Introduction 
Les sciences, avec leur souci d’exactitude, présentent régulièrement 
l’avancée macabre du Covid 19 dans le monde. Bénéficiant d’une étrange 
protection, le Burundi reconnaissait avoir eu jusqu’à ce 4 juillet 2020 rien 
que 109 cas dont un seul décès dû à la pandémie. Or selon ce que rapporte 
l’actualité de la recherche et des média, le virus s’en donne de plus en plus à 
cœur joie car de nouveaux foyers de dissémination se manifestent même là 
où il y a à peine un mois on le déclarait sous contrôle. Si au Burundi le drame 
n’est pas encore dramatique (encore faut-il vraiment le vérifier pour le 
croire), rien ne semble pouvoir diminuer la fragilité à laquelle le peuple 
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burundais est exposé. Nous analysons, ici, dans un empirisme littéraire1, 
quelques raisons qui nous poussent à considérer cette hypothèse comme 
pertinente. Nous nous intéresserons à la salutation et à la «mise en 
quatorzaine».  
La salutation au Burundi  
Si les Burundais disent que «amaboko ataresha ntahana amasho» pour dire 
que «seuls se saluent en s’embrassant les personnes de même rang», et que 
«bwakeye ntibubuza abankana» («se dire bonjour n’efface pas les 
inimitiés»), se saluer va toujours dans le sens de dire et agir: dire bonjour / 
bonsoir et se toucher, serrer la main. On dirait qu’une salutation ne peut 
être valide que quand on sent ce contact, cette chaleur que dégage l’autre 
corps quand on serre la main, quand on se livre à une accolade, voire 
plusieurs (surtout après un long moment de séparation)… Aujourd’hui, on 
voit les jeunes et des moins jeunes «branchés» se donner la bise (ou le 
bisou), légèrement en s’effleurant les joues l’un l’autre et se serrer la main 
après. D’autres qui se serrent entre les bras à s’étouffer… Comme quoi le 
contact corporel reste l’élément essentiel de la salutation.  
Et voilà que le Corona Virus s’en mêle! Et, naturellement, des dociles ont 
vite adopté les gestes qui sauvent, notamment le fait d’éternuer dans son 
coude. Pour ensuite adopter le «chek» de Bruce Greenstein en se saluant 
par… le coude. Mais ici, peu de personnes saisissent la vraie portée du geste. 
Un coude qui vient d’être inondé par des postillons positifs au corona virus 
ne peut-il pas contaminer ce qui le touche? Et ce fameux «chek» au coude 
se généralise, confirmant encore que se saluer au Burundi c’est se toucher. 
La sensation de l’autre contre soi semble tellement être une véritable 
richesse pour les Burundais qu’il faut un réel effort personnel pour se 
                                                          
1
 Nous offrons une lecture d’une nouvelle que nous avions écrite sur le thème du Corona 
Virus dès le mois de mars 2020, convaincus que la fiction n’est pas autre chose que la 
traduction verbale de possibles de l’expérience humaine. 
E U R O P E A N  S T U D I E S  /  S T U D I I  E U R O P E N E  
 
191 
contenter d’un salut à distance. Des personnes perçoivent le salut à distance 
comme un signe de mépris. Voire de le prendre pour un porteur de mort. 
On ne serre pas la main à un pestiféré, c’est connu. Bien entendu, une telle 
interprétation donne lieu à des malentendus, telle cette femme du passage2 
suivant qui vient accueillir sa fille religieuse qui rentre après un séjour 
quelque part dans un pays qu’elle ne connait pas, juste le jour où le pays 
prononce la mise en quarantaine de tous ceux qui rentrent de l’étranger. 
Nous voyons… 
…la vieille mère dans l’immense hall de l’aéroport illuminé par des lampes 
qu’elle ne voit pas, autant impressionnée qu’intimidée mais aussi d’une 
fierté à tout rompre. Se savoir la mère de cette jeune femme capable d’aller 
porter la Sainte Parole aux mécréants donne du poids. Un bruit étrange qui 
lui fait bondir le cœur envahit l’atmosphère et les gens se précipitent aux 
grandes baies vitrées: une sorte de gros lézard ailé blanc file à toute allure, 
là-bas, dans un grondement infernal. C’est cela donc un avion! se dit-elle. Et 
sa fille est là-dedans! Dommage, pense-t-elle encore, que je ne l’ai vraiment 
pas vu descendre du ciel. Mais elle se sent tout drôle, le cœur bat encore plus 
rapidement, ses membres ne la portent presque plus. Elle tremble. Un de ses 
fils, ayant compris combien sa mère est secouée par l’émotion, la rattrape au 
bon moment et la reconduit à sa place. Et c’est à cet instant qu’une voix 
venue de nulle part se met à vomir l’impardonnable consigne: 
- Suite à la pandémie du Corona virus, les passagers qui débarquent 
devront se tenir à l’écart de toute personne. Ils seront conduits dans 
un hôtel où ils observeront un confinement de quatorze jours. Ceux 
qui sont venus les accueillir pourront les saluer sans les toucher.  
C’est dit en langue nationale mais la vieille femme ne se sent pas concernée. 
Ça c’est pour les autres. Elle ne peut pas ne pas embrasser sa fille. Et comme 
dans un rêve, un flot de passagers sort d’un portail subitement ouvert dans 
                                                          
2
 Extrait de la nouvelle «Le baiser masqué». (Inédit) Tous les textes illustratifs ici proposés 
sont tirés de ce texte. 
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un mur à côté d’elle. Elle voit, là au fond, sa fille chérie dont le voile flamboie 
de blancheur immaculée dans la foule des arrivants. Elle lève et agite la main 
en un salut insistant. Elle s’étonne que sa fille ne répond pas. Elle croyait 
pourtant avoir rencontré son regard! S’est-il qu’elle ne me reconnait plus? se 
demande-t-elle. Mais si, la religieuse a vu sa mère mais ses bras sont chargés 
de lourdes sacoches. Quand elle arrive enfin dans le hall, la mère court à sa 
rencontre. Quelle n’est sa stupéfaction quand un homme habillé en blanc de 
pied en cap comme les démons des marais surgit de nulle part et lui barre le 
passage, en lui rappelant que sa fille ne peut pas la toucher maintenant, 
qu’elle attendra qu’elle rentre!  
- Mais, comment rentrera-t-elle autrement? Elle est là, je veux juste 
toucher un de ses doigts. Cette maladie ne peut quand-même pas 
être transmise par un seul doigt! Et puis qui vous a dit que ma fille est 
malade? Elle est tout de même consacrée à Dieu! Je suis une 
chrétienne! Dieu nous a gardés, moi et les miens jusque-là! Est-ce 
aujourd’hui qu’il nous abandonnera? 
Et dans ses lamentations, elle se rend compte que même l’extraterrestre qui 
lui barre le passage fait tout pour ne pas entrer en contact avec elle. Elle le 
sent qui  l’accusant de porteuse de Corona Virus. 
- Mais, Mana yanje (Mon Dieu!)! Tu me soupçonnes moi aussi de 
porter cette saleté? Regarde-moi. Est-ce que je ressemble à une 
malade? Est-ce que je ressemble à quelqu’un pouvant porter cette 
vilenie de blancs? 
Un de ses fils meurtri de honte de voir sa mère se conduire comme cela en 
public intervient et la reconduit dehors, laissant sa sœur derrière eux, 
tétanisée par la douleur de sa mère. La pauvre religieuse apprend qu’elle ne 
peut même pas passer ses cadeaux à sa famille… Et sa mère s’éloigne 
secouée de gros sanglots. 
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Voici donc une famille qui va être rongée de ressentiment et 
d’incompréhension suite à cette perturbation de ses habitudes de 
salutation!  
Et à la maison, imaginons cette mère encore courroucée de ne pas avoir été 
autorisée de saluer son enfant, obligée par son fils à se laver les mains: 
- En voilà encore! Et maintenant, qu’ai-je touché? Des excréments? 
Mes mains n’ont pas été jugées dignes de toucher celles de ma fille! 
Et maintenant, elles se sont salies d’elles-mêmes! Que vous ai-je donc 
fait mon fils? Tiens, regarde-les, mes mains! Sont-elles si sales pour 
m’obliger… 
- Mais, maman, l’interrompit son fils meurtri, moi aussi je me suis lavé 
les mains dès que je suis arrivé! On le répète à la radio, à la 
télévision, se laver les mains est l’une des façons d’éviter la 
contamination au Corona Virus! 
- Ah, comme je suis malheureuse, hommes de ma mère! Toi aussi, mon 
propre fils, tu me trouves sale? Est-ce moi donc que ce virus 
attaquera la première? M’a-t-on jamais vue sortir de la maison sans 
me laver? Doit-on encore m’apprendre à me laver les mains à mon 
âge? Quel mépris! Ne t’en fais pas, mon fils, je pars demain, je ne vais 
plus apporter de la saleté dans ton beau salon! 
Elle fit un gros coup de pied par terre, accompagné d’un autre de l’avant-
bras contre ses flancs et sortit de là! 
On croirait de telles incompréhensions dignes de la fière paysanne qui 
ignore les réalités du monde citadin. Et pourtant, que des fois n’entend-on 
pas des citadins justement jurer leurs grands dieux que c’est plus 
qu’absurde de se laver les mains à tout bout de champ! Qu’on ne fuit pas 
son voisin de siège dans un bus… 
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Confinés, masqués, masqués confinés 
Le Corona Virus a ressuscité des modèles de gestion de crise sanitaire qu’on 
ne connaissait plus que dans les livres: la quarantaine. Et la science a précisé 
que pour le cas qui nous concerne, la quarantaine se réduit à une 
«quatorzaine». En français, peut-être avec le doute sur la durée réelle de la 
quarantaine nécessaire pour un contrôle de la pandémie, on entendit parler 
de «confinement». Matérialiser les confins des royaumes individuels ou 
familiaux. Et chez-nous? 
Les premiers voyageurs qui arrivaient de l’étranger se virent «confinés» 
dans des hôtels. Aux frais de l’Etat? Peut-être mais nous entendions 
toujours des «mis en ‘quatorzaine’» demandant de l’argent pour subvenir à 
leurs besoins. Peu importe. Penchons-nous à leur vie en communauté de 
malheur. Confinés qu’ils étaient, avec un régime quotidien militarisé, en 
perdaient-ils autant de leurs défauts et qualités humains?  
Nous imaginons que la responsabilité de ceux qui géraient désormais et 
pour cause l’établissement de confinement était de distribuer des masques 
pour les cas où les confinés seraient obligés de sortir de leurs chambres, ne 
fût-ce que pour de petites promenades dans les jardins de l’hôtel. Or 
pendant ces promenades, il était fort possible que des regards s’accrochent, 
faisant naître ou renaître des sentiments nouveaux ou oubliés, telle une 
religieuse qui avait un copain avant de se consacrer à Dieu. Je ne mets 
nullement en doute sa détermination et sa foi en la protection de Jésus mais 
tout le monde sait que sous la robe qu’elle porte se trouve un corps de 
femme. Une femme, que dis-je, une religieuse en dehors de son couvent 
qui, comme sa longue robe, protègerait son corps des regards 
concupiscents. On n’est plus aux premiers siècles de l’Eglise où des ascètes 
et des vierges faisaient des vœux de chasteté et de pauvreté tout en restant 
dans le monde3. Non. Pour se protéger, il faut maintenant des murs hauts 
                                                          
3
 E. Jombart, Manuel de Droit Canon (Paris: Beauchesne et Fils, 1949), 163. 
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comme ceux d’une prison. Mais même dans une prison, on peut, on doit 
avoir du temps pour se promener. Et c’est lors d’une telle promenade que 
de loin, à deux mètres, elle remarque un regard qui, autrefois, faisait bondir 
son cœur. Des yeux qui lui rappellent les rares occasions de sa jeunesse où 
elle a joui pleinement de son état de femme belle et désirable. Elle avait 
tourné le dos à tout cela. Oui, mais… Et à ces deux mètres de distance, les 
yeux qui ont fait bondir le cœur de la religieuse ont le leur qui bat la 
chamade! Albert a rencontré Anésie. Plus de vingt ans de séparation. Le 
Covid 19 offre une occasion de raviver les plaisirs et déchirements de deux 
jeunes amoureux forcés de se séparer à la fin d’un cycle scolaire. Tout 
bêtement comme ça! Et que se disent-ils? Comment vivent-ils leurs 
retrouvailles dans ces circonstances pour le moins particulières? 
Si Albert avait encore l’ombre d’un doute, Anésie était sûre: ces yeux étaient 
uniques au monde. Ils s’étaient incrustés dans les siens vingt  ans plus tôt. Se 
savoir séparée de son Albert fut la principale raison de son postulat. Et 
maintenant qu’elle était missionnaire des Filles de Marthe, une congrégation 
dont l’œuvre est axée sur l’annonce de la parole chez les païens, la voilà 
confrontée à cette réalité qu’elle avait cru définitivement enterrée. Oh que 
si! Elle était définitivement enterrée, cette réalité. Mais où? En elle-même. 
Les litanies, les jeunes et les mortifications n’avaient finalement pas effacé 
ce qu’un amour jeune avait construit. Elle qui avait repoussé tant d’avances 
des prêtres, les unes plus explicites que les autres, la voici qui perdait ses 
moyens devant des yeux surmontant un masque. Elle voyait rapidement 
monter et descendre la pomme d’Adam de son vis-à-vis. Un signe qu’elle 
reconnaissait, qu’elle retrouvait. Elle fit un effort surhumain pour passer son 
chemin après avoir mentalement fait un signe de croix comme devant le 
diable ou un de ses anges de malheur. Mais une voix reconnaissable entre 
mille retentit: 
- Anésie! 
1 7 / 2 0 2 0  
 
196 
La même, avec ce trémolo de vieillard dont elle se gaussait souvent! Une 
foule de pensées l’envahit, mêlés à des souvenirs qu’elle aurait voulu perdre 
vu son statut actuel. Mais non, l’envie de lui répondre fut la plus grande: 
- Bonjour Albert! 
Les deux esquissèrent en même temps un pas pour tomber l’un dans les 
bras de l’autre. Mais un des «surveillants» de l’hôtel se manifesta comme 
par magie à quelques mètres de là. Rien qu’un pas, ils se seraient 
touchés, re-touchés, re-sentis cette chaleur qui animait autrefois leurs 
sentiments! Non! Pas permis. Tellement pas permis qu’ils devaient se 
déplacer en sens inverse: Anésie rentrait à la fin de sa promenade, Albert 
la commençait. Tous deux frustrés de leurs retrouvailles ratées, ils se 
séparèrent. Albert eut le courage de presque crier: 
- Tu es restée très belle! 
- Et toi, aussi élégant! 
- Je suis au 212. 
- Inutile, nous n’aurons plus l’occasion de nous revoir… 
Il la suivit de son regard attendri et déchiré, oubliant même qu’il était, lui, au 
2011. Au moment où il se retournait, il tomba nez-à-nez contre le surveillant 
qui riait aux éclats dans son masque. Il toucha la main d’Albert comme pour 
le consoler: 
- Patience, il ne reste que dix jours! 
L’interpellé faillit répondre: «qu’en sais-tu?» mais se tut et continua sa 
promenade. En rentrant, Albert entre dans sa chambre sans passer par le 
seau: un seau à l’eau chlorée ou alcoolisée est au début du couloir. Il néglige 
de se laver les mains, il l’a fait tant de fois, même trente minutes avant. Tout 
à ses stratégies de revoir sa bien-aimée maintenant voilée. Et quelle n’est 
pas sa surprise en entendant une voix chanter de l’autre côté du mur! 
Impossible de la confondre avec une autre. La même avec peut-être plus de 
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finesse due certainement à un entrainement intensif. Il écoute pieusement le 
cantique qu’il reconnait d’ailleurs: «j’ai trouvé un trésor sans prix». Parlait-
elle de Jésus ou de son amoureux? A une époque, ils se chantaient le 
cantique pour parler l’un de l’autre. Il ouvre la fenêtre et entend mieux. 
Comme si la religieuse l’avait senti, elle ouvre la sienne aussi. En se 
penchant, ils peuvent se voir et se parler… En concluant toujours par un 
«Imana iratubona» («Dieu nous voit [protège]»). 
Les Burundais ne l’ont-ils pas bien compris quand ils disaient que «ikiyago 
gisumba ikivi» («une bonne causerie vaut plus qu’une bonne tâche»)? Les 
deux protagonistes parlaient à longueur de journée, à longueur de nuit. Ils 
s’informaient de tout et de rien, et un jour, la religieuse informa son ami de 
la mort de leur «surveillant»!  
- Quoi? s’inquiéta Albert. De quoi est-il mort? 
- De quoi peut-on mourir ici? D’ennui? De chagrin de ne pas voir les 
siens? Non, non mon cher, du virus! Il est mort du Covid-19! 
Est-il possible de trouver des mots pour décrire les sentiments qu’éprouve 
un homme qui apprend que son voisin vient de mourir d’un mal qui le 
guette lui aussi? Certains se désolent au point de dépérir, voire de mourir 
finalement de peur, d’aucuns prennent la chose à la légère, comme si ce 
sont les autres que le mal concerne. Et ceci semble l’attitude de beaucoup 
de Burundais. Quand le monde entier criait «au confinement» les Burundais 
croyaient dur comme fer que ce virus ne pouvait les atteindre, sûrs d’être 
protégés par Dieu. Un Dieu qui n’avait pas été capable de protéger le Pape 
lui-même (rien qu’à le voir à la messe de Pâques…), pouvait-il éviter le 
Corona Virus à un aussi petit pays que le Burundi qui l’adore d’ailleurs par 
procuration? Puisque ce n’est pas le Burundi qui a choisi d’être chrétien ou 
musulman! Nous doutons. 
Albert ne pouvait passer un moment sans imaginer la meilleure possibilité de 
rejoindre la religieuse. Il avait tout essayé, avait chaque fois échoué. Même 
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son surveillant avait refusé son argent. Des euros fraichement sortis de la 
BCE! Quatre jours avant la fin de la quatorzaine, Albert commença à avoir 
des frissons. Il était dix heures, il venait de finir son petit-déjeuner. Le matin-
même, lors de sa promenade, il avait appris que son voisin d’en face s’était 
suicidé la veille. Personne ne savait s’il avait déjà été contaminé ou s’il avait 
tout simplement trouillé. Car de morts, il paraissait qu’il y en avait chaque 
jour. Mais les confinés n’en savaient rien. Les nouvelles venaient du dehors 
et traversaient jardins et murs avec la dose nécessaire de parasites! Le filtre 
de la radio ne fonctionnait pas car personne ne reconnaissait l’existence 
inquiétante de ce fléau mondial. Non, le Burundi, ble-ble-ble, ble-ble-ble; bla-
bla-bla, bla-bla-bla… 
Trois jours avant la fin! Albert se sent de plus en plus faible. Très haute 
température malgré ses frissons. Difficultés à respirer. Il n’a même pas senti 
l’odeur de son petit déjeuner qu’on a glissé sous la porte. Alors qu’hier 
encore, il le sentait de la douche. Il se lève difficilement, se penche à la 
fenêtre et appelle son amie. Elle accourt vite. A son «je me sens mal», elle 
sent ses propres forces la quitter. Elle entend ses lamentations où revient le 
mot «baiser», «juste un baiseeeer». 
La religieuse tambourine sur sa porte. Il faut appeler quelqu’un. Et 
effectivement quelqu’un vient et ouvre sa chambre-cellule. 
- C’est pour mon voisin d’à côté. Il se meurt. 
Mais le surveillant qui ne l’avait jamais vue sans ses atours de religieuse 
n’entend rien et reste sans voix devant cette déesse. Autrement, il aurait 
certainement pris son temps pour lui demander comment elle le savait et la 
sermonner sur les consignes de ne pas se parler entre co-confinés! La déesse 
est obligée de crier, en enfilant sa robe et agrafant son voile: 
- Il se meurt! Aidez-le! Allez appeler un médecin. 
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Le pauvre homme sort en courant, suivi d’Anésie et convaincu que Dieu qui 
les crée sait s’offrir les meilleures. Il oublie les instructions et donne ses clés à 
la religieuse: ce virus, si insolent soit-il, ne s’attaquerait pas à elle, tout de 
même. 
Le mourant voit sa bien-aimée dans toute sa splendeur et réclame toujours, 
entre deux suffocations, un baiser. «Rien que cela?, pense la religieuse, je te 
donnerais même plus, j’ai toujours été à toi». Elle va se pencher et, très vite, 
se rend compte qu’elle ne porte pas son masque. Elle rebrousse chemin, 
court dans sa chambre pour en mettre un et revient. Le médecin la trouve sa 
bouche masquée collée sur celle d’un homme mort, mort masqué, 
soigneusement enroulé dans ses couvertures. Il se dit que ce satané virus a 
encore des candidats à emporter. 
Ainsi finit cette histoire qui replace le Burundais face à ce terrible destin 
dessiné par le Corona Virus. Si on y ajoute les convictions de cabaret et de 
réseaux sociaux selon lesquels Covid-19 est une fabrication des laboratoires 
tantôt américains, tantôt chinois; le fait que ce que l’œil ne voit pas ne peut 
nuire à moins que ce ne soit un esprit démoniaque, la liste des scénarii de 
fragilité de notre pays sera complète. 
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